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Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices:






In Greenburgh, New York, Paul Solomon, once a popular sixth-grade
teacher, faces possible dismissal for his role in the "Fatal Attraction" case
involving the shooting death of his wife, Betty Jeanne Solomon. Mr.
Solomon, who was granted immunity from prosecution, admitted in open court
to having numerous extramarital affairs, including an affair with a fellow
teacher, Carolyn Warmus. She is currently facing a second trial after a hung
jury in her first trial for the killing of Mrs. Solomon. Leon Leighton, an 88-
year-old lawyer who has lived in the community for 47 years, has sent a letter
to 100 citizens asking them to press the school board for Solomon's dismissal.
Leighton is quoted in the New York Times to have said that "what he has done
is immoral" and returning Solomon to the classroom would be "an unforgiv-
able outrage to the integrity of our school system and a body blow to our
property values."' Others have echoed similar concerns with Solomon's
ability to function as a role model for students.2
* Professor of Labor and Industrial Relations, College of Business Administration
and Adjunct Professor of Law, College of Law, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb,
Illinois. J.D. & Ph.D., University of Iowa. A member of the National Academy of
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Hill has co-authored (with Anthony V. Sinicropi) three books: Management Rights:
A Legal and Arbitral Analysis (BNA, 1986), Remedies in Arbitration (BNA, 1991),
and Evidence in Arbitration (BNA, 1987).
** J.D., (candidate) College of Law, Northern Illinois University.
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The authors wish to thank James Wright, an associate in the law firm of
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1. Some Ask if Husband in Love-Triangle Case Is Fit to Teach, N.Y. TIMES,
August 17, 1991, § 1, at 23, Col. 2.
2. Nadine Brozan,A Post-Trial Question: ShouldAdulterer Teach?, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 17, 1991, at 23. In September, 1991, Paul Solomon was denied classroom duties
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What should the board of education do? Even more interesting, what can
the board do in response to the citizens' desiring to terminate the contract of
Mr. Solomon? Would it be constitutional for Paul Solomon to be held to a
higher standard of behavior than other employees of the district (the janitor,
for example)? To what extent can private and public-sector employers
regulate or control, under threat of discipline or discharge, an employee's
personal off-duty lifestyle? Can management withhold a benefit or promotion
because of the employee's unhealthy or bizarre lifestyle? Aside from the
educational environment, examples where both private- and public-sector
management concerns itself with the employee's lifestyle, or the results of that
lifestyle, are numerous:
In the air, American Airlines, similar to United, Delta, and Continental,
promulgated weight standards for flight attendants. American, like most
airlines, does not want "fat" flight attendants. Those who do not tip the scales
at the right numbers according to height and weight tables are placed on leave.
If weight is not made within a designated period, dismissal follows. 3 In
Cranston, Rhode Island a hospital attendant is refused employment with her
former employer, the State of Rhode Island, because at 315 pounds she is
considered fat. Management believes that its workers' compensation costs
might rise if it rehired her.4
A bus driver, who received extensive publicity for his off-duty activities
as Acting Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, is discharged for his "political"
activities. Management rejects outright the employee's constitutional
arguments relating to free speech and association.
5
The Omaha Girls Club dismisses an unmarried staff member because she
conceived a child out of wedlock. According to management, her condition
made her a negative role model to the children and, thus, unsuitable for
continued employment.
6
Concluding that management had to take steps to help contain medical
costs and that "there are certain lifestyle decisions that we are just not going
to assure the results of,"7 the Circle K Corporation, the nation's second-
although he still draws full pay. Warmus, free on $250,000 bond, faces an additional
charge of having forged a defense exhibit in the first trial.
3. In The Air, A New Battle Over Weight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1990, at A-12.
4. The Providence chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
Lynette Labinger, of counsel, has filed a lawsuit against the State of Rhode Island in
The United States District Court of Rhode Island. See Cook v. State of Rhode Island,
Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, C.A. No. 90-0560-T (D. R.I. 1991).
5. Baltimore Transit Co., 47 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 62 (1966) (Duff, Arb.).
6. Chambers'v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
7. Kenneth B. Noble, Company Halting Health Plan On Some "Life Style"
Illnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1988, at Al.
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largest convenience store chain, announced that it would terminate the medical
coverage of "employees who become sick or injured as a result of AIDS,
alcohol, drug abuse or self-inflicted wounds."8
The Walt Disney Company, in the midst of hiring some 12,000
employees to maintain and populate its Euro Disneyland theme park in Mame-
la-Vallee, 20 miles east of Paris, has spelled out a dress and appearance code
that goes beyond height and weight requirements. The rules mandate strict
guidelines on the length of men's hair, and prohibit facial hair and the display
of tatoos. Women's hair must be one natural color, and women can use only
limited amounts of makeup. Further, the length of women's fingernails is
restricted and false eyelashes and other eye makeup is completely disallowed:
As for jewelry, women can wear only one earring in each ear with the
earring's diameter no more than 2 centimeters.... Neither men nor
women can wear more than one ring on each hand.
Further, women are required to wear "appropriate undergarments" and
only transparent pantyhose, not black or anything with fancy designs.
9
Although a daily bath is not mentioned in the rules, employees are
expected to appear for work "fresh and clean."' ° Similar rules are in force
at Disney's three other theme parks. The French Government has lodged a
formal complaint against Disney."
An executive is dismissed because he was accompanied by someone other
than his spouse at a convention. The executive argues that nothing less than
a public policy is at issue and that management should not be allowed to
effect a dismissal simply because his lifestyle is different than that of his
superiors.'"
Other examples include the Turner Broadcasting System, who will not
consider an employee for employment if he is a smoker. 3  At U-Haul
International, workers who smoke or are underweight or overweight pay for
their health insurance.
8. Id.
9. A Disney Dress Code Chafes in the Land of Haute Couture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
25, 1991, at Al.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Staats v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp 118 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(upholding dismissal and rejecting public policy argument).
13. J. Ellison, Busybodies: New Puritans, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 20; cf
Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987). Grusendorf is
discussed at infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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A. Focus of Article
Is there a remedy at law for any of these employees, including the Mr.
Solomons of the world, if management elects to effect a dismissal because the
employee does not fit in the company's procrustean bed? 4 What are the
limits of management's power to regulate the individual lifestyles of
employees, even when those lifestyles have little or no relation to the job in
question? Are the rules different for public-sector employers where constitu-
tional standards are operative? If the employee is covered under a collective
bargaining agreement and has access to the grievance-arbitration procedure,
what are his chances of a successful challenge in the arbitration forum? When
is arbitration an effective remedy? Will an arbitrator, deciding a case in the
public sector, accord more deference to management than he would to a
private-sector company because of the applicability of the constitution to
public employees?
This Article will review case law, both in the private and public sector,
dealing with employer attempts to regulate the personal lifestyles of
employees.' Remedies under common law and federal statutes will be
reviewed with a special focus on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,16
14. After Procrustes, a Greek giant who stretched or shortened his captives to fit
one of his iron beds.
15. Lifestyle n. Also life-style, life style. "An internally consistent way of life or
style of living that reflects the attitudes and values of an individual or a culture."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 452 (3d ed. 1979).
"The consistent, integrated way of life of an individual as typified by his manner,
attitudes, possessions, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 398 (2d ed. 1986)
(which lists it as two words).
As used in this Article, "lifestyle" refers to all areas in life where an employee
could expect that an employer would not interfere, such as sexual practices and
identity, credit and financial references, off-duty drug or alcohol use, and religious
practices. Other areas include medical infirmities, grooming and dress requirements,
speech, and political and personal associations, all of which can impact or reflect the
individual's way of life. In limiting most of the analysis the these areas we do not
suggest that there are not other facets of lifestyle that may impact an employment
decision. We confess to some sins of commission (for example, a one-time drug
conviction, sometimes sufficient for dismissal from employment, may not reflect an
employee's lifestyle) and omission (we left out the parts that people would skipl). As
our editors know, this Article is already longer than promised and limiting a discussion
of lifestyle to these areas will not alter our analysis or conclusions.
Cf "If they asked, I could write a book." I could write a book from PAL JOEY,
music by RIcHARD ROGERS, lyrics by LORENZ HART
(A book published by the Bureau of National Affairs is expected by January,
1993).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
[Vol. 57
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as amended, and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.17 Constitutional
limitations on public employers are discussed in the analysis. Our investiga-
tion also includes a review of published and unpublished private and public-
sector arbitration decisions in those cases where management's employment
decisions are challenged under a just cause standard through the grievance-
arbitration procedure.'" A synthesis and policy analysis follows with
guidelines recommending when employer interference with employee lifestyle
is appropriate. Our thesis is that absent a nexus between the employee's off-
duty conduct or lifestyle and his on-the-job performance, or a significant
showing that the employee's conduct affects the employer's product or
reputation, any inquiry or regulation impacting off-duty conduct or lifestyles
should be prohibited. Some kind of presumption should operate, both in the
judicial and the arbitral forum, in favor of the employee when management
effects discipline because of off-duty conduct. While at common law no
nexus between the conduct complained of and a private-sector employee's job
need be shown, it is difficult to justify affording some protection from
arbitrary dismissal to public-sector employees and individuals covered under
collective bargaining agreements while in most cases denying any protection
to common-law "at-will" employees. Accordingly, a secondary thesis is that
the common-law employment-at-will rule ought to be scrapped in favor of a
minimal just cause standard when employees are dismissed.
II. EMPLOYERS AND WORKERS AT COMMON LAW
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, employers effectively had
total discretion in directing all phases of their business without regard to
considerations of fairness to employees. Under an 1877 legal principle, the
employer-employee relationship was "at will," meaning that employment could
be terminated at the will of either party for a good reason,". a bad reason, or
17. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1991).
18. Some challenges to regulations regarding an employee's lifestyle, such as a
regulation involving an employee's grooming, weight or his sexual preference, may be
cognizable under the Constitution, a federal or state fair employment or rehabilitation
statute, and arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. When expedient, such
restrictions are discussed in more than one section. In general, specific restrictions will
be addressed in those sections where most of the litigation has occurred or, alternative-
ly, where management's limitations are severely restricted.
19. The term "good cause" is "largely relative in [its] connotation
depending upon the particular circumstances of each case."...
"Essentially [it] connotes a fair and honest cause or reason,
regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the
power." . . . The employer does not have a right to make an
arbitrary or unreasonable decision about terminating an employee
5
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even for no reason without intervention from the courts.2" As a practical
matter, however, the at-will principle meant that the terms and conditions of
the employment relationship existed solely at the will of the employer because
few employees possessed the bargaining power to compel the employer to
enter into a true contract of employment for a specific duration or to otherwise
treat employees fairly.
Today, with the passage of protective labor legislation, particularly Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the
presence of unions and collective bargaining with labor arbitration available
to most employees covered under a collective bargaining agreement, the at-
will doctrine has been significantly modified. This section examines the
common law at-will rule and the most significant development in the entire
field of labor and employment law in the last decade-the growing willing-
ness of courts to modify the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will when
management's action is determined violative of some public policy.
Unfortunately for the employee with an unhealthy or unconventional lifestyle,
judge-made exceptions do not leave a large window for an employee's job
rights.
when there is an agreement to terminate only for good cause. In
deciding whether the employee's termination was for "a fair and
honest cause or reason regulated by the good faith of the
employer," the trier of fact does scrutinize the employer's
business judgment and determines whether the discharge was
justified under all the circumstances. If the reasons advanced by
the employer for the discharge are trivial, capricious, unrelated
to business needs or goals, or pretextual, the finder of fact may
properly find that the stated reason for termination was not "a
fair and honest cause or reason" regulated by good faith. The
employer does not have an unfettered right to exercise discretion
in the guise of business judgment.
Wood v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 5 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 263, 267 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (quoting Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., [Pugh II] 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 769-
70 (1988)).
With respect to declarations by arbitrators, see infra note 469 and accompanying
text.
20. For an in-depth treatment of the common law at-will rule, see Marvin Hill,
Jr., Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees from Unjust Dismissal: A
Statutory Proposal, 3 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 111 (1982).
[Vol. 57
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A. Review of the Common Law At-Will Rule Regarding a
Private-Sector Employer's Power to Designate the "Right Kind"
of Employee Management Desires
Stieber reports that approximately 60 million U.S. employees are subject
to the employment-at-will doctrine, and approximately 2 million of them are
terminated each year without the right to a hearing before an administrative
agency or an arbitrator. Further, about 150,000 of these employees would
have been found to have been discharged without just cause and reinstated to
their former positions had they been accorded a hearing."1 St. Antoine
argues that the most significant development in the entire labor law field
during the past decade is the growing willingness of state courts to modify the
traditional employment-at-will rule.2 Using tort or contract theory, judges
have overturned the traditional at-will rule and have placed significant
limitations on management's right to dismiss employees at will. Some of the
theories applied by the courts are arguably applicable to the employee with an
unconventional lifestyle, and for this reason it is instructive to review recent
developments in employment at will.
1. Judicial Limitations: A Primer of Exceptions
to the At-Will Rule at Common Law
Judicial limitations to the employment at-will rule may generally be
categorized into three major divisions: (a) public policy (the most widely
applied exception); (b) "whistle-blowing;" and (c) "malice and bad faith"
exceptions. While there is admittedly overlap between and within the
categories of cases in these divisions, it is useful to examine leading cases
within these categories.
a. Public Policy Exceptions
A theory adopted by courts in those states that limit the employment-at-
will rule is that employers should not be permitted to discipline or discharge
employees for reasons violative of an established "public policy."23 A rule
21. Jack Sticber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 1985 SPRING MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION
(IRRA) 557 (1985).
22. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Revision of Employment-At-Will Enters a New
Phase, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1985 SPRING MEETING, IRRA 563 (1985).
23. In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (IlL. 1981)
(discussed infra note 38 and accompanying text), the court, addressing the issue of
public policy, stated as follows:
1992]
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to the contrary would mean that public policy could easily be defeated by the
threat of retaliatory conduct on the part of employers. Public policy cases fall
into four categories: (1) refusal to violate a criminal statute; (2) exercising a
statutory right; (3) complying with a statutory duty; and (4) adhering to
professional codes of ethics. The courts, applying a public policy analysis,
have accorded little relief to employees terminated because of a particular
lifestyle.
(1). Discharge for Refusing to Violate a Criminal Law
The leading case in this category is Petermann v. Teamsters Local
39 6 .
24 In that case, a union business agent was discharged for refusing to
commit perjury for his employer (a labor union). In ruling for the employee,
the California Court of Appeals stated that "the right to discharge an employee
under such a contract may be limited by statute ... or by considerations of
public policy."25 In another often-cited case, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.,' the Supreme Court of California found a cause of action in tort for an
employee who was discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal price-
There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that
public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens
of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and
statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions. Although there
is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters purely personal ... a
survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory discharges shows that
a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities before the tort will be allowed.
Id. at 878-79 (citation omitted).
In Lucas v. Brown & Root, 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984), the court of appeals
defined public policy this way:
Public policy is usually defined by the political branches of government.
Something "against public policy" is something that the Legislature has
forbidden. But the Legislature is not the only source of such policy. In
common-law jurisdictions the courts too have been sources of law, always
subject to legislative correction, and with progressively less freedom as
legislation occupies a given field. It is the courts, to give one example, that
originated the whole doctrine that certain kinds of businesses-common
carriers and innkeepers-must serve the public without discrimination or
preference. In this sense,then, courts make law and they have done so for
centuries.
Id. at 1205.
24. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
25. Id. at 27.
26. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
[Vol. 57
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fixing scheme. In so holding, the court declared that "an employer's authority
over its employees does not include the right to demand that the employee
commit a criminal act to further its interests and an employer may not coerce
compliance with such unlawful directions by discharging an employee who
refuses to follow such an order."27
(2). Discharge for Exercising a Statutory Right
While recognizing that generally "an employee at will may be discharged
without cause," in 1973 the Indiana Supreme Court, in Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co.,28 carved out an exception to the at-will doctrine for employees
discharged for exercising a statutorily conferred right to receive a workman's
compensation award. The Indiana court reasoned that it would be against
public policy to prohibit a cause of action because the language of the Indiana
compensation statute prohibited any "device" to circumvent the employer's
liability. The court stated that the statute created a duty in the employer to
compensate employees for work-related injuries and a right in the employee
to receive such compensation, and in order for the goals of the act to be
realized and for public policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to
exercise his right without being subject to management reprisal.29
27. Id. at 1336-37. The public-policy exception was further defined in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988), where an employee was dismissed
after reporting to his employer that his newly-hired supervisor was currently under
investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his supervisor's former employer.
The court found that his conduct did not implicate basic public policy because the
employee disclosed information only to his employer that did not serve any public
interest. Id at 380. The Foley court also held that there is no remedy in tort for a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment
contract.
Id. at 396-96.
See also Kessler v. Equity Management Inc., 572 A.2d 1144 (Md. Ct. App. 1990)
(finding cause of action for employee who refused supervisor's orders to enter
apartment while tenant was absent to snoop through papers for information that
landlord could use to collect past rent); Sargent v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust, 809
P.2d 1298 (Okla. 1991) (auditor discharged for refusal to destroy audit report that was
possible evidence in shareholders' suit against bank stated tort claim for wrongful
discharge).
28. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
29. Id. at 427. While some states have passed specific legislation prohibiting
discharge of employees for filing workmen's compensation claims; see, e.g., Peabody
Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981), others have not and, accordingly,
several courts since the Frampton decision have had to address the issue. See, e.g.,
Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Kelsay v. Motorola,
1992]
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(3). Discharge for Complying with a Statutory Duty
In the leading case in this area, Nees v. Hocks,0 the Supreme Court of
Oregon held that an at-will employee may recover in tort for wrongful
discharge when complying with statutory jury duty to sit on a jury, reasoning
that the legislature and the courts regard the jury system high on the scale of
American institutions and citizen obligations. It follows that if an employer
were permitted with impunity to discharge an employee for fulfilling jury duty
obligations, the jury system would be adversely affected.
(4). Discharge for Adhering to Professional Codes of Ethics
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,32 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey considered whether a cause of action existed for an at-will physician
and research scientist who was dismissed for refusing to continue a project she
considered medically unethical (she opposed continued laboratory research,
development, and testing of a drug containing saccharin, which Ortho intended
to market for the treatment of diarrhea). What is interesting in this case is the
court's focus on the special considerations arising out of the right to fire an
at-will employee who is a member of a recognized profession. As stated by
the court:
Employees who are professionals owe a special duty to abide not only by
federal and state law, but also by the recognized codes of ethics of their
professions. That duty may oblige them to decline to perform acts required
by their employers. However, an employee should not have the right to
prevent his or her employer from pursuing its business because the
employee perceives that a particular business decision violates the
employee's personal morals, as distinguished from the recognized code of
ethics of the employee's profession. 3
Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, (Ill. 1971). Generally, those courts recognizing a cause of action
have relied on the clear mandate of the law encouraging employees who sustain on-
the-job injuries to seek disability benefits. Courts refusing to grant employees a cause
of action under this type of claim insist that the legislature is best suited to create a
new cause of action. Absent express legislative intent, these courts are reluctant to
imply a cause of action for a retaliatory discharge. See Dockery v. Lampart Table Co.,
244 S.E.2d 272 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
30. 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
31. Id. at 516.
32. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
33. Id. at 512.
[Vol. 57
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While the court made it clear that a cause of action would lie where the
discharge is contrary to a clearly mandated public policy, it cautioned that not
all professional codes of ethics express such public policy. 4  Absent
legislation, and as indicated by the court, the judiciary must define the cause
of action in a case-by-case determination.35
b. Whistle-Blower Exception
Related to the public policy exception are disciplinary measures triggered
by an employee's reporting of allegedly unlawful conduct. In some cases the
employee may report a supervisor's conduct to upper management; in other
cases the employee may report the company's activities to a governmental
authority. Whistle blower cases are factually similar: (1) the employee objects
to work or conduct that the employee believes violates state or federal law; (2)
the employee expresses his intention not to perform the requested work or
34. Id. at 512.
35. Id. at 512. Pierce was followed by Warthen v. Toms. River Community
Memorial Hosp., 488 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). In that case a
registered nurse employed in a hospital's kidney dialysis unit was assigned to dialyze
a double amputee patient who suffered from a number ofmaladies. On two occasions
she had to cease treatment because the'patient suffered cardiac arrest and severe
internal hemorrhaging during the dialysis procedure. When she was again scheduled
to dialyze this patient, she informed management that "she had moral, medical, and
philosophical objections" to performing this procedure because the patient was
terminally ill and, according to the nurse, it was causing the patient additional
complications. Her request for reassignnient was initially granted but, approximately
eight months later, she was again assigned to dialyze the patient. Once again she
objected to the head nurse who told her that if she continued to refuse to dialyze the
patient, she would be dismissed.
On a retrial, the court concluded that the nurses' code of ethics is a personal
moral judgment and does not rise to a public policy. The court reasoned that
"identifying the mandate of public policy is a question of law, analogous to
interpreting a statute or defining a duty in a negligence case" and that the burden is on
the employee "to identify a 'specific expression' or 'a clear mandate' of public policy
which might bar his or her dismissal." Id. at 232-33. The court accordingly held that
the considerations cited by the nurse involving her own personal morals did not rise
to the level of a public policy mandate.
Id. at 233-35; see also Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1979), where the court rejected a nurse's contention that a cause of action should
be allowed for a wrongful dismissal for refusing management's order to reduce the
overtime assignments of her staff since she felt that the reduction of overtime would
jeopardize the health of the patients. Id. at 514-15. The court pointed out that a
statute containing general principles pertaining to the licensing of nurses did not create
a cause of action. Id. at 515-16.
11
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engages in "self-help" activity outside the work place to halt the work (often
by going to the media); and (3) the employee is dismissed.
The courts have had little trouble in affording a cause of action in tort to
an employee who is urged by his or her employer to violate a criminal or civil
statute as part of a company pattern or practice. The more difficult situation
involves those cases where an employee reports conduct that the employee
feels is illegal or, because of professional considerations, unethical.
For example, the Supreme Court of West Virginia, in Harless v. First
National Bank in Fairmont,36 considered whether an employee who was
discharged in retaliation for his efforts to require his employer to comply with
a state consumer credit and protection statute stated a cause of action in tort.
Finding that the legislature intended to establish a policy protecting credit
consumers, the court ruled that this "policy should not be frustrated by a
holding that an employee of a lending institution covered by the Act who
seeks to ensure that compliance is being made with the Act, can be discharged
without being furnished a cause of action for such discharge. 37
A similar result was reached by the Illinois Supreme Court in Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co.,38 where the court found a cause of action in
tort for an employee who was discharged for supplying local law enforcement
agencies information indicating that a fellow employee might be violating
criminal statutes. Reasoning that public policy favors the exposure of crime
by citizens possessing knowledge of criminal activity, the court concluded that
"[p]ersons acting in good faith who have probable cause to believe crimes
have been committed should not be deterred from reporting them by the fear
of unfounded suits by those accused. 39
With few exceptions, before a court will allow a cause of action for
"whistle blowing," the conduct complained of must be clearly illegal. The
burden to show illegality is on the employee. A possibility of criminal
activity will be insufficient to protect the employee who goes to the authorities.40
36. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
37. Id. at 276.
38. 421 N.E.2d 876 (II. 1981).
39. Id. at 880 (citing Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229 (II1.
1980)).
40. A review of the cases in the whistle-blower area indicates that, in finding a
cause of action, the courts undertake a balancing of the competing interests at issue.
The employer's interest is to be permitted to efficiently operate a business; the
employee's interest is security in earning a livelihood. At the same time, the judiciary
has recognized that society has an interest in making sure that its civil and criminal
statutes are not violated. Accordingly, where the conduct complained of by a whistle
blower clearly violates a criminal or civil statute, courts have little difficulty finding
a cause of action in tort for a retaliatory discharge. These situations involve conduct
that the legislature has clearly seen fit to address. Courts reason that to refuse a cause
[Vol. 57
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c. Malice and Bad Faith Exception
The malice and bad faith exception operates in tandem with that of public
policy. It is this exception which provides the employee with a disapproved
lifestyle with the greatest opportunity for relief.
The predominant case in this area is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.41 In
that case a married woman was discharged by her foreman because of her
refusal to go out on a date with him. 42 The New Hampshire Court held the
discharge malicious and unlawful and concluded that a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment which is motivated by bad faith or
malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic
system or the public good.43 In Lucas Brown & Root, Inc.,44 an employee
was dismissed when she refused to sleep with her supervisor.45 Although the
time for filing a sexual harassment claim had run out under Title VII, the
Eighth Circuit reasoned that the decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court
established the proposition that there are exceptions to the at-will rule that
come into play when the bases for the discharge are so extreme and
of action would effectively permit an employer, to increase his chances of escaping
liability for violating civil or criminal statutes. It is difficult to rationalize any public
policy that would be served in the case where an employer is allowed to dismiss an
employee for acting as a "private attorney general," at least in those instances where
a court determines that the employee's allegations are correct.
A more interesting and difficult problem arises in the case where an employee
reasonably, but incorrectly, concludes that his employer's conduct is illegal. Even
though the disclosure is motivated by a good faith belief that the conduct was illegal,
few courts will allow a cause of action for the so-called "good faith" whistle blower.
There should be no difficulty in refusing a cause of action to an employee who, for
vexatious reasons, falsely accuses his employer of violating statutes. No policy is
served by affording protection in this case; indeed, an employer would likely have a
cause of action in tort against such an employee.
It is of note that some states have passed legislation which prohibits employer
reprisals or disciplinary action against an employee who reports to a public body an
employer's violation or suspected violation of any federal, state, or municipal law or
regulation. See, e.g., Parten v. Consolidated Freightways, 923 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1991)
(citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932(c) (1990) making it illegal for employer to
discharge because "(c) the employee refuses to participate in any activity that the
employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation
adopted pursuant to law.").
41. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
42. Id. at 550.
43. Id. at 551.
44. 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 1203.
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outrageous as to render the discharge tortious for intentional infliction of
emotional distress."6 According to the court, "a woman invited to trade
herself for a job is in effect being asked to become a prostitute," and
"[p]laintiff should not be penalized for refusing to do what the law forbids."4 7
The court, citing the decision in Tameny, declared that "it is an implied term
of every employment contract that neither party be required to do what the
law forbids," and that if the plaintiff can prove that she was dismissed for
refusing to sleep with her foreman, and that her employer was responsible for
it, she can recover damages for breach of contract."
Underlying the malice and bad faith exception is the principle that an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (often termed an "implied-in-
law contract") exists. The principle essentially holds that in every contract
there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will
have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive
the fruits of the agreement. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.49 a California
appellate court found that an employee made out a prima facie case of
wrongful termination in violation of an implied promise by the employer that
it would not act arbitrarily in dealing with the employee.50 The court stated
that "[iln determining whether there exists an implied-in-fact promise for some
form of continued employment ... a variety of factors in addition to the
existence of independent consideration" are relevant to such a finding. 51
These include "the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the
employee's longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer
reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the
industry in which the employee is engaged."5 2 Given Pugh's 32 years of
employment, the commendations and promotions he received, the apparent
absence of any criticism of his work, the assurances he was given "that if you
are loyal to [See's] and do a good job, your future is secure," and the
employer's acknowledged policies that administrative personnel would not be
terminated except for good cause, the court had little trouble in concluding
that there were facts in evidence from which a jury could determine an
implied promise of fair dealing with the employee.53
46. Id. at 1204-05.
47. Id. at 1205.
48. Id. at 1205 (citing Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335
(Cal. 1980)).
49. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
50. Id. at 927.
51. Id. at 925.
52. Id. at 925-26.
53. Id. at 927.
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Most courts have adhered to the common law and have not adopted a
general requirement of good faith and fair dealing where employment
contracts are of indefinite duration.54 Moreover, even in the select jurisdic-
tions that have ruled that employment contracts are subject to an implied
covenant that the parties carry out their obligations in good faith,55 courts
have declined the invitation to transform the requirement of good faith into an
implied-in-fact condition that an employee may be discharged only for good
cause. Sometimes an employee handbook can modify an at-will relation-
ship, but absent this situation the employee is left with little recourse at
common law, especially where the employer issues disclaimers in the
employment application or handbook.
5 7
2. Judicial Limitations: Lifestyle Cases
A review of court decisions in lifestyle cases reveals that employees have
limited opportunity under common law to challenge the restrictions imposed
by employers regarding the kind of employee management desires. Indeed,
at common law no nexus between the conduct complained of and the
employee's job need be shown, although in selected cases courts, substituting
their views for those of management, have ruled in favor of employees. Four
areas of recurring interest involve (a) association, (b) health, (c) sexual
propriety and privacy, and (d) speech.
54. See HEW-LENv. F.W. Woolworth, 737 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Haw. 1990); Fogel
v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451, 453 (Iowa 1989) (noting that "[t]he
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the covenant have unequivocally rejected
it [covenant of good faith and fair dealing]."); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24
(Okla. 1989); Brehany v. Nordstrom Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991) ("The
covenant of good faith.., cannot be construed to change an indefinite term, at-will
employment contract into a contract that requires an employer to have good cause to
justify a discharge.").
55. See, e.g., the discussion of the court in Western States Minerals Corp. v.
Jones, 807 P.2d 1392 (Nev. 1991); see also Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,
768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) (stating that at-will employment contracts in Alaska
contain an implied covenant of good faith fair dealing).
56. See, e.g., Vaske v. DuCharme, McMillen & Assoc., 757 F. Supp. 1158 (D.
Colo. 1990) (holding that employment manual that contains non-inclusive list of
actions that constitute "cause" for which employees may be dismissed may form
implied just-cause standard); Shumaker v. Frito-Lay, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA)
155 (D.C.N.D. 1991); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Tr. 505 N.E.2d 314,
318 (Ill. 1987) ("[A]n employee handbook or other policy statement creates
enforceable contractual rights if the traditional requirements for contract formation are
present.").
57. Suter v. Harsco Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1991).
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a. Association
A major consideration in the association area is whether at common law
a private-sector employer can dismiss an employee because of his membership
in an organization that the company finds distasteful or because of the
employee's association with employees of competitors. 58 Reflective of the
majority view, the Fourth Circuit, in Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc.,59 ruled
that a private-sector employee's right of association is not protected and that
he may be discharged based on the fact "that he belongs to an obnoxious
organization, ' 6° in this case the Ku Klux Klan. Holding that the complaint
states no cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Ace the court
declined to rule on the question whether "religious pomp and ceremony" is
enough to make the Klan a religion for purpose of Title VII.62
In Rulon-Miller v. IBM,63 an association case with wide implications (at
least in those limited situations where management has issued some declara-
tion regarding the privacy rights of its employees), a California state court
sustained a $300,000 ($100,000 compensatory and $200,000 punitive) jury
verdict in favor of an employee dismissed for dating a competitor's employ-
ee. The court found that IBM's declarations that employees have a right
to privacy and the right to hold a job even though off-the-job behavior might
not be approved by management resulted in a cause of action for wrongful
termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' According to
the court, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing embraces a number of
rights, including the right of an employee to the benefit of rules and
regulations adopted for her protection and the requirement that like cases be
treated alike.6
How arbitrary can a private-sector employer be in dismissing or failing
to hire an employee because of conduct that has no bearing on the job at
issue? Does Bellamy, reflecting the majority view in at-will cases, stand for
the proposition that management can exclude an individual from employment
58. Other types of associations often of interest to management-the sexual
partners of employees-is discussed infra notes 85-87 & 397-419 and accompanying
text.
59. 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
60. Id. at 505.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), discussed infra notes 117-34 and accompanying
text.
62. Bellamy, 508 F.2d at 505.
63. 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. 1984).
64. Id. at 530.
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because that person is a member of a Green Bay Packer fan club (an
understandable decision to those employers in Chicago but arguably disturbing
elsewhere)? Absent state action, we see no legal infirmity in dismissing a
complaint by an at-will employee that he was terminated or not hired because
of his preference in football teams or even for race, as one court has held.6
There may be little or no basis in fact for management's decision, and it may
even be irrational and capricious, but excluding individuals from employment
because of their associations or even their race, sex6g, or national origins
has not been recognized as a public-policy exception to the at-wil rule.
Unless the dismissal violates a clearly-stated public policy, the employee,
unlike his public-sector counterpart, has little recourse to rectify an irrational
decision. If the employee has any recourse, it is under a specific intent to
harm theory,7 ' or a theory that the information requested or acted upon
constitutes an "unreasonable, substantial, or serious interference with [the
employee's] privacy. '
67. See Eklofv. Bramalea Ltd., 733 F. Supp 935 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (black employee
who failed to pursue administrative remedies under Human Relations Statute precluded
from bringing tort action for wrongful discharge; racial-discriminatory discharge does
not qualify as exception to common law at-will rule).
Marvin's (not Emily's) football example is not as bizarre as one would think.
Eddie Sutton, while basketball coach at the University of Kentucky, located in
Lexington, directed that Andy Dumstorf, described as a "first-rate" worker in the
Kentucky sports information department, be terminated because Dumstorf "made no
secret of his love for the Louisville [Cardinals] basketball team," Kentucky's arch-
rival. According to published reports, Sutton commented that "the true Kentucky fans
will understand .... They'll probably give me a medal." A Loyalty Test, THE
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 3, 1986 at 9.
68. See Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. 1990) (denying tort claim for
dismissal because of pregnancy).
69. Guevara v. K-Mart Corp., 629 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (exclusive
remedy provision of West Virginia Human Rights Act bar to national origin claim).
70. There may be a glimmer of hope under the common law, even when there is
no statutory expression of public policy. See, e.g., Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586,
588-98 (Vt. 1986), where the court ruled that public policy prevents all employment-
based decisions that are "cruel or shocking to the average man's conception of justice."
71. Mclsaac v. WZEW-FM Corp., 1 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1396 (Alaska
1986); Mudd v. Hoffman Homes for Youth, 543 A.2d 1092, 1096 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
72. In Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court considered whether management could force three long-term sales
employees to answer certain questions on an employment "biographical summary,"
which sought information about serious illness, operations, accidents, nervous
disorders, smoking and drinking habits, off-duty problems, worries, medication, age
and health of parents, and other medical and business matters. While the court ruled
17
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b. Health and Appearance
In an effort to hire only "healthy" employees, can management refuse to
hire employees who are smokers, drug users, or "unattractive" because of
weight or grooming preferences? While there is some support for the
proposition that public-sector management should not be allowed to impose
a no-smoking ban that applies to an employee's off-duty conduct, 7 there is
in the public-sector authority to the contrary.74 Similarly, at common law
that there was no invasion of privacy because the employees did not complete the
questionnaires, the court went on to state:
[I]f the questionnaires sought to obtain information in circumstances that
constitutes an "unreasonable, substantial, or serious interference with [the
employee's] privacy in violation of the principles expressed in G.L. c.214,
sect. 1B, the discharge of an employee for failure to provide such
information could contravene public policy and warrant the imposition of
liability on the employee for discharge.
Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).
73. See, e.g., Rossie v. State, 395 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986)
(upholding Wisconsin Department of Revenue directive banning smoking in certain
areas of state building, noting that regulation does not prevent smoking "in the
lunchroom, at home, or on the street.").
74. See, e.g., Grusendorf v. Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987)
(finding rational basis between no-smoking regulation and promotion of health and
safety of firefighter trainees).
We have found no private-sector case holding that management cannot impose
a no-smoking rule, both on and off duty.
Numerous states have enacted statutes prohibiting employers from discriminating
against an employee because he is a smoker. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-5-4-1 (1991)
(prohibiting off-duty use of tobacco); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Baldwin 1990);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 762 (West 1991) (prohibiting discrimination by employer for
use or non-use of tobacco); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (1991) (protecting smokers'
privileges during non-working hours); N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:6B-1 (1991) ("No
employer shall refuse to hire or employ any person or shall discharge from employ-
ment or take any adverse action against an employee with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions or other privileges of employment because that person does not
smoke or use other tobacco products, unless the employer has a rational basis for
doing so which is reasonably related to the employment, including the responsibilities
of the employee or prospective employee."); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 50-11-3 (Michie
1991) (making it unlawful to refuse to hire, to discharge or to disadvantage because
of use or non-use of tobacco); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7.1-1 (1990) ("No employer
... shall require, as a condition of employment, that any employee or, prospective
employee refrain from smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his or
her employment.. ."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (Law Co-op. 1990) ("The use of
tobacco products outside the workplace must not be the basis of personnel action,
including, but not limited to, employment, termination, demotion, or promotion of an
[Vol. 57
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management can dismiss an employee who is deemed medically unfit because
of drug problems 5 or presents a grooming or appearance problem for a
company.76 Most weight and grooming challenges are litigated under Title
VII," the Rehabilitation Act,78 or before arbitrators. 79 Accordingly, health
and grooming issues will be discussed in later sections.
c. Sexual Propriety and Privacy
To what extent can management at common law inquire into or otherwise
regulate the sexual activities of its employees? While most reported cases in
this area relate to privacy under the constitution' or challenges under a
collective bargaining agreement, a number of cases involve management's
right to inquire into areas deemed private by the employee or the employer's
right to engage in off-duty surveillance of an employee suspected of
falsification of disability or sick-leave abuse.8'
employee."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-14 (1991) ("unfair employment
practice for an employer to terminate the employment of an employee due to that
employee's engaging in any use of tobacco products off the premises of the employer
during nonworking hours unless such a restriction: (1) relates to a bona fide
occupational requirement and is reasonably and rationally related to the employment
activities and responsibilities of a particular employee ... or (2) is necessary to avoid
a conflict of interest with any responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of
such a conflict of interest."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (1990) (prohibiting
discrimination against employee for engaging in the use of agricultural products).
75. See, e.g., Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Wyo. 1987)
(upholding dismissal for refusal to submit to urinalysis test).
76. See Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College, 446 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa 1989)
(terminating employee for head lice, reporting to work in dirty uniform, and urinating
in mop bucket while on duty); cf. Wood v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 554 So. 2d 1028
(Ala. 1989) (cancer); Wilson v. Weight Watchers, 474 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (qualified privilege to inquire about employee's alcohol problem).
77. See infra notes 193-205 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 277-86 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 477-83 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 397-419 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Fayard v. Guardsmark Inc., 5 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 516
(E.D. La. 1989) (no invasion of privacy for surveillance of employee's house and
checking licenses on cars stopped there when surveillance occurred from public area);
Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes, 443 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (management,
suspecting malingering, engaged private investigators in an attempt to determine extent
of employee's claimed injuries, including observing employee through an open window
from a parked car with a 1,200 millimeter camera lens).
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In the few reported cases in this area the courts are in agreement that an
at-will private-sector employee has no protection against dismissal for
homosexuality, 2 adultery,8 or shenanigans involving moral turpitude
repugnant to his employer8 Thus, in Staats v. Ohio National Life Insurance
Company,8s a federal court held that a life insurance agent could not bring
an action for wrongful discharge either in tort or contract under a public
policy theory when he was terminated for showing up at his employer's
convention with a person not his wife.8 Reflecting the majority view, the
court reasoned that freedom of association may be an important right, but
there was no right under Pennsylvania law to "'associate with' a non-spouse
at an employer's convention without fear of termination . . . ."7 The federal
court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting in diversity jurisdiction,
similarly ruled that a private-sector employee had no constitutional right under
the First and Fourth Amendments to be free of unreasonable searches
regarding alcohol and drug testing.8
82. See e.g., Joachim v. AT&T Info. Serv., 793 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986)
(sustaining dismissal of homosexual employee).
83. In those states prohibiting discrimination because of marital status, an
employee may have a cause of action. See, e.g., Slohoda v. UPS, 475 A.2d 618, 620
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (reversing summary judgment for employee allegedly
dismissed for engaging in adultery with co-worker, reasoning that "if an employer's
discharge policy is based in significant part on an employee's marital status, a
discharge resulting from such policy violates N.J.S.A. 10:5-12"-a prohibiting
discharge based on marital status).
84. See Meleen v. Hazelden Found., 928 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1991) (sexual
relationship with patient); Myles v. Delta Air Lines, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA)
123 (D. Utah 1990) (arrest on drug charges); Jevic v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 5 Indiv.
Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 765 (D.NJ. 1990) (no public policy violation for revocation
of job offer after testing positive for marijuana); Shull v. New Mexico Potash Corp.,
802 P.2d 641 (N.M. 1990) (layoff of alcoholic employee); Hershberger v. Jersey
Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (sustaining discharge based on
positive results of unconfirmed drug test).
85. 620 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
86. Id. at 120.
87. Id. at 120; see also Morris v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987)
(affirming reversal of summary judgment on tortious interference claim of dismissed
unmarried company secretary and married employee who accompanied each other on
plane trip).
88. See Borse v. Pierce Goods Shop, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1991); see
also Home v. J.W. Gibson Well Service, 894 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding
discharge for employee that tested positive for drugs, rejecting argument that public
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d. Speech
Black letter law in this area holds that at-will private-sector employees
have no First Amendment freedom of speech rights or, for that matter, any
other constitutional rights, vis-a-vis their employers8 9 When an employee's
off-duty speech bothers management, he can be dismissed, whether or not a
nexus to the job exists. As stated by one court: "[tihere is no public policy
prohibiting an employer from discharging an ineffective at-will employee.
The fact that [the employee's] job duties included public speaking does not
alter that rule."9
The most expansive application of the public policy exception in the area
of speech (and arguably other constitutional rights) is Novosel v. Nationwide
Insurance Co.,9' a decision by the Third Circuit. In that case the employer
was lobbying for a no-fault insurance law in Pennsylvania.92 Novosel, an
employee of Nationwide from December 1966 until November 1981, was a
district claims manager. 93 When Novosel refused to lobby, and then in
private said disparaging things about the campaign, his employment was
terminated.' Novosel sought damages, reinstatement, and declaratory
relief.95 The district court granted Nationwide's motion to dismiss.96
On appeal, the Third Circuit ruled that Novosel's wrongful discharge
claim was cognizable under Pennsylvania law because the "employment
termination contravenes a significant and recognized public policy." 97 What
is especially noteworthy is that the appellate court relied on Novosel's First
Amendment rights even though free speech protection had traditionally been
interpreted as only protecting against governmental interference. 98 The court
89. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see also
Pagdilao v. Maui Intercontinental Hotel, 703 F. Supp. 863, 868 (D. Haw. 1988)
(holding that employer did not violate any clear mandate of public policy for
discharging bellman for profanity and insubordination at company picnic, reasoning
that "[p]laintiff has failed to present any arguments or authority to support his assertion
that a barrage of profanities at a company picnic is for the 'public good' or in the
'interests of society."').
90. Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991) (sustaining dismissal
of company vice president, acting as liaison with Congress, after advocating decreased
defense spending at press conference).
91. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).





97. Id. at 898.
98. Id. at 899.
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found that concern for the rights of political expression and association of
public employees was sufficient to state a public policy under Pennsylvania
law.9 Further, the court found no infirmity in the absence of a statutory
declaration of a public policy.a"
Taking Novosel one step further is Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil
Co.,10' where a New Jersey Superior Court held that an oil company could
not institute random workplace drug testing for its employees."° According
to the court, drug testing/screening of employees without reasonable
individualized suspicion violates public policy which applied to public as well
as private employment.0 3 A similar result was reached by the Supreme
Court of West Virginia.'
B. Summary: How Far Can Private-Sector Employers Extend
Their Jurisdiction Over Employees at Common Law?
Is there a window of opportunity at common law for the at-will employee
who is not covered under a collective bargaining agreement with a lifestyle
repugnant to his employer? The common law rule that an employer has an
absolute right to discharge an at-will employee is, in most jurisdictions, now
modified by the principle that where management's motives for the retaliatory
action contravenes some substantial public policy, a cause of action will lie
either in tort or contract. In selected jurisdictions, those employees who are
discharged in retaliation for either having exercised a statutorily-conferred
personal right or having fulfilled a statutorily-imposed duty will have a cause
of action in tort. The courts that have adopted the public-policy exception,
however, have focused on a specific policy consideration rather than the
general equities of the particular fact situation. Matters that are the subject of
99. Id.
100. Id. Recent Pennsylvania decisions have limited the application of Novosel
to First and Fourth Amendment claims. See Borse v. Pierce Goods Shop, Inc., 758 F.
Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Herchberger v. Jersey Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990).
101. 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 113 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (The
opinion of the New Jersey Superior Court was not recommended for publication by the
New Jersey Committee on Opinions. The case was appealed to the New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, where it was reversed and remanded. Hennessey,
589 A.2d 170 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert. granted, 598 A.2d 897 (N.J.
1991)).
102. Hennessey, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) at 116-17.
103. Id. The decision of the Superior Court was reversed by the Appellate
Division. See Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.), cert. granted, 598 A.2d 897 (N.J. 1991).
104. See Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va. 1991).
[Vol. 57
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/7
1992] LIFESTYLE REGULATIONS-EMPLOYMENT LAW 73
personal preference, ethics, or morality which are not overlapped by specific
legislative-type declarations have, as a general rule, little chance of finding
protection by the courts. Courts talk of the balancing of interests in arriving
at a decision, but unless an employee can point to a specific statutorily right
or duty, the balancing will inevitably result in a resolution adverse to the
employee. Thus, an employee who shows up at his employer's convention
with a person not his wife, but presented as his wife, has no public policy
defense to a wrongful termination."°  If he worked for a public-sector
employer he may or may not have a constitutional right to "associate" with a
person not his spouse depending on his job and the agency he worked for,' °6
but his claim to privacy or right to pursue a particular lifestyle will fall on deft
ears by a reviewing court. Only conduct that is extreme and outrageous,
amounting to claims for outrage 07 or intentional or reckless infliction of
emotional distress,'08 may result in relief for the individual.
Absent a cause of action in tort, an employee challenging a discharge
must rely on contract theory. The principle that every contract of employ-
ment, whatever its duration, is subject to an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing (thereby making every employment relationship subject to a
de facto standard of "just cause") has not been adopted by the courts.'°9
105. See Staats v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 118, 120 (W.D. Pa.
1985).
106. See infra notes 397-419 and accompanying text.
107. Eserhut v. Heister, 812 P.2d 902 (Wash. 1991).
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (requires that the
conduct be "extreme and outrageous"); White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1208
(La. 1991) (noting that "[m]ost states now recognize intentional infliction of emotional
distress as an independent tort, not 'parasitic' to a physical injury or a traditional tort
such as assault, battery, false imprisonment or the like."); see also Boggs v. Avon
Prod., 564 N.E.2d 1128, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (discussion of § 46); Madani v.
Kendall Ford, 794 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress for employee dismissed for refusal to pull
down pants and expose himself to co-workers in portion of workplace open to public
view, but disallowing claim for wrongful discharge under public policy exception to
at-will rule); cf. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz.
1985) (refusing to participate in activities such as "mooning" constitute public policy
exception to at-will rule).
109. See, e.g., Therrien v. United Air Lines, 670 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1987)
(rejecting implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629
F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (D.N.M. 1986) (holding that discharged at will-employee has no
cause of action for tort of wrongful discharge for marriage to employee of company's
competitors, rejecting implied covenant of fair dealing contractual approach); Holmes
v. Union Oil Co., 760 P.2d 1189, 1193-94 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) ("the Idaho courts
have not deemed it appropriate articulate a covenant so broad that it would go beyond
the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine creating liability for termination of
23
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Selected courts have enforced promises of job security in contracts of
indefinite duration, but these decisions appear limited to extreme cases where
legitimate expectations were created by the employer that dismissal would be
for just cause only. Similarly, courts have rejected employee handbooks and
personnel manuals as a basis per se for implying a just cause standard for all
at-will employees. As stated by one federal court, an employment manual is
only a unilateral expression of company policy and is not bargained for and,
accordingly, it cannot be the basis of an employment contract."' Similar
reasoning may even be applied to oral representations that are not mutually
negotiated."' Courts that have found a cause of action in contract have
determined that a just cause provision is contained in a handbook or manual,
or that management has orally promised not to dismiss except for cause.1 2
What results, then, is that management has significant discretion at
common law to regulate the lifestyles and off-duty conduct of its employees.
Courts are unwilling to incorporate constitutional-type rights into private
employment relationships. The reason for not expanding public policy
exceptions to the common law at-will rule, as articulated by one court, is that
"application of constitutional values such as individual privacy to private
relationships carries the danger that those values will 'expand like a gas to fill
up the available space.' ',113 Private-sector employees, desiring protection
employees whose activities were not otherwise worthy ofjudicial protection."); Martin
v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1001-02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("Care must be
taken to prevent the transformation of every breach of contract into an independent tort
action through the bootstrapping of the general contract principle of good faith and fair
dealing."); Morris v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 848 (Kan. 1987) ("principle of law
'... that every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and its enforcement, is overly broad and should not be applicable
to employment-at-will contracts.").
110. Rouse v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 605 F. Supp. 230 (D. Kan. 1985); see
also Joachim v. AT&T Info., 793 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986) (sustaining dismissal of
homosexual employee notwithstanding employee handbook provides that sexual
preference would not be basis forjob discrimination or termination); Tohline v. Central
Trust, 548 N.E.2d 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) ("Absent mutual assent, a handbook
becomes merely a unilateral statement of rules and policy which creates no obligations
and rights.").
111. See Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213, 218-19 (Minn. 1962).
112. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892
(Mich. 1980) (oral statement to employee); cf Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483
N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ohio 1985) ("An additional limit on an employer's right to discharge
occurs where representations or promises have been made to the employee which fall
within the doctrine of promissory estoppel.").
113. See Hennessey v. Costal Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170,176 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1128
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from officious employers, must look to statutes or labor arbitrators for
protection.
IH. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS IMPACTING MANAGEMENT'S
RIGHT TO DISCHARGE EMPLOYEES WITH UNHEALTHY OR
UNUSUAL LIfESTYLES
Background. The once inflexible rule that an employer can discharge a
worker at any time and for any reason is no longer controlling. Statutes now
limit the right of employers to terminate employees to such an extent that
employers arguably have less freedom than employees to terminate employ-
ment. Unlike the employer, a disgruntled employee can terminate the
employment relationship whatever the reason.
Specifically, since 1964, managerial discretion has been significantly
limited with respect to employees' civil rights. No longer can management
discriminate against employees (or applicants for employment) because of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age. At the state level, manage-
ment discretion may be limited in the areas of marital or sexual prefer-
ence,1 4 physical disability,1 5 and creed or political affiliation.11 6  The
following sections discuss major civil rights and other employment-related
legislation, court decisions, and federal guidelines affecting management's
ability to discharge employees because of any unhealthy or unusual lifestyles.
(Alaska 1989)).
114. Marital or sexual preference: ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1985);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7051 (West
1989); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 151B, § 4 (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE. ANN.
§ 49-2-303 (1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-02.4-
03 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.020 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-716
(Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 49.60.010 (West 1990).
115. Handicap: ALASKA STAT. § 18.80. 220 (1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-14-
301 (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (Supp. 1991); DEL CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 724 (West Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601 A.6 (West 1989); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 207.150 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104
(1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.020 (Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 3-6A-
15 (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 1988).
116. Political Affiliation: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7051 (West 1989); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 3-6A-15 (Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 67-19-2 (1986);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.18 (West 1987).
25
Hill and Delacenserie: Hill: Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
A. Federal statutes
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended
Title VII, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972 and again
in 1978 (the pregnancy amendment), is an all-encompassing federal statute
regulating virtually every facet of personnel management.117  The Act
explicitly prohibits discrimination in employment as to hiring, firing,
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' Since 1972, the Act has
applied to employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce who have
fifteen or more employees each working day in twenty or more calendar
weeks of the current calendar year." 9 It also applies to employment
agencies procuring employees for such an employer,'2 and to almost all
labor organizations."' The 1972 amendments also extend coverage to all
state and local governments; government agencies; political subdivisions,
excluding elected officials, their personal assistants, and immediate advisors;
and the District of Columbia departments and agencies, except where subject
by law to the federal competitive service. 22
Any person claiming to be aggrieved under the statute may file a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The
EEOC is vested with the authority to investigate individual charges of
discrimination, to promote voluntary compliance with the statute, and to
institute civil actions against parties named in a discrimination charge."
The EEOC cannot adjudicate claims or impose administrative sanctions.
Rather, the EEOC can (if it so elects) prosecute violations in the federal
courts, which are authorized to issue injunctive relief and to order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate.' 24
To effectuate the purposes and policies of the statute, Congress prohibited
employers from retaliating against employees who initiate complaints under
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
118. Id.
119. Id. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a).
120. Id. §§ 2000e(c), 2000e-2(b).
121. Id. §§ 2000e(d), 2000e-2(c).
122. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2 92
Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)). As originally enacted in 1964,
Title VII did not cover employees of the federal government. In 1972, however, the
statute was amended to include most federal employees. Id. § 11 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (0(1) (1988).
124. Id. §§ 2000e-5(f), (g).
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Title VII. The retaliation provision has been held to afford protection to
employees even though the conditions and conduct complained of do not
constitute a violation of Title VH." Moreover, even relatives of persons
who exercise rights under the statute are protected from employer retalia-
tion. 26
Under Title VII, discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin
is regulated by a different statutory standard than that applied to race or color.
Employment discrimination with respect to religion, sex, or national origin is
tolerated only where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupation-
al qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a
particular business. 7 There is no statutory BFOQ for race or color.
Accordingly, the statute mandates a two-step analysis in employment
discrimination cases. First, the EEOC or a court must find that the defendant
(usually an employer) has discriminated against an employee or applicant on
a basis prohibited by the Act."2 Only after a determination that a prohibited
form of discrimination has occurred will the second step be considered. Thus,
if discrimination is found, the employer has the opportunity to demonstrate
that the discrimination was justified as a BFOQ. 29 The reach of Title VII's
prohibitions against employment discrimination has been expanded by the
courts to include even neutrally-stated and indiscriminately-administered
employment practices (in the absence of demonstrable business necessity) if
the practice operates to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
a protected class. 30
125. See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1259
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 439 U.S. 1066, rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979).
126. Kombluh v. Steams & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
127. Section 703(e) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment
any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to
classify or refer for employment any individual .... on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular enter-
prise....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(e), 88 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988)).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2e (1988).
129. Id.
130. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), discussed infra note 142
and accompanying text.
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The statute has also been used to protect whites. In McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trial Transp. Co., 13 the Supreme Court held that the terms of Title VII
are not limited to discrimination against members of any particular race.
To rule otherwise, the Court said, would "constitute a derogation of the
Congressional mandate to eliminate all practices which operate to disadvan-
tage the employment opportunities of any group protected by Title VII,
including Caucasians."'
33
a. Structure of Title VII
Title VII forbids discrimination only under specific circumstances. Under
Title VII, "discrimination" is an unlawful employment practice only if: (1)
committed by someone covered by the Act; (2) on a "basis" (race, color,
religion, sex, national origin) cognizable under Title VII; (3) with regard to an
"issue" (hiring, discharging, compensation, terms and conditions of employ-
ment, etc.) cognizable under the statute; and (4) with a causal connection or
"nexus" between the basis and the issue.134 Simply stated, not all discrimi-
nation is prohibited by the statute. A person not covered by the Act (for
example, an employer with less than 15 employees) can discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and not violate Title VII
(but such an employer may violate a state anti-discrimination statute).
Similarly, discrimination by an employer with 3,000 employees on the basis
that the applicant is a Green Bay Packer fan does not violate the Act. It is
only discrimination that is based on race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin that the federal statute addresses. If race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin is not involved, the federal statute is simply inapplicable to the
conduct at issue.
Further, the discrimination must be linked in some way to employment
or terms and conditions of employment. For example, it is not a violation of
the statute for a city government (otherwise covered by the statute) to exclude
girls from playing little league hardball because no employment is involved.
Such conduct may violate a state statute that prohibits sex discrimination in
public accommodations, but the federal anti-discrimination statute is not
violated.
Finally, there must be a causal connection between the "basis" (race, sex,
etc.) and the "issue" (terms and conditions of employment) in order to make
131. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
132. Id. at 280.
133. Id. at 279-80 (quoting EEOC decision No. 74-31, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1326, 1328 (1973)).
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out a violation of Title VII. Thus, it is not a violation of Title VII for an
employer to simply fail to hire a black, or a female, or a Catholic if there is
no causal connection or "nexus" between the "basis" (race, sex, or religion)
and the "issue" (the decision to hire).
b. The Concept of "Discrimination" Under Title VII
Title VII was not designed to right all wrongs in an employment setting,
nor was it designed to mandate that employers act reasonably toward
employees. The touchstone of the Act is "discrimination." If there is no
discrimination, the statute does not apply.
Two theories by which discrimination may be proved are disparate
treatment and disparate impact. The most easily understood type of discrimina-
tion is disparate treatment, which involves treating an individual less favorably
than others similarly situated because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.135 Proof of a discriminatory motive is usually required in disparate
treatment cases, although it may be inferred from the mere fact of a difference
in treatment.1 36 The plaintiff has the initial burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.' Disparate
impact involves employment practices that are facially neutral but which have
a discriminatory effect when applied. 138 If the practice cannot be justified
as a business necessity, the statute is violated. 39
135. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335-36 n.15
(1977).
136. Id.
137. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-56 (1981).
The burden is not onerous. Id. at 253.*
138. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (effect of neutral
policy denying seniority to women returning from pregnancy leave); Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (disparate impact on blacks). In Chambers v.
Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), the court discussed three ways
of establishing disparate impact:
(1) whether blacks (or women or black women) as a class or at least blacks
(or women or black women) in a specified geographical area are excluded
by the suspect practice at a substantially higher rate than whites (or men);
(2) the percentages of class member applicants [employees] that are actually
excluded by the practice or policy, or (3) the level of employment of blacks
(black women) by the employer in comparison with the percentage of
blacks in the relevant labor market or geographic area.
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The issue of whether a test, or any other selection device that excludes
an employee with a particular lifestyle repugnant to management, is a valid
predictor of job performance,' 40 or is otherwise necessary for the safe or
efficient operation of the business, arises in employment discrimination cases
only after the plaintiff has demonstrated that the challenged criterion exerts a
disparate impact on a protected class. In other words, under Title VII an
employer defending a charge of disparate impact discrimination is not
compelled to demonstrate business necessity unless the selection criterion is
first found to have a discriminatory impact.
14
'
140. In the case of a test, once it is shown to have an adverse impact, the
employer, in order to escape liability under Title VII, must demonstrate that it is valid.
Validation is merely a showing that the device predicts job-performance. In this
regard, the first step in the validation process is for the employer to formulate a proper
definition of the job. While the EEOC Guidelines do not provide specific procedures
for conducting a job analysis, they do state that any professional method of job
analysis is acceptable if it is comprehensive and otherwise appropriate for the specific
validation strategy used. A validation-type study is then performed.
The Guidelines cite three validity strategies for showing that a test is job related:
(1) Criterion-related validity - a statistical demonstration of a relationship (correla-
tion) between scores on a test and actual job performance; (2) Content validity -a
demonstration that the content of a test is representative of important aspects of the
job. For example, a typing test given to an applicant for a secretarial position, or a
driving test given an applicant for a fork-lift job. Content validity is present to the
extent that the actual content of a test contains samples of job performance; (3)
Construct validity is present where there is a relationship between a "construct" or a
"trait," and that trait is important for successful job performance. To validate a test
through this method it is first necessary to determine through job analysis that a
particular trait or construct (honesty, for example) is actually related to job perfor-
mance (cashier). Second, it must be demonstrated that the test used does in fact
measure the specific trait. Finally, it must be demonstrated that success on the test is
a predictor or measure of success on the job.
141. The current Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures define
"adverse impact" as "a substantially different rate of selection in hiring, promotion or
other employment decision which works to the disadvantage of members of a race, sex
or ethnic group." 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1989). Although not a legal definition of
discrimination, the Guidelines provide that an adverse impact exists when the selection
rate for a particular group is less than 4/5 or 80 percent of the selection rate for other
groups. Id. For example, if 70 percent of the male applicants are selected and 60
percent of the female applicants are selected, no adverse effect exists because 60
percent, the female selection rate, is 86 percent of 70 percent, the male selection rate.
However, if 60 percent of the male applicants and 40 percent of the female applicants
are selected, an adverse impact exists because 40 percent is only 67 percent of 60
percent. Smaller differences in selection rates may still constitute adverse impact,
where they are significant in both statistical and practical terms or where an
employer's actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately.
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c. Standards Limited by Law
After the Griggs decision, 42 and the October, 1991, congressional and
It should be noted that the number of candidates may be so small that the
statistical results do not reflect the reality of the employment situation, or that the
statistical universe is so small that the results achieved are due mainly to chance or
random distribution.
142. The granddad of disparate impact cases is Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S.
424 (1971). The facts are straightforward. Prior to the effective date of Title VII,
Duke Power Company openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring and
assigning of employees. Id. at 426-27. The plant was organized into five operating
departments: (1) Labor, (2) Coal Handling, (3) Operations, (4) Maintenance, and (5)
Laboratory and Testing. Id. at 427. Blacks were employed only in the Labor
Department where the highest paying jobs paid less than the lowest paying jobs in the
other four operating departments in which whites were employed. Id. Promotions
were normally made within each department on the basis of seniority. Id. Transferees
into a department usually began in the lowest position. Id.
In 1955 the Company instituted a policy of requiring a high school education for
initial assignment to any department except Labor, and for transfer from Coal Handling
to any inside department (Operations, Maintenance, or Laboratory). Id. When the
Company abandoned its policy of restricting blacks to the Labor Department in 1965,
completion of high school was also made a prerequisite to transfer from Labor to any
other department. Id.
The Company added a further requirement for new employees on the effective
date of Title VII. Id. To qualify for placement in any but the Labor Department it
became necessary to register satisfactory scores on two professionally developed
aptitude tests, as well as to have a high school diploma. Id. at 427-28. Completion
of high school alone continued to render employees eligible for transfer to the four
desirable departments from which blacks had been excluded if the incumbent had been
employed prior to the time of the new requirement. Id. at 428. Subsequently, the
Company began to permit incumbent employees who lacked a high school education
to qualify for transfer from Labor or Coal to an "inside" job by passing two other
tests-the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical Aptitude Test. Id.
Since a smaller percentage of blacks relative to whites had received a high school
degree (34 percent as opposed to 12 percent in North Carolina), and because whites
fared better on the tests than blacks (58 percent vs. 6 percent), the requirement was
found by the Court to have an adverse or disparate impact on blacks. Id. at 430 n.6.
More important, no relationship was shown between obtaining a high school
diploma and successful job performance (it was found that a large percentage of whites
without a high school diploma had performed successfully in the cited jobs). Id. at
431. The Griggs Court made it clear that the statute proscribes not only overt
discrimination, but also employment practices that are fair in form but discriminatory
in operation. If a test operates to exclude a protected class cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. Id. at 436. The Court stated that
"any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."
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presidential backing of a compromise civil rights bill,"" any recruiting,
hiring, promotion, or retention criterion that has a 'disparate impact on a
protected class must be shown to be job related to avoid liability under the
statute. As noted, under disparate impact analysis an employment practice
Id.
143. As this Article was nearing its deadline, Senate Democrats unanimously
backed a compromise civil rights bill. A. Clymer, Senate DemocratsBack Compromise
On Civil Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991, at 1. On November 21, 1991,
President Bush signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The most significant provisions of the bill concern the Court-created business
necessity test first announced in Griggs, discussed supra note 142. In a 1989 case,
Wards Cove Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Supreme Court, in dictum,
stated that once a plaintiff shows that a disparate impact results from an employment
practice, plaintiffs still had the burden of proving that the employer's practice did not
serve in a significant way legitimate employment goals. Id. at 659. The compromise
legislation overturns the dicta in Wards Cove and returns to the Griggs standard where
the burden shifts to the employer to show a "manifest relationship to the employment
in question" once plaintiff demonstrates that the practice has a disparate impact. Under
the new Act, unlawful discrimination can be demonstrated if the employer cannot rebut
a prima facie case by "demonstrat[ing] that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity." The language found
in the 1991 Act-"job related and consistent with business necessity"-is identical to
that found in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA is discussed at
notes 296-316 and accompanying text.
The 1991 statute identifies the following language as declaring the intent of
Congress in referring to "practice" and "business necessity":
When a decision-making process includes particular, functionally-
integrated practices which are components of the same criterion, standard,
method of administration, or test, such as the height and weight require-
ments designed to measure strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), the particular, functionally-integrated practices may be analyzed as
one employment practice.
Business necessity is otherwise not defined.
Under the 1991 Act, management must now demonstrate that an employment
practice shown to be responsible for disparate impact really is necessary as opposed
to simply being useful or.convenient. Moreover, if disparate impact can be established
but not traced to any particular employment practice (the case in Wards Cove), the
employer will have the burden of demonstrating that it needs the whole complex of
employment practices from which the disparate impact flows.
Title VII was also amended to create the ability to sue for backpay, compensatory
damages, and in extreme cases punitive damages. There are no limits on awards of
backpay. All other damages (mental anguish, pain and suffering and punitive
damages) would be limited to $50,000 for employers of 16 to 100, $100,000 for
employers of 101 to 200, $200,000 for employers of 201 to 500, and $300,000 for
employers of 501 or more.
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must first be shown to have a disparate impact before the employer's
obligation to demonstrate job relatedness comes into play. Title VII does not
mandate that all selection criteria be job related, but only those criteria that
have an adverse impact on the employment opportunities of members of a
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A selection criterion may not be
job related, yet if the impact on both non-minorities and minorities is the
same, Title VII is not violated. In other words, an employer is entitled to use
a job criterion that does not predict performance on the job (weight, for
example), so long as the criterion does not have a disparate impact on a
member of a protected minority. One can, of course, question why an
employer would ever use a selection device that has no predictive utility
whatsoever. Nevertheless, the law does not require rationality (making it
difficult for employees with unconventional lifestyles), but only that the
criteria used be non-discriminatory.
d. Hiring Standards Applicable to Employee Lifestyle
Although management has much discretion in designating job qualifica-
tions, the courts have applied fair employment laws in such a manner as to
limit an employer's consideration and use of factors that might otherwise be
used in screening job applicants. Of special interest relating to an employee's
lifestyle are the following topics: (1) police or criminal history records; (2)
garnishment, financial status, or credit references; (3) unwed mothers; (4)
sexual preference and change of sex; (5) race association (interracial marriage
and associations); (6) weight and other personal appearance restrictions; (7)
drug and alcohol addiction; and (8) religion.
(1). Police or Criminal History Records
Many employment applications ask applicants if they have prior arrest or
conviction records. If the applicant's lifestyle has resulted in arrests or
convictions,'" there may be relief under Title VII or a state fair employment
statute.
Both the EEOC and the courts have distinguished pre-employment arrest
inquiries from inquiries concerning convictions. Inquiries into an applicant's
arrest records have been struck down unless shown to be job-related. 145
144. See, e.g., Glaz v. Ralston Purina Co., 509 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding no public policy exception to at-will rule in discharging employee who had
been arrested, convicted, and imprisoned in Hungary for bribery, even though dismissal
resulted from employer's policies).
145. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff d, 472
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
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Courts have recognized that blacks, in disproportionate numbers, are subject
to arrest for serious crimes. However, with few exceptions, conviction
inquiries have been held to constitute a legitimate employer concern. Still,
employers are advised not to adopt a blanket policy of excluding any applicant
with a conviction record. In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,616 the
Eighth Circuit held that an employer violated Title VII by using a conviction
as an absolute bar to employment. The court reasoned that because blacks are
convicted at a higher rate than whites, the employer's practice of summarily
rejecting all applicants with a conviction record (minor traffic offenses were
excluded) had an adverse impact on a protected class under the statute.147
The EEOC has consistently taken the position that reasonable cause exists
to believe that the statute is violated when applicants are automatically
eliminated from job consideration because of a conviction."14 The reasoning
of the Commission usually follows the same pattern: Because blacks are
convicted at a rate significantly in excess of their percentage in the population,
an employment practice of disqualifying persons for employment because of
conviction records can be expected to have a discriminatory impact upon
blacks and would, therefore, be unlawful under Title VII in the absence of a
justifying business necessity. 49 To establish business necessity the employ-
er must demonstrate that the nature of a particular criminal conviction (retail
theft, for example) disqualifies the individual job applicant from performing
the particular job in an acceptable, business-like manner (cashier). The most
important factor in this determination is the job-relatedness of the conviction.
If it is established that the conviction is not job-related, it is unlawful under
Title VII to disqualify the individual because of the conviction.'"
Contrary to the position taken by the Commission, however, most courts
have not found that a policy of rejecting applicants with a conviction record
has a per se disparate impact on minorities.151 Rather, to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, the rejected applicant is required to show that the
conviction rate for blacks is higher than that for non-minorities in the relevant
146. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
147. Id. at 1298-99.
148. Id. at 1295, 1298-99.
149. Id. at 1298-99.
150. EEOC Decision No. 80-12, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1794, 1795
(1980) (citing Commission Decision No. 78-35,26 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1755
(1978)).
151. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 472 F.2d 631 (S.D. Fla. 1989);
Hill v. United States Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Craig v. HEW,
508 f. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (rejecting argument that courts should take
judicial notice of probable disparate impact of rule against employing persons with
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labor market. Again, employers need not demonstrate that its policy is job-
related absent a showing of discriminatory impact.
It is of note that numerous states have enacted legislation addressing the
use and dissemination of information concerning an applicant's arrest or
conviction record in an employment setting.152 The effect of this legislation
is, in most cases, a mandate that management cannot consider arrests that have
not resulted in convictions or, alternatively, convictions that have been
expunged from the employee's record.
(2). Garnishment, Financial Status, and Credit References
Some lifestyles result in bankruptcy or other financial problems. While
at common law an individual could be dismissed for credit-history prob-
lems,3 3 both the courts and the EEOC have taken the position that since
minorities are more frequently garnished than non-minorities, a policy of
152. CAL LAB CODE § 432-7 (West Supp. 1991) (allows limited exceptions for
employers providing health care); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11105 (West Supp.
1991); COL REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-308(1)(f)(I) (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31.51i (West 1987) (arrest information shall not be available to any member
of the firm interviewing the applicant except the job personnel department or the
person in charge of employment); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 100A (West
Supp. 1991) (an applicant for employment with a sealed record on file may answer "no
record" with respect to an inquiry herein relative to prior arrests); MIcH. CoMp. LAws
ANN. § 37.2205(a) (West 1985) ("An employer.., shall not in connection with an
application for employment ... . make or maintain a record of information regarding
an arrest, detention, or disposition of a violation of law in which a conviction did not
result."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West 1991) (public employer limitation); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296.16 (McKinney 1991) (It is an unlawful discriminatory practice to
make any inquiry about any arrest or criminal accusation in which a conviction did not
result.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9125 (1983)
(Felony and misdemeanor convictions may be considered by the employer
only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant's suitability for
employment in the position for which he has applied. The employer shall
notify in writing the applicant if the decision not to hire the applicant is
based in whole or part on criminal history record information.);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-5-7(7) (Supp. 1991) ("unlawful employment practice" to "inquire
either whether the applicant has ever been arrested or charged with any crime;
provided, however, that nothing herein shall prevent an employer from inquiring
whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any crime."); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 51.215 (West Supp. 1991) (allowing institution of higher education to obtain from
any law enforcement agency "criminal history information" to evaluate applicants for
security-sensitive positions); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-392.4 (Michie 1990).
153. See Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1990).
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discharging employees after several garnishments violates Title VII. Some
courts, however, will require that the plaintiff use the debt-paying characteris-
tics of the employer's work force rather than the population at large in
establishing disparate impact.
Also of note is the Consumer Credit Protection Act'54 which provides
that an employer may not discharge an employee because his earnings have
been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness. 5u Further, under
the Fair Credit Act,' any employer who denies a job to an applicant based
on information contained in a "consumer report"'5 7 must advise the applicant
of this fact and provide the name and address of the consumer reporting
agency who complied the report. 8 The anti-discrimination provisions of
the Federal Bankruptcy Code may also provide relief to employees who are
debtors under Chapter 11. 9
Finally, at the state level, employer discretion to use garnishments or
credit history'60 as employment criterion may be limited in some respects
but, more often than not, the statutes specifically permit employers to use
credit information for employment purposes.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1988).
155. Id. § 1674(a).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
157. A "consumer report" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(d) (1988) as "any
written or oral information bearing on the person's credit history, character, reputation,
or mode of living prepared by a reporting agency."
158. Id. § 1681m(a).
159. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, in relevant
part provides:
No private employer may terminate the employment, or discriminate with
respect to employment against, an individual who is or has been a debtor
under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an
individual associated with such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such
debtor is bankrupt-
(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or the Bankruptcy Act;
(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case under this title
or during the case but before the grant or denial of a discharge; or
(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title or that
was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (1988); see, e.g., Stockhouse v. Hines Motor Supply, 2 Indiv.
Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 487 (D. Wyo. 1987).
160. All states have laws concerning garnishments. Arizona, California, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and New York have specifically
addressed the use of credit references. See also Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance,
551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1990) (holding that employee discharged solely because of court
order that child-support payments be withheld from wages has civil cause of action for
damages under Ohio statute prohibiting such retaliation).
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Section 701(k) of Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
against an employee because she is pregnant. Suppose an employer seeks to
remove or avoid hiring a woman because she is pregnant and unmarried? An
employer who applies a legitimacy rule to one sex and not the other
discriminates on account of sex under Title VII. It makes no difference that
the resulting discrimination is between all males and some females (non-
unwed mothers) versus some females (unwed mothers). Discrimination
between members of a protected class is nevertheless sex discrimination under
Title VII.
The more interesting question is whether an unwed mother rule can be
supported by a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) or, in a disparate
impact case, a business necessity defense. Courts have considered the
argument by employers that they should be allowed to discriminate against
unwed mothers because they are poor role models. In Andrews v. Drew
Municipal Separate School District'6' two unwed mothers challenged under
the constitution (Title VII was never argued) a policy that prohibited the
district from hiring any teachers or teachers' aides who were unmarried
parents." The Fifth Circuit rejected the school district's argument that
unmarried pregnant employees would be bad role models for students.
163
The court of appeals also found unpersuasive the argument that the presence
of unmarried teachers or teachers' aides would encourage teenage pregnan-
cy. 164
In Harvey v. Young Women's Christian Association,165 a federal court
found that an unwed female employee was fired because of her desire to offer
herself, as an unwed mother, as an alternative lifestyle role model to the
young females in her community.' 66 The court found discrimination on
account of sex, but because her alternative lifestyle was in conflict with both
the moral and religious philosophy of the YWCA, the court found that
management had met the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for discharge. 67 Conversely, in Dolter v. Wahlert High School,'(6
a federal court for the Northern District of Iowa, in denying defendant's
161. 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert.
dismissed, 425 U.S. 559 (1976).
162. Id. at 612.
163. Id. at 617.
164. Id.
165. 533 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
166. Id. at 956.
167. Id. at 957.
168. 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
1992]
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motion to dismiss, held that a Catholic high school's asserted BFOQ defense
for the discharge of an unwed mother who was a Catholic lay teacher of
English, appeared to relate more to religious and moral qualifications, rather
than to sexual qualifications.1' The court noted that a code oi moral
conduct regarding unwed parents could constitute a religious BFOQ.
However, the code must apply equally to both male and female employ-
ees. 17' The court found no infirmity in extending Title VII's prohibitions
against sex discrimination to a sectarian school. To the extent that Sue Dolter
could show that other single teachers violated the code of conduct, manage-
ment's BFOQ defense could be seen as pretextual.
The federal court for the Northern District of Nebraska, in Chambers v.
Omaha Girls Club,'7' agreed with the employer that an unwed mother
served as a bad role model for the youth that the club served." The court
conceded that while Chambers may be a good example of hard work and
independence, it is just as likely that she will serve as a negative role model
and may defeat the objective of the Girls Club, which was to reduce the
number of teenage pregnancies. 173 Finding that the Girls Club may be seen
as "tacitly" approving of teenage pregnancies, the court held that Chambers'
discharge was "necessary and adequately related to the core purpose" of the
club.174
In an especially bizarre case (and the only arbitration case we know of
involving the dismissal of an unwed mother for immorality), Arbitrator Sidney
Mogul, in Hawthorn School Dist. No. 17, Marengo, Illinois v. Jeanne
Ecklnan,'75 ruled that a school board could not dismiss a former novitiate
resident in a Catholic Convent who became pregnant as a result of a rape.
Citing Andrews, the arbitrator held that the dismissal of the teacher violated
due processunder the United States and the State of Illinois Constitutions. In
the words of Mogul, "an individual's private life is no basis for dismissal
where the teacher's teaching ability is not affected.' 76
In limited environments (sectarian schools) management may have a
legitimate interest in endorsing a specific lifestyle or role model for its market.
Outside of the narrow situations present in Chambers and Harvey (we are not
asserting that Chambers is decided correctly), we see little justification,
169. Id. at 267-68.
170. Id. at 271.
171. 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986).
172. Id. at 926.
173. Id. at 927-28.
174. Id.
175. An unpublished 1982 decision.
176. The School Board of Marengo gives new meaning to the old adage that it
is management that creates labor unions.
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economic or otherwise, for unwed parent rules. Such cases (especially
Marengo) are the stuff that comprise made-for-TV movies.
(4). Sexual Preference and Change in Sex
Title VII's prohibitions against discrimination on account of sex does not
extend to discrimination on account of sexual preference. The Ninth Circuit,
in De Santis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., " rejecting both a
disparate treatment and disparate impact theory of discrimination, held that
Title VII was meant to put women on equal footing with men in terms of
employment activities, and that the prohibition of sex discrimination found in
Title VII applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should not
be extended to include sexual preferences. If an employee, discriminated
against because of sexual preference, has any statutory recourse it is at the
state or local level. To date, however, only four states outlaw discrimination
on this basis 178 and only one, Wisconsin, applies to private-sector employ-
ees. As the recent California experience illustrates, politically the trend may
be against further legislation. 79
Title VII has also not been found to extend to transsexuals or those
undergoing sex change operations. The Seventh Circuit, in Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc." recognized that while there may be differences between
homosexuals and transsexuals, the same reasons apply for not extending Title
177. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
178. 1991 Conn. Acts. 58 (Reg Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1991); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 4 (1991); WIs. STAT. § 111.31 (1988).
Cities and counties which have enacted anti-discrimination legislation on the basis
of sexual preference include Tucson, Arizona; Berkeley, Cupertino, Davis, Laguna
Beach, Los Angeles, Mountain View, Oakland, Sacramento, San Francisco, San Jose,
Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood, California; Aspen and Boulder,
Colorado; Hartford, Connecticut; District of Columbia; Atlanta, Georgia; Honolulu,
Hawaii; Champaign, Chicago, Evanston, and Urbana, Illinois; Iowa City, Iowa;
Baltimore and Montgomery County, Maryland; Amherst, Boston and Malden,
Massachusetts; Ann Arbor, Detroit, East Lansing, Ingham County, Lansing and
Saginaw, Michigan; Hennepin County, Minneapolis, and Mankato, Minnesota; Alfred,
Buffalo, Ithaca, New York City, Rochester, and Troy, New York; Chapel Hill,
Durham, and Raleigh, North Carolina; Columbus, Cuyahoga, and Yellow Springs,
Ohio; Portland, Oregon; Harrisburg and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Austin, Texas;
Clallam County, King County, Olympia, Pullman, and Seattle Washington; Dane
County, Madison, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
179. See Robert Reinhold, Many Sniff Politics in Gay Rights Veto, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1991, at A16 (discussing California Governor Pete Wilson's veto of a bill
protecting homosexuals against job discrimination).
180. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985).
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VII protection to both. 181 A public-sector employee who is discriminated
against because of his sexual preference or transsexuality may fare better
asserting a due process or equal protection claim.'1 Because sexual
preference discrimination often stems from a perception that homosexuals are
"sick," one commentator has suggested that gay and lesbian employees might
attempt to challenge discriminatory practices under Section 504 of the Federal
Rehabilitation Act (discussed infra).'83 We have found no case supporting
this view.18
(5). Race Association (Interracial Marriage and Associations)
Does Title VII prohibit the refusal to hire or the firing of an employee
because of the race of the people the employee associates with? Courts have
gone both ways on this issue. In Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.'8 and Adams
v. Governor's Committee on Post-Secondary Education' the courts held
that white persons who have been discharged because of their interracial
marriages (Adams)'87 or association (Ripp)lss with other races do not have
181. See also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982)
(upholding discharge of a male who claimed he was a female when he applied for the
job); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (allowing
dismissal the employee after learning that employee was preparing to have a sex
change operation).
182. See infra notes 397-404 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 234-56 and accompanying test; Developments in the Law,
Employment Law Issues Affecting Gay Men and Lesbians, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508,
1581 (1989).
184. See Blackwell v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (sexual orientation not handicap under Federal Rehabilitation Act).
185. 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
186. 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1348 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
187. While plaintiff Adams alleged that he was dismissed because of his marriage
to a black woman, the court found that he was discharged because his employer lost
confidence in him. In dictum, however, the court stated that "neither the language of
the statute [Title VII] nor its legislative history supports a cause of action against a
person because of relationship to persons of another race." Id. at 1351. Interestingly,
the court stated that Adams could state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, discussed
infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text, which proscribes racial discrimination in
employment. According to the court, "[i]t is settled that the nature of the discrimina-
tion in this case-taking adverse action against a white person because of his
association with blacks-falls under § 1981." Id. (quoting Fiedler v. Marumsco
Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144, 1150 (4th Cir. 1980) (white female student expelled
for dating black male denied right to contract because of racial association in violation
of § 1981), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006 (1975)). Having decided that the real reason
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a cause of action under Title VII because the discrimination did not occur
because of the white person's race. However, other courts have held that
employment discrimination on the basis of interracial association or marriage
is prohibited by Title VII. Relying on Whitney v. Greater New York
Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists'89 and quoting from Reiter v. Center
Consolidated School District, No. 26-JT 90 the court of appeals in Parr v.
Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co.'91 held that the employer could
not refuse to hire Parr because of his interracial marriage. The court concluded
that when the plaintiff alleged discrimination because of an interracial
marriage or interracial association he was in essence alleging discrimination
based on his race because he was denied employment opportunities because
his race was different from his wife's."l
(6). Weight and Other Personal Appearance Restrictions
Management's preference for employees who have the appropriate dress,
look, and weight frequently clash with the employee's desire for a different
lifestyle with respect to dress, grooming, and weight. In all three areas courts
accord significant discretion to management. Courts have taken a "common
sense" approach and have recognized management's right to formulate and
enforce dress, grooming, and weight restrictions, even where the employer's
for Adams' discharge was his relationship to his superiors, and not his relationship to
a black woman, no violation of § 1981 was found.
188. The holding in Ripp is an aberration. The better rule for employers is
articulated by the 11th circuit in Parr as follows: "When a plaintiff claims discrimina-
tion based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that
he has been discriminated against because of his race." Parr, 791 F.2d at 891.
Employers intent on discriminating against their employees or applicants for
employment because management is displeased with their off-duty associations face
liability under Title VII.
189. 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (where a white female employee was
dismissed because she had a relationship with a black male).
190. 618 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1985) (where the employee alleged she had not
been hired because of her involvement with the Hispanic community).
191. 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986), on remand, 657 F. Supp 1022 (M.D. Ga.
1987).
192. On remand, the trial court dismissed Parr's complaint because he was not
genuinely interested in the job and that he was only trying to create a basis for EEOC
charges. To have a claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must have been a bona fide
applicant for the job. Parr v. Woodmen Life Ins. Co., 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (M.D.
Ga. 1987).
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only interest is in enhancing its image with the public.193 Title VII may,
under certain circumstances, provide some relief.
It is not a per se violation of under Title VII when management
formulates a dress or grooming code. However, when an employer applies a
dress or grooming code to members of one sex and not the other, manage-
ment's rule is likely to be invalidated by a court under Title VI.' 94 Further,
when dress or grooming codes impose a more defined standard of uniformity
on female employees than male employees, a violation of Title VII may
result.' 95 Thus, when management requires female accountants to "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have [their] hair styled, and wear jewelry," 196 and do not apply similar
requirements to male employees, as Professor Harold Hill would say, "folks,
ya got trouble in River City.' 97 Still, courts, as well as arbitrators, have
193. In Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir.
1973), the appellate court declared:
Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a company's
place in public estimation. That the image created by its employees dealing
with the public when on company assignment affects its relations is so well
known that we may take judicial notice of an employer's proper desire to
achieve favorable acceptance. Good grooming regulations reflect a
company's policy in our highly competitive business environment.
Reasonable requirements in furtherance of that policy are an aspect of
managerial responsibility.
See also Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1979)
("The decision to project a certain image as one aspect of company policy is the
employer's prerogative which employees may accept or reject. If they choose to reject
the policy, they are subject to such sanctions as deemed appropriate by the company.
An employer is simply not required to account for personal preferences with respect
to dress ind grooming standards.").
194. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.C. 1973) (requirement
forbidding only female cabin attendants to wear eyeglasses violative of Title VII).
195. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980) (requirement of "career ensemble" for
females and business suits for males discriminatory under Title VII).
196. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd,
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
197. Cf. MEREDITH WILSON, The Music Man, (Ya Got Trouble).
Query: Can management insist that their female employees wear makeup? Or is
wearing makeup "an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women"
(to borrow a term in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236-37 (1989)).
We know of no case on point. The Eleventh Circuit, in Tamimi v. Howard
Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1987), sustaining the trial court, ruled that a
motel that adopted a mandatory makeup rule for the purpose of discharging a pregnant
desk clerk violated Title VII's prohibitions against sex discrimination. Sondra Tamimi
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was the only woman who did not wear makeup. Management's discontent with her
looks began the day that Tamimi informed management that she was pregnant. The
makeup rule was adopted two days later. According to the trial court, "[ilt was only
when plaintiff became pregnant which caused her face to 'break out,' that [manage-
ment] implemented the rule which he knew plaintiff would not obey." Id. at 1554.
While the trial court indicated that it "need not decide whether an employer under
certain circumstances may require its female employees to wear makeup," id., the court
went on to declare:
Based on [management's] testimony, there is no doubt that if plaintiff
had not become pregnant, she would not have been dismissed from her job.
To require that plaintiff wear makeup because she appears less attactive
[sic] when pregnant, even though the employer had no such requirement of
plaintiff or any other employee prior to plaintiff's pregnancy, is a form of
sexual discrimination. Pregnancy is a "fundamental sexual characteristic"
that is a protected characteristic under Title VII. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the mandatory makeup rule was conceived, implemented and
applied to plaintiff in a discriminatory manner because of plaintiff's
pregnancy, and further finds that, in dismissing plaintiff from her job,
defendant discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of her sex.
Id. (Citations omitted). The court of appeals affirmed.
While an employer cannot take gender into account in making employment
decisions, except in those cases where gender is a BFOQ, it is unclear whether
requiring makeup is, as Justice Brennan pointed out in Price Waterhouse, an
impermissible sexual stereotype. According to Brennan:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for "'[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."'
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), on remand, 56 F.R.D.
420 (N.D. 111. 1972))).
In Price Waterhouse, Justice Brennan noted that "[w]e need not leave our
common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute." Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 241. Because the class created by a makeup requirement is some women
(those who wear it) and some women (those who don't) and all (or virtually all) men
(what can we say here?), and because a makeup requirement does not significantly
limit the employment opportunities of women nor impact a fundamental right, we see
no infirmity under Title VII when an employer requires women, as part of a grooming
code, to wear makeup. But we're not sure! See also Drinkwater v. Union Carbide
Corp., 56 Fed. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 483 (1990) (undue preoccupation with what
female employees look like is not permissible under anti-discrimination laws if some
kind of attention is not paid to male employees; comments to female employees about
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ruled that different standards of dress are not discriminatory so long as
employment opportunities of one sex are not disadvantaged relative to the
other sex. In Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,'9" the Ninth Circuit ruled
that there was no violation of Title VII when a male was dismissed for failing
to wear a tie even though 'no such requirement existed for females.
199
Likewise, another federal court ruled that there was no violation of race or sex
under Title VII when an employee was dismissed for wearing a "corn row"
hairstyle in violation of hospital policy.?o The employee's "lifestyle"
regarding her hair was beyond the reach of Title VII proscriptions against race
or sex discrimination.
Other circuits reason that grooming and dress codes do not violate Title
VII unless the requirements affect immutable characteristics or constitutional-
ly-protected activities, such as marriage or child-rearing, which present
insurmountable obstacles to one gender.2°' Under this standard, it would not
be impermissible for an employer to enforce a no-beard regulation, although
the rule would clearly have a disparate impact upon males. A beard is not an
"immutable" trait of being male, nor is it a constitutionally protected activity
to grow a beard. 2°2
makeup, eyeshadow, and clothing insufficient in themselves to support hostile
environment claim).
198. 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977).
199. See also Baker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977)
(grooming codes requiring different lengths of hair for men and women not violative
of statute); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) (permitting
employer's regulation of hair length for men but not women employees); Baker v.
California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046
(1975) (suit by male employee dismissed for violating hair length policy allowing
women to wear their hair longer than-men properly dismissed).
200. Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 27 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 698 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (employee dismissed for wearing "corn row" hair style in violation of
hospital policy not entitled to relief under Title VlI's proscriptions against race and sex
discrimination). See also Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (restriction on wearing "all braided" hairstyle not violative of prohibitions on the
basis of sex or race).
201. See, e.g., Earwood v. Continental South Eastern Lines, 539 F.2d 1349 (4th
Cir. 1976); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975)
(grooming regulation applicable to males with long hair not sex-based discrimination
because employer applied personal grooming code to all employees); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971), on
remand, 56 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. 111. 1972) (unlawful to restrict employment of married
females but not married males, even though most flight attendants female).
202. Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) on remand sub nom. Owen v. Barry,
543 F.2d 465 (2d. Cir. 1976) (upholding hair-grooming regulation for police officers
against constitutional challenge of deprivation of liberty interest).
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Similarly, management is not precluded from having height and weight
requirements for its employees, although height and weight requirements that
have a disproportionate effect upon women are impermissible under Title VII
unless shown to be job-related.'
The more difficult case is where the pool of job applicants is limited to
women and, at the same time, the employer maintains a height or weight
restriction that eliminates some, but not all, women for consideration. In light
of the Supreme Court's rejection of a "bottom line" defense to discrimina-
tion,' employers are advised to examine their height and weight require-
ments and discard those that have an illegal discriminatory effect. Even
though there appears to be no discrimination in the process of selecting
women for positions when the "bottom line" or end result is examined, if the
criterion has an impermissible disparate impact that cannot be justified under
a business necessity test, it is violative of Title VII.
Title VII was never intended to interfere in the promulgation and
enforcement of nondiscriminatory personal appearance regulations by
employers.2 5  An employer may require male employees to adhere to
different modes of dress, grooming, and weight standards than those required
of female employees and still not run afoul of the statute.
(7). Drug and Alcohol Addiction
Employees whose lifestyle resulted in a drug or alcohol problem have
little or no recourse under Title VII. In New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer,'0 the Supreme Court considered the Transit Authority's blanket
policy of not employing persons who use narcotic drugs. 207 The Supreme
Court, reversing both the district court and the court of appeals, found that
203. Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (policy of
requiring only female flight attendants to comply with weight requirements violative
of Title VII).
204. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). In Teal, a group of black
employees challenged under a disparate impact theory of discrimination management's
use of a facially neutral examination which a disproportionate number of blacks failed.
The Court rejected the employer's bottom-line defense that he took corrective measures
to insure that the number of black employees reflected the relevant labor market.
205. Craft v. Metromedia, 572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd in part, 766
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986).
206. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
207. In relevant part, the Authority's rule provided: "Employees must not use,
or have in their possession, narcotics, tranquilizers, drugs of the Amphetamine group
or barbiturate derivatives or paraphernalia used to administer narcotics or barbiturate
derivatives, except with the written permission of the Medical Director-Chief Surgeon
of the System." Id. at 571.
1992]
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management's policy of refusing employment to any person (car cleaner, track
repairman, bus driver) who is on a methadone-maintenance program was not
violative of Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Mr.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that a prima facie violation of
Title VII could be established by statistical evidence showing that the practice
had the effect of denying the members of one race equal access to employ-
ment opportunities. Even assuming that the employees established the
necessary disparate effect upon blacks, the Court ruled that the Authority
rebutted the prima facie case by demonstrating that its narcotics rule, and its
application to methadone users, was job related. The majority found that the




Sometimes an employee's lifestyle regarding his religious practices will
disqualify him for employment. Illustrative is State of Minnesota v. Sports &
Health Club, °i where management asked prospective employees whether
they attended church, read the Bible, were married or divorced, prayed,
engaged in pre-marital or extra-marital sex, believed in God, heaven or
hell.210 Applicants were also asked whether they lived with a person of the
opposite sex and whether they were antagonistic to the Bible regarding
homosexuals and fornicators.21 ' To what extent can management attempt
to convert others to their own beliefs when management's beliefs conflict with
the employee's religious lifestyle? Can an employee clothe a particular
lifestyle in the garb of religion and preclude management from effecting a
termination? For example, the authors know of a high-school teacher who
wears a crucifix upside down. When informed one day by a student that her
cross was upside down, she responded that it was part of her Satanic faith.
Is this protected under Title VII?212
208. Id. at 587 n.31 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
209. 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986), on
remand sub nom. State ex rel Johnson v. Sports & Health Club, 392 N.W.2d 329
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
210. Id. at 847.
211. Id.
212. Cf United States v. Board of Ed. for School Dist. of Philadelphia, 911 F.2d
882 (3d Cir., 1990) (upholding state law prohibiting teachers from wearing anything
in classroom indicating membership in religious organization; argument that state law
conflicted with Title VII and that district could have accommodated Muslim teacher's
request to teach in head garb without undue hardship rejected). See also Cooper v.
Eugene School Dist. No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1986), appeal dismissed, 480 U.S. 942
[Vol. 57
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Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of religion. The 1972 amendments to the act define the term "religion"
to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief"
and provide that an employer cannot discriminate on the basis of religion
unless the employer can demonstrate inability "to reasonably accommodate to
an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."213 The
difficulty comes in ascertaining whether conduct is a religious belief or
practice. This is important because only true, bona fide religious beliefs and
activities require employer accommodation.
Suppose an employee has a "religious" practice that is totally repugnant
to management, Satanic worship, for example? Must management accommo-
date this employee on October 31st the feast of All Saints' Day or "All
Hallow E'en"-the holy day for Satanic believers? In United States v.
Seeger,214 and Welsh v. United States, 215 two conscientious objector cases,
the Supreme Court broadly defined religious practices to include moral or
ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong, sincerely held with the strength
of traditional religious views. The EEOC has been liberal in its interpretation
of what constitutes a religion, adopting the Court's definition in Seeger and
Welsh. What is particularly distressing for the practitioner is the absence of
a workable definition of religion. After Seeger and Welsh, one might define
religion to include anything that an individual decides is religious in his own
scheme of things. Such a definition would avoid the courts in the constitu-
tional problem of entanglement with religion, but would create havoc in the
workplace and due process problems for employers who would have no way
of implementing such a broad and vague scheme if charged with an affirma-
tive duty to accommodate an employee's religious observances.
As an alternative, one might determine that an individual's belief was not
religious as a matter of law because it fell outside the protection intended by
Title VII. This, however, would require a court to read the statute as
protecting only certain established religion, and such a reading would have
serious constitutional problems.
(1987) (upholding garb statute against claim that school district could have accommo-
dated Sikh wearing white clothes and white turban while teaching, rejecting free
exercise argument and stating that "rule against such religious dress is permissible to
avoid the appearance of sectarian influence, favoritism, or official approval in the
public school.") Id. at 308.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000eo) (1988).
214. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
215. 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970) (expanding Seeger to include moral or ethical
beliefs which assume the role and function of a religion of a religion in the objector's
life).
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Noting the warning issued by the Supreme Court that "it is no business
of the courts to say ... what is a religious practice or activity,"216 the
courts, with few exceptions, have accorded great deference to the religious
claims of individuals under Title VII. This does not mean that management
must accommodate an employee merely because an individual characterizes
some form of conduct as religious and asserts that it is sincerely held. As
stated by one court, if one were an avid sports fan, one could not use that
enthusiasm, however intense, to require permission to attend a sports
event.2" 7 Dr. Timothy Leary once argued that the use of marijuana was
necessary to the free exercise of his religion,2 8 yet no person would
seriously contend that his conduct, if the basis of an employment decision,
was a religion under Title VII. Many claims by employees can be character-
ized as mere philosophies that are not entitled to protection. For example,
membership in the Ku Klux Klan has been held not to be a protected religious
belief.219 As such, an individual who wants to attend a "religious" rally in
Louisiana will not have to be accommodated.
The paradox here is apparent. At one extreme, there is no obligation to
relieve an employee who wants to play golf on Sunday. No matter how
sincere the employee is and no matter that the belief in the religion of golf
occupies in the employee's life a position parallel to that of the belief
sanctioned in Seeger, golf is not a religion under Title VII. At the other
extreme, traditional, established tenets of religion, such as special Sabbath
observance by Seventh Day Adventists, Orthodox Jews, or members of the
Worldwide Church of God, are clearly religious for purpose of the statute and
thus deserving of accommodation. The difficult cases are those where the
employee claims that a practice is religious, but where the practice does not
have the "ring of religion." In Wessling v. Kroger, °20 a sunday school
teacher was not protected under the statute for leaving work early to assist her
church in preparations for a Christmas play after being denied permission by
management. Similarly, a federal employee, in Marcus v. Veterans Adminis-
tration,221 did not establish religious discrimination in the form of retaliation
for failing to attend an office Christmas party.
The lesson is that under Title VII an employee will not be able to take
a particular facet of his lifestyle-sexual preference, political association,
216. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953).
217. Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 464 F. Supp. 622, 630 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
218. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 392
U.S. 903 (1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
219. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974).
220. 554 F. Supp. 548, 552 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
221. 692 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 57
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/7
1992] LIFESTYLE REGULATIONS-EMPLOYMENT LAW 99
speech, hair length, drug use,222 weight, or even prostitution m and an-
nounce to management that it is a protected religious practice and expect a
safe harbor from discharge, although, in certain cases, an employee may be
able to don some form of religions garb224 or even maintain facial hair'
222. Cf. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1518-19
(D.Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988) (mandatory drug alcohol testing
program constitutional notwithstanding employees' allegation that program incorporates
view of alcoholism as illness, rather than sin, and thus burdened employees' free
exercise of religion).
223. See Judge Weighing Claims of a Religion Based on Sex, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 1990, at A4-A5 (discussing a first amendment claim to rights to a religion based
primarily on "absolution" through sex and "sacrifice" through a payment of money).
224. Karriem v. Oliver T. Carr Co., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 882 (D.D.C.
1985) (prohibiting employer from preventing Muslim security guard from wearing
Islamic pin where pin bore no resemblance to badge of local police); EEOC Case No.
81-20 (Apr. 8, 1981), 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1809 (1981) (finding
reasonable cause that statute violated by common carrier's refusal to consider for
employment female of Pentecostal faith, which forbids women to wear pants, where
carrier rejected applicant's offer to wear uniform-color skirts which would not interfere
with operation of bus, and applicant had driven bus three years while wearing skirt);
EEOC Dec. No. 71-779 (Dec. 21, 1970), 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 172 (1970)
(reasonable cause found by discharge of nurse whose "Old Catholic" faith requires her
head to be covered at all times).
But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 570 (1986) (First Amendment
does not prevent Air Force from applying uniform dress requirement in forbidding
Jewish rabbi from wearing yarmulke while on duty); Abdush-Shahid v. New York
State Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, 475 U.S. 503,570 (N.Y. 1976) (upholding
decision prohibiting rehabilitation officer from wearing 'Sunni Muslim dress' as part
of religious garb).
225. EEOC v. Electronic Data Systems, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 588
(W.D. Wash. 1983) (protecting employee that has bona fide belief that shaving beard
contrary to Jewish faith); Sharif v. City of Chicago, 530 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(prohibiting suspension of detective who grew goatee in observance of Al-Islamic
religion, where department agreed not to enforce prohibition against beards for medical
reasons).
But see Tamimi v. Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1987)
(no religious bias in dismissing female who refused to wear makeup where employee
did not communicate religious belief to management); EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia,
Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91-92 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (no violation in refusal to consider Sikh
job applicant for position of restaurant manager because of religious-based refusal to
shave facial hair; employer could not accommodate where exemption from clean-
shaven rule would affect company image and would impose risk of non-compliance
with sanitation regulations); EEOC Dec. No. 71-1529 (May 9, 1971), 3 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) Cases 952 (1971) (reasonable cause did not exist to find violation
of statute where employer refused to consider for employment male with shoulder-
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because of a bona fide religion. Furthermore, an individual need not believe
in any particular god to claim protection (atheism has been held to be
religion),226 but the belief, to be cognizable under Title VII, must be based
on some deity or have some spiritual type of focus, a necessary requirement
if golf and marijuana use are to be excluded as "religions." We have found no
cases on point, but case law suggests that even Satanic worship qualifies.
2. Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871
The Civil Rights Act of 1 870 m in relevant part provides that "[a]ll
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State... to make and enforce contracts... and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings ... ." The significance of this statute is
that it applies to claims of discrimination in private employment apart from
the federal remedy of Title VII. Indeed, in certain cases the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 will cover certain forms of discrimination, such as alienage,
which are not otherwise prohibited under Title VII. 2 Finally, this statute,
unlike Title VII, contains no stated limitations period in which a complaint
must be filed. And unlike Title VII, backpay awards are not limited to two
years. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Pattersone20 holding that
section 1981 does not apply to a claim for a discriminatory discharge, 1981
has little utility in lifestyle cases for current employees.2
The Civil Rights Act of 1871,122 in relevant part, declares that "[e]very
person who, under color of any statute ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
length hair, where employer did not know that applicant considered long hair to be
incident of religion); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rts, 265
N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1970) (no violation of Act where employer refused to consider for
employment job applicant who insisted on wearing beard in adherence to religion).
226. Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
228. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 (1989).
229. St. Francis College v. Al-Khazrajiu, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
230. See supra note 226.
231. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, discussed supra note 143, has reversed the
Court's decision in Patterson by amending § 1981 to provide that "the term 'make and
enforce contracts' includes ... the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and
conditions of the contractual relationship." The 1991 Act is significant for plaintiffs
interested in obtaining unlimited punitive damages, which are not available under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. The 1991 Act may accordingly have some relevance to
plaintiffs that are able to assert a cause of action under § 1981.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party ,injured in an action at law
.... " This section, similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, has been held
applicable to claims of discrimination independent of Title VII. However,
state action is required for a successful claim under the 1871 Act. Any
claimed infringement of constitutional rights to free speech or association can
be maintained against a governmental official who deprives an employee of
a protected right.? 3
3. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Individuals with a physical or mental handicap may be protected by the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,23 or state law prohibi-
tions against handicap discrimination applicable to private or public employ-
ers0 5
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act requires that any contract in excess
of $2,500 entered into by any federal department or agency for the procure-
ment of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction)
include a provision requiring contractors to seek to employ handicapped
individuals.? On the other hand, contractors with transactions in excess of
$50,000 and who employ 50 or more employees must maintain a written
affirmative action program within 120 days after receiving the contract, and
must update the program annually. 7  Although section 503 requires
affirmative action programs to hire and advance qualified handicapped
employees, these programs do not require goals and timetables. -  Section
503 does not outlaw discrimination but, rather, requires affirmative action
covenants in government contracts. The current regulations specify that a
complaint may be filed with the Director of the Labor Department's Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFFCP) and that the Director is
responsible for investigating the complaints.2 9  Section 503 does not
provide a private right of action for handicapped individuals against the
Federal government or federal contractors.24
233. Epps v. Clarendon County, 405 S.E.2d 386, 387 (S.C. 1991).
234. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982).
235. All states prohibit discrimination against the handicapped. Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands have no state statute. Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi prohibit
handicap discrimination only by public employers. ALA. CODE § 21-7-8 (1988); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-14-301(b) (Michie 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-9-149 (1989).
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Section 504 of the statute prohibits discrimination against any individual
on the basis of handicap in any program receiving federal financial assistance.
Specifically, the statute provides that:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps... shall, solely by reason
of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.2 1
A handicapped individual is defined as any person who: "(i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment."24 The applicable regulations
define "major life activity" as "functions, such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working."2 43 Having "a record of such impairment" .is defined
as "a history of, or has been classified (or misclassified) as having a ...
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties."2" "Regarded as having such an impairment" is defined as:
(1) has a physical ... impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by an employer as constituting such a limitation; (2)
has a physical impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as
a result of the attitude of an employer toward such an impairment; or (3) has
none of the impairments defined in [29 C.F.R. sect. 1613.702(b) but is treated
by an employer as having such an impairment.- 5
The term "handicap" does not include any individual who is an alcoholic
or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual
from performing the duties of the job in question, or whose employment, by
reason of such alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to the
property or the safety of others.24 Employees or applicants for employment
who test positive for drugs are accordingly not handicapped under the
Act.2A
7
241. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
242. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1988).
243. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c) (1988).
244. Id. § 1613.702(d).
245. Id. § 1613.702(e).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c) (1982).
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There is no affirmative action requirement in section 504. A handicapped
individual may bring a court action on his own behalf where a violation of
section 504 is claimed, regardless of whether the primary objective of the
federal funds is to provide employment opportunities. 248 The burden of
proof in Rehabilitation Act cases follows the scheme under Title VII case
law.24
9
The significance of this statute for labor and management is illustrated
by Southeastern Community College v. Davis,750 a decision involving a post-
secondary institution. During an initial interview of a person seeking
admission to a nursing program, it became apparent to the interviewer that
Davis was having trouble hearing the questions being asked of her.25' Upon
further investigation, Davis was found to have a severe hearing impair-
ment5 2 An adjustment of her hearing aid was made, but even this allowed
only the hearing of "gross sound" occurrences. 53  Lip reading would be
necessary for Davis' full understanding of what was being said.2 4 The
admission committee subsequently rejected Davis' application for admittance
into the program reasoning that it would be detrimental to patient safety to
allow Davis to become a nurseY Davis then filed a complaint in federal
court alleging both a violation of section 504 and a denial of equal protection
and due process.
The Supreme Court held "otherwise qualified" to mean "qualified in spite
of the handicap" rather that "qualified except for the handicap." Therefore, "an
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap.",256
While the question whether an individual meets the statutory definition
of handicapped must be considered on a case-by-case basis, the implications
of Davis for employers is clear. Management may properly take into account
the physical requirements of a job in all phases of employment. An employee
248. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (Supreme
Court approved the availability of backpay recovery by a private plaintiff under section
504 without affirmatively declaring the existence of a private cause of action).
249. See, e.g., Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 120 (5th Cir. 1980);
Guinn v. Bolger, 598 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1984) (applying the scheme for allocating
the burden of proof in a disparate treatment case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)).
250. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
251. Id. at 400.
252. Id. at 401.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 401-02.
256. Id. at 405-06.
53
Hill and Delacenserie: Hill: Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
facing an "insurmountable impairment barrier," i.e., where the handicap itself
prevents the individual from fulfilling the essential requirements of the
position, is not "otherwise qualified" for the job under section 504. Moreover,
a fair reading of Davis is that an individual facing a "surmountable employ-
ment barrier," a barrier to job performance that can be overcome with
accommodation, is not otherwise qualified if accommodation requires a
substantial modification in the requirements of the job, or would result in an
undue administrative and financial burden to the employer. The burden of
proving inability to accommodate rests with the employer. Factors considered
in assessing hardship include the size of the program, the type and duration
of the program, and the nature and cost of accommodation. A business
necessity test is used in determining whether accommodation of a handicapped
individual is required. Accordingly, an employer (covered by the statute) may
not deny any employment or training opportunity to a qualified handicapped
employee, applicant, or participant if the basis for the denial is the need to
make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental limitations of the
employee.
a. AIDS as a Handicap under the Rehabilitation Act
Suppose management only wants healthy employees? Can management
(assuming coverage by the Act) exclude an AIDS victim (someone who is
HIV-infected and shows signs of AIDS-related diseases) from employment
consideration?257 The question of whether AIDS2 is a handicap under
the Federal Rehabilitation Act has not been addressed by the Supreme Court.
However, in view of the Court's 1987 opinion in School Board of Nassau
County, Florida v. Arline,29 there is every reason to believe that employers
cannot take adverse employment action against an AIDS victim based simply
upon an individual's ability to transmit the disease or fear or contagion
(coworkers, customers, public). In that case plaintiff Arline, an elementary
257. See Dennis Hevesi, Aids Carriers Win a Court Ruling, NEw YORK TIMES,
July 9, 1988, at 6. See generally Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination
Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 681 (1985); Judith S. Merrell,
Note, AIDS and Cancer: Critical Employment Discrimination Issues, J. CORP. L. 849
(1990).
258. "AIDS ii a clinical definition developed in 1982 by the Public Health
Service's Centers for Disease Control to allow monitoring of conditions typically
associated with severe breakdown of immunologic defenses against viral, bacterial and
parasitic infections, subsequently found to be caused by [the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV)]." Local 1812, AFGE v. U.S. Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 52 n.2
(D.D.C. 1987).
259. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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school teacher, was discharged after suffering a third relapse of tuberculosis
within two years.' Arline sued the school district under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court ruled that in defining a "handicapped
individual" the contagious effects of the individual's disease upon others
cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the disease's physical effects upon
the individual,2 1 Thus, it would be unfair, reasoned the Court, to allow an
employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of the disease upon
others and the effects of the disease upon the individual, at least where the
contagiousness and the individual's physical impairment result from the same
underlying condition.= z According to the Court, the Act does not exclude
individuals based upon fear of contagiousness.
According to the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), physical or mental impairments include: "(A)
any psychological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine.' 3
In addition, the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,2 4 which codified
the decision in Arline, specifically provides that discrimination against
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals solely on the basis that the
handicap is a contagious disease is impermissible.2 5 In 1988 the Depart-
ment of Justice, reversing an earlier position, likewise concluded that AIDS
is a handicap under the Act.2
260. Id. at 276.
261. Id. at 282.
262. Id.
263. 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1988).
264. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(enacted March 22, 1988) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
265. The relevant provision specifically provides:
For the purpose of sections 503 and 504, as such sections relate to
employment, ["individual with handicaps"] does not include an individual
who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of
such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health and
safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious
disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1988).
266. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM ON APPLICATION OF REHABILITATION
ACT's SECT. 504 TO HIV INFECTED PERSONS, Sept. 27, 1988, reprinted in AMERICANS
wrT DISABILITIES ACT, 1989: HEARINGS ON S. 933 BEFORE COMM. ON LABOR AND
HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE SUBCOMM. ON THE HANDICAPPED, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
338, 343 (1989).
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Under current medical knowledge, AIDS does not present a threat of
infection to coworkers or customers through casual workplace contact.
Accordingly, most AIDS victims would be considered "qualified" to hold jobs
until the disease renders them physically incapable of working.2s7 This was
the position taken by the Ninth Circuit in Chalk v. United States District
Court Central District of California,'m where the court of appeals ruled that
a teacher of the hearing impaired, diagnosed as having AIDS, could not be
denied his former teaching position in favor of an administrative assignment.
If, however, AIDS is later determined to present a significant threat of
infection to coworkers or customers, management could arguably discriminate
against AIDS victims based on fear of contagion. At any rate, numerous
states have enacted laws on the subject of HIV and AIDS-related diseases,2 9
most of which deal with testing and the confidentiality of test results.270
267. The consensus of opinion holds AIDS qualifies as a handicap or disability
under federal anti-discrimination laws. See Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough
County, 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding AIDS a handicap under
Rehabilitation Act); Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988)
(reversing denial of preliminary injunction reinstating teacher with AIDS to classroom
duties under Rehabilitation Act); Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 730
(S.D. Ill. 1989) (concluding HIV carriers handicapped under Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-31); Robertson v. Granite City Comm. Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp.
1002, 1006-07 (S.D. Ill. 1988) (holding student with AIDS-related complex (ARC)
handicapped under Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148,
694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding AIDS handicap under section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381
(C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding child with AIDS handicapped under Rehabilitation Act).
268. 840 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Doe v. Centinela Hospital, 57
U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that seropositive persons are "handicapped"
under Rehabilitation Act because they are "regarded as having an impairment.").
269. Two-thirds of the states have announced either administratively or judicially
that AIDS-related discrimination is illegal under their statutes. See, e.g., Raytheon Co.
v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1089 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1988), aff'd, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1989); Dist. 27 Comm. Sch. Bd. v. Board
of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); M.A.E. v. Doe & Roe, 566 A.2d
285, 287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (Cavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating AIDS a disability
or handicap under PHRA); see also Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS, Employment and
Unemployment, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 939-40 n.74-89 (1989) (collecting decisions).
270. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(3)(a)-(c) (West 1989) (prohibiting
employers from requiring HIV-related tests as a condition of hiring, promotion or
continued employment, unless absence of HIV infection is a bona fide occupational
qualification BFOQ for the job in question); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101(c) (1989)
(stating that "no person shall be compelled ... to disclose whether that person has
been tested for the presence of HIV infection, in order to obtain or maintain ...
employment."); IOWA CODE § 601A.6(1)(d) (1989) (prohibiting testing as a condition
[Vol. 57
56
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/7
1992] LIFESTYLE REGULATIONS-EMPLO YMENT LAW 107
Some states have included AIDS within the definition of physical handicap for
purposes of their fair employment or civil rights statutes.271 As a result, an
employer living in a jurisdiction with such a statute cannot take adverse action
because an individual is afflicted with full-blown AIDS or is sero-positive
(HIV-infected).2'
Whether a public-sector employer can compel an employee to submit to
an AIDS test is a more difficult question. Although distinguishable on their
facts, the two cases to reach the courts of appeal are arguably split on the
of employment); N.M. STAT ANN. § 28-10 A-1 (Michie 1989) (prohibiting use of
AIDS test as condition of employment unless BFOQ present); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-
148 (1989) (prohibiting HIV tests of current employees as basis of determining
"suitability" for continued employment; employers permitted to test applicants and may
refuse to hire solely on the basis of positive HIV test; statute also permits HIV tests
as part of annual medical exams routinely required for all employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-6-22 (1989) (prohibiting HIV testing as condition of employment except in
instances where employers can demonstrate, through medical authorities, "clear and
present danger" of AIDS transmission if testing were not done); VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 495(a)(7) (1989) (prohibiting HIV-related blood tests as condition of employment);
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.172 (1988) (prohibiting HIV testing as condition of'
employment absent BFOQ).
271. See, e.g., MD. REG. CODEANN. § 14.03.02.01-14.03.02.05 (1986) (declaring
that HIV infection physical handicap under Maryland law); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 191.655.1 (1986) (including AIDS and AIDS-related complex (ARC) within
definition of handicap); PA. HUMAN RTs. COMM. DIRECTIVE, REAFFIRMATION OF
PHRC AIDS POLICY, POLICY No 88-01 (June 2, 1988) (declaring AIDS a handicap
for person regarded or treated as having AIDS).
272. Query whether a symptomless HIV-infected person is handicapped under the
Rehabilitation Act? See Local 1812, AFGE v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F.
Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (where the court stated that an HIV-infected person is not
an "otherwise qualified individual" for worldwide Foreign Service duty).
Are all HIV carriers physically impaired because of measurable deficiencies in
their immune systems even where disease symptoms have not yet developed? Arline
appears to require that management make an individual determination and, thus, an
employer covered under the Act cannot make a generalization with respect to all HIV-
infected persons.
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issue.m Employers who disclose the results of an employee's test risk tort
liability for invasion of privacy. 4
It is of note that arbitrators, when deciding AIDS cases, apply traditional
notions of just cause, and require management to demonstrate that the afflicted
employee cannot perform the assigned work before dismissal is allowed.275
In this respect arbitrators track the intent of the Act.
b. Obesity as a Disability under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Ac 76
While merely being overweight is not a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act,mn no court has held that obesity can never be a handicap under Section
504 of the Act. Most courts, never bothering to discuss the difference
between severe or morbid obesity, obesity, and simply being overweight,278
273. Compare Glover v. East Neb. Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d
461, 464 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989) (state administrative agency's
policy of requiring certain employees to submit to AIDS and hepatitis B test in order
to provide safe environment for mentally retarded clients unreasonable search and
seizure) with Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 827 (5th Cir. 1990)
(allowing dismissal of male homosexual nurse, who had long-term relationship with
man who ultimately dies from AIDS-related condition, for failing to disclose results
of AIDS test).
See also Doe v. Attorney General, 723 F. Supp 452 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (upholding
testing for physician by health care facility); Local 1812, AFGE v. United States Dep't
of State, 662 F. Supp 50 53 (D.D.C. 1987) (allowing testing by State Department of
Foreign Service employees).
274. Cronan v. New England Tel., 1 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 651 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1986).
275. For an excellent discussion on the rulings of arbitrators in AIDS cases, see
Roger Abrams & Dennis Nolan, AIDS in LaborArbitration, DAILY JOURNAL REPORT,
March 29, 1991, at 24-35.
276. We are thankful to Lynette Labinger, of Roney & Labinger, the Rhode
Island Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, Providence, Rhode Island, for
sharing their pleadings and motions with us from Cook v. State of Rhode Island, C.A.
90-0560-T, a case involving obesity under the Rehabilitation Act.
277. Underwood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (154-pound female flight attendant not handicapped).
278. As stated by one court, "the difference between 'obesity' and 'overweight'
is not merely one of semantics." Id. at 95. Obesity is not simply a physical
characteristic but a clinically ascertainable and observable medical condition. See, e.g.,
State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1985) ("Mhe Commissioner could find that the complainant's obese condition itself,
which was clinically diagnosed and found to render her medically unsuitable by the
respondent's own physician, constituted an impairment and therefore a disability within
[Vol. 57
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have held that "obesity" is not a handicap, and thus failing to hire or
discharging an individual based on his weight is not unlawful discrimination
in violation of the Act. Courts have based this conclusion on the fact that the
obesity adversely affects job performance," 9 and that employers are entitled
to control productivity by refusing to hire or by discharging those employees
who are likely to be absent often and who are less productive.m Additional-
ly, even though the statute does not differentiate between voluntary and
involuntary conditions, courts have found that obesity should not be
considered a handicap because the condition is able to be altered, unlike other
handicaps such as lameness or blindness."s
Suppose that a person is clinically obese, or regarded by the employer as
clinically obese, or has a record of being clinically obese, through no fault of
the individual, and the obesity substantially limits a major life activity
(walking, breathing, or even working, for example)? Is that person handi-
capped under the Act? There is some reason to conclude that, under these
circumstances, severe or morbid obesity is a handicap under the statute. In
Civil Service Commission of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commissionm the court relied on a "perceived handicap" analysis to affirm
an agency finding that obesity is a handicap under Pennsylvania law. A
comparison of the Pennsylvania statute with the Rehabilitation Act indicates
that the state statute tracked the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicap.
Similarly, in State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox, 3 the Court of
Appeals for New York held that a female, 5 feet, 6 inches and weighing 249
pounds, seeking a job as a computer programmer, suffered from a "disability"
the contemplation of the statute.").
Being overweight, on the other hand, is a lay term that could refer to being above
the suggested weight and height tables.
279. See Greene v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981);
Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 699 S.W.2d 75 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd.,
413 N.Y.S.2d 233,234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home,
415 N.W.2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1987) (stating in dictum that state law may comprehend
condition which significantly impairs person's abilities, but holding that plaintiff failed
to show that there was genuine issue whether her obesity fell within protections of
Act); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n, 448 A.2d 701, 707 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
280. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights, 413 N.Y.S.2d 233,
234 (1979).
281. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 448 A.2d at 707 (accepting principle that morbid
obesity could fall within definition of handicap or disability under state law, but
holding that it was not a handicap per se).
282. 591 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
283. 480 N.E.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. 1985).
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under New York's Human Rights Law (which included medical impairments
in its definition of disability). What is particularly interesting is that the court
rejected management's arguments that it could deny employment because of
the statistical likelihood that Catherine McDermott's obese condition would
produce impairments in the future.2 The court also rejected the company's
argument that the statute applied only to immutable disabilities and not to
those which are correctable.2u
Case law suggests that a claim that clinical obesity is a handicap should
not be dismissed by a trial court for failure to state a claim unless it is clear
to the court that relief could not be granted under the Act under any set of
facts that could be proved consistently with the allegations.' Consistent
with the decisions of the Pennsylvania and New York courts, before rejecting
a claim of handicap discrimination regarding obesity, an individualized, fact-
intensive examination should be conducted. The fact that obesity is not
included in the federal definition promulgated by HHS is not dispositive of the
issue.
c. Drug and Alcohol Addiction
As noted, under the federal statute the term "handicap" does not include
any individual who is an alcohol or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol
or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question.2  Thus, drug addicts and alcoholics are not categorically excluded
from coverage of the Rehabilitation Act. They are excluded only if their
current use prevents them from performing the duties of the job or if their
employment "would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of
others."'
284. Id. at 697.
285. Id. at 698.
286. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
287. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
288. Id. Query under what conditions would addiction to nicotine would prevent
someone from currently performing ajob or would constitute a direct threat to property
or to the safety of others? Under the law we see no reason why management cannot
exclude smokers as a class because of their economic impact on the organization. See
Leila B. Boulton, Comment, Tobacco UnderFire: Developments in JudicialResponses
to Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 643, 645 n.11 (1987) (asserting
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Similarly, several states have statutes that expressly exclude alcohol or
drug abusers from protection under their handicap acts. 9 In those states
that do not address the issue, the courts are split.29 We know of no case
that does not allow for the dismissal of an employee who reports for work
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.2 1
d. Smoking as a Handicap under the Rehabilitation Act
It is unclear whether smoking caused by nicotine addiction is a handicap
under the Rehabilitation Act. Under the Court's test in Arline, an argument
can be advanced that a long-time smoker or, alternatively, one addicted to
nicotine, is a handicapped individual because he has a "physical impairment"
of a "body system" that limits the "life activities" of breathing and working.
Under this logic, management would have to accommodate smokers. One
commentator, points out that even if smoking is found to be a handicap,
smoke-cessation classes, restricted smoking areas, and distributing nicotine
gum might be considered reasonable accommodation for employees who
smoke.'
289. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(4)(a) (1956); CAL. FAIR EMPLOYMENT
& HOUSING COMM. RULES & REGS. § 7293.6(a)(4) tit. 56 (1988); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 66-502(2) (1988); 56 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 2500.20 (1984); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 207.140(2)(b) (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2253(2) (West 1989);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(4)(a) (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op.
1976); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221(k)(2.01)(7)(A) (Vernon 1987); VA. CODE
ANN. § 51.5.3 (Michie 1991).
Some states expressly include drug addiction and alcoholism as protected
conditions. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. § 3.02c.2(a) (West 1991); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-
3(t) (1991).
290. See, e.g., Clowes v. Terminix Int'l Inc., 538 A.2d 794 (N.J. 1988) (finding
alcoholism a handicap); Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio
1986); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 273 N.W.2d 206,212-23 (Wis. 1979) (alcoholism a handicap); Doe v. Roe.,
Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 876 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), aff'd 553 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (drug addiction handicap under New York Human Rights Law).
Contra Welsh v. Municipality of Anchorage, 676 P.2d 601 (Alaska 1984)
(alcoholism a handicap); Phillips v. City of Seattle, 766 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Wash. 1989)
(refusing to define alcoholism as handicap).
291. See, e.g., Harper v. Louisiana State Bd. of Nursing, 484 So.2d 857, 858-61
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting discharge if drugs or alcohol makes employee unable
safely and substantially to perform job duties); Blitz v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 363
N.W.2d 94, 96-97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (pilot); Squires v. Labor & Indus. Rev.
Comm'n, 294 N.W.2d 48, 49-57 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
292. Joan Vogel, Comment, Containing Medical and Disability Costs by Cutting
Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE
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An alternative remedy for a smoker who has been excluded from
employment consideration or otherwise discriminated against because of his
addiction is a Title VII suit under a disparate impact theory293 If it can be
demonstrated that blacks as a class have a higher percentage of smokers than
whites,294 management will be compelled to demonstrate a business necessi-
ty test for an off-duty, no-smoking rule which, in many cases, may be a
difficult burden for management to meet.
4. The Americans With Disabilities Act
On July 13, 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),295 which broadened the scope of protection available under the
Rehabilitation Act (which covers only employers who contract with the federal
government). While the Act regulates a variety of areas including real estate
transactions and public accommodations, the provisions dealing with
employment are particularly important for employers attempting to regulate
their employees' lifestyle or, alternatively, divest themselves of employees
whose disabilities may result in higher medical or insurance costs.
The Act defines an employer as any person or his agent having 15 or
more employees. Employers with less than 15 employees are not covered by
the Act.' The ADA excludes the federal government or any corporation
owned by the federal government. 297  All other public employers are
covered.
The ADA protects "qualified individuals with disabilities. '298 The
statute provides that a qualified individual with a disability may not be
discriminated against if with "reasonable accommodation" the individual can
DAME L. REV. 1024, 1037 (1987).
293. See the discussion of disparate impact theory, supra notes 138-41 and
accompanying text.
294. In 1986, the Centers for Disease Control found that black men smoked at a
rate of 32.5 percent while white men smoked at 29.3 percent. Black women smoked
at 25.1 percent compared to 23.7 percent for white women. See John C. Fox and
Bernadette M. Davison, Smoking in the Workplace: Accommodating Diversity, LAB.
L. J. 387, 388 n. 5 (1989) (citing Cigarette Smoking in the United States, 1986,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 582 September 11, 1987).
295. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12112 (Supp. 1990). See generally Robert E. Stein, The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, ARB. J. 6, 6-15 (1991).
296. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(A) (Supp. 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e)(1) (1990). The
provisions of the ADA do not become effective until July 26, 1992, for those
employers with 25 or more employees. The effective date for those employers with
less than 25 but more than 14 is July 26, 1994.
297. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) (Supp. 1990); 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(e)(2) (1990).
298. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. 1990).
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perform the essential functions of the position sought or held.2' The Act
defines a qualified individual with a disability as one:
"who with reasonable modification of rules, policies, or practices, the removal
of architectural, communication or transportation barriers, or the provisions of
auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility for participation in
programs or activities or receipt of service provided by a public entity. '3 °
This definition also protects the qualified individual from hiring and
employment practices that are discriminatory.
Under the ADA a "covered disability" is defined as a "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."3'°1 A
record of prior impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment
is also considered a covered disability.302 Physical or mental impairments
include: (1) physiological disorders or conditions; (2) cosmetic disfigurement;
(3) anatomical loss affecting a number of designated systems; 3 3 (4) mental
or psychological disorders, including (a) mental retardation, (b) organic brain
syndrome, (c) emotional illness, (d) mental illness, (e) special learning
disabilities;3°4 (5) disease or infections, including HIV infection (AIDS),
cancer, heart disease, drug addiction, and alcoholism.
A physical or mental impairment is not a disability if it does not
substantially limit one or more "major life activities. 30 5 According to the
ADA, a major life activity includes "caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, reaching, learning, and work-
ing."3°6 To have a disability, one must have an actual physical or mental
impairment and not simply a physical condition. Thus, an individual with a
visual impairment would be covered but a person with two broken legs would
not be covered even though that condition would impair working. Further, the
disability must be serious enough to affect some form of major life activity.
The second and third definition of disability, which tracks the definition
in the Rehabilitation Act, includes persons with a record or history of
impairment and persons regarded as being disabled. The person with a history
of past disability is protected by the ADA, even if he has recovered from the
impairment.30 The Act covers individuals who associate with people with
disabilities. Thus, if a person is excluded from employment because he lives
299. Id.
300. Id. § 12131(2).
301. Id. § 12102(2)A.
302. Id. § 12102(2)B, C.
303. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1990).
304. Id. § 1630.2(b)2.
305. Id. § 1630.2(g)(i).
306. Id. § 1630.2(i).
307. Id. § 1630.2(g)(2).
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with an HIV-infected person, the Act provides a safe harbor if management
discriminates against that person because of that association.
A number of disabilities are excluded from the statute. Section 114(a)
of the Act states that employees or applicants engaged in illegal drug use are
excluded from the Act's protection. The "drug user" exclusion applies to any
individual whose drug use is current.3° Thus, a person who has successful-
ly completed a drug rehabilitation program and is no longer using drugs is
protected under the Act. Similarly, a person who is erroneously regarded as
an illegal drug user is protected. The Act allows testing for illegal drugs.
Also specifically excluded are homosexuals, bisexuals, transvestites,
transsexuals, pedophiles, exhibitionists, voyeurs, kleptomaniacs, compulsive
gamblers, pyromaniacs, and persons with other sexual disorders °.3  Employ-
ees whose lifestyles include any of the above are not protected by the ADA.
What is management prohibited from doing? The ADA prohibits a
covered employer from discrimination with respect to hiring an employee
against "qualified individuals with disabilities" because of the person's
disability. The ADA lists a number of different forms of discrimination,
including (1) limiting, segregating or classifying disabled persons; 310 (2)
participating in contractual relationships that effectuate discrimination; 311 (3)
enacting standards, criteria, and methods of administration that effectuate
discrimination; 312 (4) excluding or denying jobs or benefits because of a
relationship to individuals with disabilities; 313 (5) using qualification
standards, employment tests, all other selection criteria that effectuate
discrimination.1 4 Employers' medical examinations cannot ask applicants
if they have a disability or require applicants to take a medical exam before
a job is offered. However, after offering a job the employer can require the
employee to take a medica exam but only if required of all employees and the
results are kept confidential. Of course, management can always ask an
applicant if he can perform the job.
Finally, the ADA provides that failure to make reasonable accommoda-
tion may not be actionable if there would be undue hardship on the employer.
The Act defines undue hardship as an act requiring significant difficulty or
expense. 35 If a qualified individual is discriminated against in violation of
308. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (Supp. 1990).
309. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d)(1) (1990).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (Supp. 1990).
311. Id. § 12112(b)(2).
312. Id. § 12112(b)(3)A.
313. Id. § 12112(b)4.
314. Id. § 12112(b)6.
315. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(i), (iii), (iv). Various factors taken into account include:
(1) the nature of the cost accommodation required; (2) the overall financial resources
[Vol. 57
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the ADA, numerous remedies are available. Temporary or preliminary relief,
such as temporary restraining orders, permanent injunctions, additional
backpay, and equitable relief are available. The employer may also be forced
to pay the employee's attorney's fees if a violation is found.316
5. Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income
. Security Act (ERISA)
An employee who can establish a causal connection between a medical
risk and the loss of benefits and an adverse employment action may have
relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Section
510 of ERISA,317 makes it unlawful:
for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate
against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is
entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, [or this title]
.... It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel
or discriminate against any person because he has given information or has
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this
[Act]. ... 318
Section 510 is relevant because it may provide redress for employees who are
dismissed or otherwise discriminated against because they are considered
insurance or medical risks.319 Section 510 also applies to beneficiaries-a
person designated by a participant or one entitled to receive benefits under the
terms of an employee's benefit plan. It does not cover job applicants or
employees who have no benefits. Accordingly, an applicant who is refused
of the facility invoked in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; (3) the
number of persons employed at the facility; (4) the effect of the reasonable accommo-
dation on expenses and resources; (5) the impact of the accommodation on the
operation of the facility; (6) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; (7)
the overall size of the covered entity's business with respect to the number of
employees; (8) the number, type, and location of its facilities; (9) the type of
operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and function of
its workforce; (10) the geographic separateness of the facility; and (11) the administra-
tion or fiscal relationships of the facility to the covered entity. Id. All factors should
be taken into account when determining whether a particular accommodation is
reasonable under the ADA.
316. Id. § 12117(a).
317. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
318. Id.
319. See generally Vogel, supra note 283, at 1024.
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employment because of his anticipated medical costs has no cause of action
under section 510.
In a decision with far-reaching implications for employees with AIDS or
drug or alcohol problems, the Fifth Circuit, in McGann v. H & H Music
Co.,320 ruled that a self-insured employer can change its policy to reduce
coverage for workers who develop costly illnesses.321 John McGann,. an
employee of H & H Music, discovered that he was afflicted with AIDS in
December of 1987.322 McGann submitted his first claims for reimbursement
under the employer's group medical plan and informed management that he
had AIDS.323 In July 1988, H & H Music informed its employees that
effective August 1, 1988 changes would be made in their medical cover-
age.3' These changes included limiting benefits for AIDS-related claims to
a lifetime maximum of $5,000. 3' Before the change, the lifetime coverage
was $1 million.326 Other changes included increased individual and family
deductibles, elimination of coverage for chemical dependency treatment,
adoption of a preferred provider plan, and increased contribution requests.327
No limitation was placed on any other catastrophic illness.3" H & H Music
also became a self-insurer under the new plan.3' By January 1990,
McGann had exhausted the $5,000 limit on coverage for his illness.
In August 1989, McGann sued H & H Music under section 510 alleging
that the company discriminated against him in violation of both prohibitions
of section 510. He claimed that the provision limiting coverage for AIDS-
related expenses was directed specifically at him in retaliation for exercising
his rights under the plan and for the purpose of interfering with the attainment
of a right to which he may become entitled as a beneficiary under the
plan.330 The employer, conceding the factual allegations of McGann's
complaint, moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment,33' reasoning that management had an absolute right to alter the
terms of the plan, regardless of intent. The district court also held that even
if the issue of discriminatory motive were relevant, summary judgment would
320. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).
321. Id. at 402-05.
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still be proper because the employer's motive was to ensure the future
existence of the plan and not specifically to retaliate against McGann.5
32
In sustaining the lower court, the appellate court pointed out that, at trial,
McGann would bear the burden of proving the existence of the employer's
discriminatory intent as an element of either of his claims. 33  McGann
conceded that the reduction in AIDS benefits will apply equally to all
employees filing AIDS-related claims and the effect of this reduction will not
be felt only by him. Also, he did not allege that the company's reduction had
any other purpose other than to reduce costs. As such, McGann could not
make the necessary showing sufficient to show that management had a
specific intent to retaliate against him to survive summary judgment.
Similarly, McGann failed to adduce evidence of the existence of "any
right to which [he] may become entitled under the plan."3  The court made
it clear that the right referred to in section 510 "is not simply any right to
which an employee may conceivably become entitled, but rather any right to
which an employee may become entitled pursuant to an existing, enforceable
obligation assumed by the employer."335 There was nothing to indicate that
H & H Music ever promised that the $1 million coverage limit was permanent
and there was no evidence that any oral or written representations were made
to McGann that the coverage limit would be lowered. The court refused to
rule that section 510 prohibits any discrimination in the alteration of an
employee benefit plan that results in an identifiable employee or group of
employees being treated differently than other employees. Reflecting the
better weight of authority, the court concluded:
[Section 510] does not prohibit welfare plan discrimination between or
among categories of diseases. Section 510 does not mandate that if some,
or most, or virtually all catastrophic illnesses are covered, AIDS (or any
other particular catastrophic illness) must be among them. It does not
prohibit an employer from electing not to cover or continue to cover AIDS,
while covering or continuing to cover other catastrophic illnesses, even
though the employer's decision in this respect may stem from some
"prejudice" against AIDS or its victims generally. The same, of course, is
true of any other disease and its victims. That sort of "discrimination" is
simply not addressed by section 510.336
332. Id.
333. Id. at 403-04.
334. Id. at 404.
335. Id. at 404-05.
336. Id. at 405.
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The implications of McGann, and similar cases,337 are staggering for
employees who develop a catastrophic illness and work for an employer that
is self insured.3  Under federal law, employers are free to discriminate in
the creation, alteration or termination of employee benefits plans. Employers
are not free to retaliate against an employee, such as effecting a dismissal, or
to deprive an employee of an existing right. A fair reading of the law is that
companies that adopt self-insurance programs, and thus are able to avoid state
regulation, are, in effect, free to classify risks and eliminate coverage at whim.
It is difficult to imagine any employer who cannot articulate a legitimate
business purpose, such as saving money, for eliminating coverage.
B. State Statutes
1. State and Local Fair Employment Statutes
Virtually all states have enacted statutes or ordinances prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age.
Because Title VII requires the EEOC to initially defer processing charges of
employment discrimination to those states that have enacted a comprehensive
fair employment statute (defined as a "706 agency"),3 39 the operation of a
state or local statute should have particular relevance for the labor or
management practitioner. As noted, state statutes are important to employees
with unconventional lifestyles because many states will cover forms of
discrimination (marital status and sexual orientation, for example) which are
excluded under Title VII 0 0
2. Developments in State Laws Aimed at Preserving
an Employee's Privacy-Type Rights
Some states have enacted statutes or have constitutions that apply
constitutional-type rights, such as privacy, to all employees, regardless of
337. See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991)
(unilateral modification of existing plan to provide a $25,000 cap on AIDS coverage
not supportive of section 510 claim).
338. Over half of all employees work for companies that are partially or fully self
insured. R. Pear, Court Approves Cuts in Benefits in Costly Illness, THE N.Y. TIMES
Nov. 27, 1991 at 1.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1988).
340. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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whether they work for a public or private sector employer.31  When
applicable, employees may find a safe harbor for lifestyle protection.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
To what extent is the constitution a "safe harbor" for employees with
bizarre or unconventional lifestyles? Suppose management disapproves of the
sexual partners, associations, or speech of its employees? Can a public
employer dismiss or fail to hire such employees? This section addresses the
constitution as a limitation on management's power to regulate the lifestyles
of its employees.
Background. A public-sector employee dismissed because of off-duty
lifestyle conduct may be protected under the constitution. Specifically, at the
state level the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits deprivations of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. Application of this prohibition
requires a two-stage analysis: a court will first determine whether the asserted
individual interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of "life, liberty, or property"; if protected interests are implicated,
the court then decides what procedures constitute "due process of law" or,
stated differently, the type of notice and hearing to which the individual is
entitled under the amendment. 2 As the Supreme Court has noted, "The
341. See, e.g., Paradis v. United Technologies Pratt & Whitney Div., 672 F. Supp.
67 (D. Conn. 1987); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska
1989); Garrett v. Los Angeles City Unified Sch. Dist., 172 Cal. Rptr. 170, 174 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding that chest x-ray for tuberculosis as condition of employment
not violative of state constitutional right of privacy); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431
N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982).
342. Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that "[no state] shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
The Fifth Amendment is a limitation only upon the actions of the federal government,
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), and in part provides that "no
person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONsT. amend. V. It is settled that although not explicitly drafted in the language
of the Fifth Amendment, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an
equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminat-
ing among individuals or groups. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
While most case law regarding off-duty conduct involves a state as employer, the
discussion in this section has applicability to the federal government as employer
although, in many instances, the forum for resolving federal employee constitutional
claims will not be the courts but arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (1988) (providing that all collective bargaining agreements in the
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question is not merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the
nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or
property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment."0
43
The significance of concluding that an individual has a protected property
or liberty interest in some aspect of his employment is that he cannot be
denied that interest without due process of law. From a procedural standpoint,
an employee facing discipline or discharge for questionable conduct who has
some property or liberty interest in continued employment is entitled to
procedural due process. Equally important, substantive guarantees are also
inherent in the due process clause. Justice John Harlan, rejecting the view that
the due process clause is a guarantee only of procedural fairness, declared that
the due process clause contains both a substantive and a procedural compo-
nent. As stated by Justice Harlan, if due process was simply "a procedural
safeguard it would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life,
liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the
future could, given even the fairest possible procedure in application to
individuals, nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three. Thus the
guarantees of due process, . . . have in this country 'become bulwarks also
against arbitrary legislation. ' s,
4
In a nutshell, substantive due process means fundamental fairness. The
test applied for finding a violation of substantive due process involves a
"balancing of the nature of the individual interest allegedly infringed, the
importance of the government interests furthered, the degree of infringement,
and the sensitivity of the government entity responsible for the regulation to
more carefully tailored alternative means of achieving its goals."345 Thus,
federal sector contain a procedure for settlement of grievances, including questions of
arbitrability). Moreover, arbitration decisions involving employee removals,
suspensions for more than 14 days, reductions in grade or pay, or furloughs of 30 days
or less ("Category II" claims), are subject to review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f) (1988).
Alternatively, a federal employee may elect to process a grievance through the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB), with appeal to the federal circuit. For Category
II issues, the arbitrator is governed by the same criteria and standards that would
govern the MSPB. See FRANK ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 54-55 (4th ed.
1985). In both the arbitral and the MSPB forum, as well as on appeal to the Federal
Circuit, employees may argue that the federal government is precluded by the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause from adversely affecting an individual's employment
status.
343. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
344. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)).
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an employee with an unconventional lifestyle asserting a violation of due
process must convince a court that his conduct encompasses a property or
liberty interest worthy of constitutional protection.
A. Property Interests
In a 1985 case the Supreme Court declared that property interests "are not
created by the Constitution, 'they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law ... ."'6 The leading case in this area continues to be Board
of Regents v. Roth s 7 where the Court discussed the basis for a public
employee's claim of a property right in continued employment. In that case
a university professor argued that his employer's failure to provide any reason
or hearing for his nonrenewal violated procedural due process.38 The Court
reasoned that, prior to determining what form of hearing is required under the
due process clause, it must first be ascertained whether a liberty or property
interest has been denied.349 Although the Court recognized that the re-
employment of Roth by the university was of major concern to him, the Court
nevertheless held that the nonrenewal decision violated neither a liberty nor
a property interest where the state did not make any charge that might
seriously damage Roth's standing in the community or impose on him a
stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of
other employment.3 50 The Court further stated that in order to have a
property interest in a benefit one must have more than an abstract demand for
it; a "legitimate claim of entitlement" is mandated.' Roth's property
interest in employment, the Court reasoned, was created and defined in the
terms of his employment, and since the university made no provisions
whatsoever for renewal, no procedural infirmity existed in the denial of a
hearing.
352In Perry v. Sindermann, a companion case to Roth, the Court made
it clear that implied promises may give rise to a property interest under the
due process clause. Sindermann involved another professor serving on a year-
to-year basis whose employment was not renewed and who had not been
granted a hearing. The Court ruled that a potential property interest in
346. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,538-39 (1985) (quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
347. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
348. Id. at 565.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 577.
352. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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continued employment existed where the university had a de facto tenure
system for professors after seven or more years of service.' 3 In remanding
the case to the district court, the Court found that Sindermann, who had taught
at a state college for 10 years, must be accorded the opportunity to establish
that his property interest was secured by explicit rules and understandings of
the institution.5 4
The Court, in Bishop v. Wood,355 stated that where a property interest
is created by state law, the issue of what satisfies due process is determined
by reference to the appropriate state statute creating that right. Of particular
note in the employment area, the Court declared that the due process clause
"is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions. 35 6
More recently, however, the Court said in 1985 that "'[w]hile the legislature
may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred,
without appropriate procedural safeguards. ''357
B. Liberty Interests
In Meyer v. Nebraska,3 58 the Supreme Court, discussing the nature of
a liberty interest, stated:
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.359
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has placed several limitations
upon a public employee's ability to prove a deprivation of liberty under the
Constitution.36 The Court has held that in order to make a successful claim
353. Id.
354. Id. at 602-03.
355. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
356. Id. at 350.
357. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 541 (quoting Amett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part)).
358. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
359. Id. at 399.
360. In Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 294 (1984), the Third Circuit
stated that
[a]n employment action implicates a fourteenth amendment liberty interest
only if it (1) is based on a 'charge against [the individual] that might
[Vol. 57
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of liberty deprivation, an employee must demonstrate that the dismissal
resulted in the publication of information36' that either put the employee's
reputation or integrity at stake, or was stigmatizing.3 2 The information
must have the general effect of curtailing the employee's future freedom of
choice or action.m3 A liberty interest is not implicated merely because
nonretention on one job, taken alone, might make an individual somewhat less
attractive to other employers.364 As pointed out by one commentator, "To
rise to the level of a deprivation of liberty, the foreclosure of other employ-
ment opportunities [has] to be more severe, like the foreclosure achieved
through regulations barring an employee from future employment in a
particular jurisdiction."36 Simply stated, "[t]he mere fact of discharge from
a government position does not deprive a person of a liberty interest,"3
although it may deprive an individual of a property interest, as in the case of
a tenured public employee.
In Paul v. Davis,367 and Siegert v. Gilley,36 the Court held that repu-
tation alone is not a protected liberty interest when the action is not accompa-
nied by an alteration of the individual's legal status. As such, a defamation
unaccompanied by an adverse personnel action or, alternatively, minor
"personnel actions-such as reprimands, internal transfers, and investigatory-
reports now escape procedural scrutiny under" the Davis and Gilley deci-
sions.?9
seriously damage his standing and associations in the community ... for
example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality' or (2)
'impose[s] on him a stigma or other disability that forecloses his freedom
to take advantage of other employment opportunities.'
Id. at 294 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).
361. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
362. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
363. Sipes v. United States, 744 F.2d 1418, 1422 (10th Cir. 1984) ("a liberty
interest may be impinged if the Government 'imposed on him a stigma or disability
that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities."')
(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, citing Asbill v. Choctaw Housing Auth., 726 F.2d
1499 (10th Cir. 1984) (no denial of liberty interest because intra-govemment
dissemination of reasons for employee's dismissal does not constitute "published")).
364. Roth, 408 U.S. at 574 n.13.
365. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1780,
1788 (1984).
366. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 905, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1069 (1981).
367. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
368. 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991) (stating that "[d]efamation, by itself, is a tort
actionable under the laws of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation.")
369. See Developments in the Law, supra note 338, at 1790.
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C. What Process Is Due?
Once an individual proves that a property or liberty interest has been
impermissibly infringed upon by the state, a determination must be made as
to what procedural process is due. It is often the case that a state statute, an
ordinance, or even a collective bargaining agreement370 sets out the specific
procedures to be followed where an individual has been adversely affected. In
this situation the procedures must be substantially followed and must not be
less restrictive than the minimal constitutional constraints of due process.
371
With respect to the minimal constitutional guarantees, the Court, as early as
1854, made it clear that a government entity is not free to make any process
"due process," and that the courts, in effecting the due process guarantee, must
examine "not [the] particular forms of procedure, but the very substance of
individual rights to life, liberty, and property."37 In this respect, due process
does not necessarily mandate a court proceeding in every case where property
or liberty interests are affected. 73
More recently, the Court stated that "'the root requirement' of the Due
Process Clause [is] 'that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing
before he is deprived of any significant property interest"'; 374 however, the
Court, in a footnote, did recognize that there are "some situations in which a
370. See, e.g., Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1984)
(indicating in dictum that grievance procedure providing for arbitration might be
procedurally adequate); Hamilton v. Adult Educ. Dist., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3197
(E.D. Wis. 1985) (holding that plaintiff-janitors' collective bargaining agreement
"provided all the process that was due them");
371. See the discussion by Justice White, writing for the majority, in Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540 (1985) (rejecting the argument that
where the legislature which confers the substantive right also sets out the procedural
mechanism for enforcing that right the individual "must take the bitter with the
sweet").
372. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
373. The late Justice Felix Frankfurter, in suggesting a balancing test, stated that
every case must be considered by itself:
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the
office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the consider-
ations that must enter into the judicial judgment.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
374. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 534-35 (emphasis in original quoting
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
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post deprivation hearing will satisfy due process requirements,""7 5 comment-
ing, "[i]n general, 'something less' than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient
prior to adverse administrative action." 76 What is particularly interesting
is that, in balancing the competing interests, the Court appeared to accord




Case law suggests that a public employer, in dismissing a nonprobation-
ary employee, should provide either oral or written notice of the charges and
an opportunity for a pretermination hearing of some kind. The hearing need
not be a full adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to governmental action, 3 7
but may simply be a request that the employee provide his or her side of the
story in person or in writing to management. While the pretermination hearing
"need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge," it should serve
as an initial check against clearly incorrect decisions.3 79 As stated by the
Court, it should be "essentially, a determination of whether there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true
and support the proposed action.
38 0
375. Id. at 542.
376. Id. at 545 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976)).
377. Id. at 543.
With respect to the government's interests in immediate termination, the Court
said:
[A]ffording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination
would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable
delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the employee's interest in
avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions; and until the matter is settled,
the employer would continue to receive the benefit of the employee's
labors. It is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new
one. A governmental employer also has an interest in keeping citizens
usefully employed rather than taking the possibly erroneous and counter-
productive step of forcing its employees onto the welfare rolls. Finally, in
those situations where the employer perceives a significant hazard in
keeping the employee on the job, it can avoid the problem by suspending
with pay.
Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted).
378. The Court, in Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-47, noted that in only one case,
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has the Court required a hearing of this type.
379. Id. at 532-33.
380. Id. at 533.
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D. Deprivation of Protected Interests
There is no question that otherwise "terminable-at-will government
employees, while they may generally be discharged for any number of reasons
or for no reason at all, may not be discharged for exercising their constitution-
al rights."38' At the same time, the courts have indicated that the state may
have a greater interest in regulating the conduct of its employees than the
activities of the population at large.' Although there is overlap between
them, four areas are of particular interest in the off-duty lifestyle areas: (1)
political affiliation or patronage, (2) privacy, (3) association and speech, and
(4) morality standards.
1. Political Association
The Seventh Circuit has stated the black letter law regarding limitations
on a public employee's political affiliations as follows: "A public agency that
fires an employee because of his political beliefs or political affiliations
infringes his freedom of speech."' 3 The court went on to note that "there
are exceptions to this principle, carved out to minimize its adverse impact on
the effective functioning of government. '  Employees at the policy-
making level of government can therefore be fired on political grounds. 5
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has recognized that a public employer
cannot run a government with officials who are forced to keep political
enemies as their confidential secretaries.3m In Branti v. Finkel,387 the
Supreme Court stated that "the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label
'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question
is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office
involved."m Applying this test, the Court concluded that the continued
381. McMullen v. Carson, 568 F. Supp. 937, 943 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (upholding
dismissal of clerk typist for active membership in Ku Klux Klan).
382. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
383. Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1985).
384. Id.; see also Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (patronage dismissals
prohibited by first amendment).
385. Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 722 F.2d 1307 (7th Cir.
1983).
386. Soderbeck, 752 F.2d at 288; see also De La Cruz v. Pruitt, 590 F. Supp.
1296 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (reversing dismissal of government nonpolicymaking and
nonconfidential employee for political beliefs).
387. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
388. Id. at 518.
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employment of an assistant public defender could not properly be conditioned
upon his allegiance to the political party in control of the county government.
If an employer cannot demonstrate that the employee's party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the job, dismissal
cannot be effected. The focus is on the powers of the office and not on the
tasks of the officeholder.
2. Privacy
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy, in a line of decisions going back to 1891, the Supreme Court has
recognized a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
"zones of privacy," that exist under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments, or in the concept of liberty granted by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2 "[O]nly rights that are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"' are included in the right to privacy.39° Privacy rights
extend to two types of interests: "[o]ne is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."
3 91
The Supreme Court has developed a three-tier test to review a state's
ability to regulate personal liberties. The top-tier or strict scrutiny test applies
to fundamental rights or suspect classifications. Under this test a regulation
limiting the exercise of a fundamental right must be justified by a "compelling
state interest and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to
empress only the legitimate state interest."" When a fundamental right is
not present, the lower-tier test is applied and requires only that the regulation
have a rational relationship to some legitimate state objective.393 The Court
has developed a middle-tier analysis to apply to conduct which is not
considered a fundamental right, but is significantly sensitive or. intimate. This
analysis requires that a regulation must "serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives. 394
Many public employees have successfully argued that regulation of off-
duty behavior by the state, unaccompanied by any nexus to the job, is an
389. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
390. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Navy's policy
of discharge for homosexual conduct not violative of any constitutional right to privacy
or equal protection).
391. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
392. Roe, 410 U.S. at 115-20.
393. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
394. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Case law indicates that public manage-
ment can discipline employees for off-duty conduct without constitutional
infirmity if that conduct does not involve a "fundamental" right. If it is
determined that an employee's conduct involves a "fundamental right," it can
only be abridged to the extent necessary to achieve a strong, clearly articulated
state interest. The Supreme Court has not exhaustively articulated those rights
that are "fundamental" or the kinds of interests that are within the "zone of
privacy" protected against unwarranted government intrusion. Instead, the
Court has taken a case-by-case approach. In certain contexts the Court has
extended a guarantee of privacy to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing and education, abortion, 395 and the private
paossession of obscene matter.
Most of the decisions that define the parameters or boundaries of
legitimate employer concern with an employee's off duty conduct are those
dealing with an employee's sexual practices. For example, several courts have
refused to recognize homosexual conduct as a privacy interest, although the
better view is that a public employee cannot be dismissed from employment
merely because he is a homosexual.397 One federal court pointed out that the
rationale for these decisions is that dismissal solely because of one's status as
a homosexual is "so arbitrary and capricious as to violate due process.1 398
395. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
396. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
397. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prohibiting
discharge on basis of sexual preference absent proven nexus between homosexual
conduct and disruption of agency efficiency); Swift v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 596,
602 (D.D.C. 1986) (denying government's motion to dismiss homosexual White House
stenographer's privacy claim, reasoning that "the government has not offered any
explanation as to how plaintiff's dismissal is related to a legitimate governmental
purpose."); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1148 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("right of
privacy extends to private sexual conduct between consenting adults-whether husband
and wife, unmarried males and females, or homosexuals"); benShalom v. Secretary of
the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 977 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (no "nexus" between homosexuality
and military capability); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(military service); Society for Indiv. Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal.
1973) (Civil Service Commission can discharge for immoral behavior only if behavior
"impairs the efficiency" of the service), affd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
1975).
398. Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(quoting Society for Indiv. Rts., 63 F.R.D. at 400); see also Morrison v. State Bd. of
Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 391 (Cal. 1969) (holding that male teacher who engaged fellow
male teacher in noncriminal physical homosexual relationship not subject to
disciplinary action under statute authorizing revocation of teacher's life diploma for
immoral or unprofessional conduct or moral turpitude absent nexus to ability to teach,
stating "[management] offered no evidence that a man of petitioner's background was
[Vol. 57
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Where dismissals or other disciplinary actions have been upheld, there has'
generally been a showing that the homosexual conduct was open and
notorious, or a finding that the state's interest in discipline, morale, or
efficiency outweighed the employee's privacy interests. '9 In Padula v.
Webster,' for example, the D.C. Circuit, applying an equal protection
analysis, found permissible the FBI's refusal to hire Margaret Padula because
she was a homosexual. Ruling that a challenged classification of homosexual-
ity need only satisfy a minimum standard of rationality, 40' the court refused
to recognize homosexuality as comparable to race, alienage, and national
origin, the three classifications recognized by the Supreme Court as deserving
of heightened scrutiny.4 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick, °3 a decision holding that the right to engage in consensual
homosexual sodomy4° is not constitutionally protected, the appellate court
reasoned that "[i]f the Court was unwilling to object to state laws that
criminalize the behavior that defines the class [homosexual], it is hardly open
to a lower court to conclude that the state-sponsored discrimination against the
class is invidious."
any more likely than the average adult male to engage in any untoward conduct with
a student.").
399. See Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1984)
("even if privacy interests were implicated in this case, they are outweighed by the
Government's interest in preventing armed service members from engaging in
homosexual conduct."); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (denial
of university employment because of "activist" role concerning the social status to be
accorded homosexuals), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); Endsley Y. Naes, 673 F.
Supp. 1032,1038 (D. Kan. 1987) (upholding dismissal of female police officer because
of rumors of her relationship with other road deputy); Naragon v. Wharton, 572 F.
Supp. 1117, 1124 (M.D. La. 1983) (sustaining reassignment of graduate assistant for
having homosexual relationship with university student not her student, rejecting
argument that employee's freedom of association was restricted).
400. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
401. Id. at 104.
402. Id. at 102.
403. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
404. The crime of "sodomy", punishable by imprisonment for up to twenty years,
was defined by Georgia law as "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another." GA CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1984). The
statute applies to all persons, whether married or single, heterosexual or homosexual.
Georgia is one of 19 states that outlaw all forms of sodomy, in contrast to those states
that criminalize only homosexual acts. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-1813 (Michie
1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1989).
79
Hill and Delacenserie: Hill: Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Similarly, extramarital heterosexual cohabitation has sometimes been
accorded constitutional protection4 5 but, more often, courts have denied this
activity protected status.' Some public-sector employers, with concurrence
405. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th
Cir. 1988) (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against individual who investigated
sexual harassment claim of employee and forced her to reveal facts about her sexual
history); Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1330-31 (9th Cir.
1987) (stating that Navy engineer "had a constitutional right to be free from
unnecessary, overbroad, or unregulated employer investigations into his sexual
practices .... "); Thome v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 470 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that reliance on private, non-job-related considerations on police officer
application form questions regarding possible pregnancy, abortion, and identity of
sexual partners violates constitutionally protected association and privacy interests),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984); Kukla v. Village of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 808
(N.D. I11. 1986) (police sergeant and female police dispatcher unmarried but living
together fall within "personal intimacies of the home"); Briggs v. North Muskegon
Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585,591 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (upholding constitutional right
of police officer to sexual privacy absent showing that cohabitation affected job
performance); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(holding that regulations permitting inquiry into off-duty relationship of police officers
violated officer's constitutional rights, stating: "a party's private sexual activities are
within the 'zone of privacy' protected from unwarranted government intrusion");
Mindel v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (postal clerk's
extramarital cohabitation protected).
406. See Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 482-83 (5th Cir.) (stating that "right
to privacy has not been infringed by the scope of the regulation proscribing, as conduct
prejudicial to good order, cohabitation of two police officers, or proscribing a superior
officer from sharing an apartment with one of lower rank."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965
(1983), discussed infra notes 424-30 and accompanying text; Suddarth v. Slane, 539
F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982) (dismissal of police officer for adultery permissible);
Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior College, 498 F. Supp. 555, 576 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(extramarital affair not protected within scope of privacy); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie
Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (sustaining dismissal of
public employees who were living together in a state of "open adultery," applying
minimum rationality test), afftd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052
(1978); Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Philadelphia, 414 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1980)
(upholding discharge). But see In re Dalessandro, 397 A.2d 743, 758 (Pa. 1979)
(judge's open and notorious adulterous relationship not subject to discipline).
Aside from consensual homosexual sodomy, the Supreme Court has yet to answer
the question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes from
regulating private consensual sexual behavior among adults. In addition, "[n]o
Supreme Court case has held that married persons have a constitutional right to engage
in adultery." Andrade v. City of Phoenix, 692 F.2d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 1982). See
generally K. Karst, The Freedom of htimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980);
Michael A. Woronoff, Note, Public Employees or Private Citizens: The Off-Duty
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from selected courts, have asserted that extramarital off-duty relationships are
permissible so long as the affair is "clandestine" rather than "open." When the
affair is exposed or, for whatever reason, becomes "unconventional"
(practicing polygamy, for example), °7 the employee's privacy interest is
often outweighed (in the eyes of the courts) by the public employer's interest
in "conventional" employees. In Shuman v. City of Philadelphia,408 for
example, a federal district court recognized that even though activities may be
within the protected "zone of privacy," this protection is by no means
absolute. It stated that "if the sexual activities of a public employee were
open and notorious, or if such activities took place in a small town, the public
employer might very well have an interest in investigating such activities and
possibly terminating an employee.",409 According to the court, "[iun such a
case, the actions of the public employee with respect to his or her private life
could be deemed to have a substantial impact upon his or her ability to
perform on the job. 41°
Likewise, an individual may give up any reasonable expectation of
privacy when he or she makes public the conduct that is arguably protect-
ed.411 Joining swingers clubs, 412 appearing on televised talk shows,
413
and having your picture in Beaver or Screw Magazine41 4 is not consistent
Sexual Activities of Police Officers and the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 195, 211 (1984).
407. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 849 (1985), where the court of appeals rejected the argument that a constitutional
right of privacy prevented the State of Utah from discharging a police officer for
entering into a polygamous marriage.
408. 470 F. Supp. 449, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir.) (presence of
onlooker in bedroom of married couple defeated couple's reasonable expectation of
privacy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior College,
498 F. Supp. 555, 576 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (admitting extramarital affair to several
persons).
412. See Pettit v. State Bd. of Ed., 513 P.2d 889, 890-91 (Cal. 1973) (holding that
teacher that joined "swingers" club, and who was observed by undercover police
officer committing three separate acts of oral copulation with three different men at a
party, was properly terminated for immoral and unprofessional conduct evidencing
unfitness to teach).
413. Id. at 890 ("appearing on Joe Pyne show discussing "nonconventional sexual
life styles").
414. Borges v. McGuire, 107 A.D.2d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (reversing
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with the assertion that one's privacy rights have been violated. An employee
who commences a tort action may also relinquish what would otherwise be a
privacy right as part of the discovery process.415
Applying the better rule, in Swope v. Bratton,416 a federal court stated
that a police department has an interest in and may investigate some areas of
the personal sexual activities of its employees "if the activities have an impact
upon job performance., 417 The court noted, however, that "in the absence
of a nexus between the personal, off-duty activities and poor job performance,
inquiry into these activities violates the constitutionally protected right of
privacy; a party's private sexual activities are within the 'zone of privacy' and
protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion." 418  In this case the
court concluded that a police chief did not have the right to order a policeman
to refrain from developing a "more than casual relationship" with a police
dispatcher, at least where the relationship was not "open and notorious" and
there was no "public outcry" or complaints by any citizen. Swope suggests
that public outcry and citizen complaints can be a criterion in determining
constitutional rights, a position long accepted by labor arbitrators419 in
deciding off-duty misconduct cases.
3. Association and Speech
There is no question that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association is, like speech and assembly, a fundamental right. As noted by
one judge, "[s]ince speech, assembly and association all serve a common
purpose-to promote the free exchange of ideas-defeating any one of these
rights might defeat them all. Freedom of association therefore stands as a
fundamental right in a free society."42 The Supreme Court has made it
clear that mere membership in an organization without specific advocacy of
any illegal conduct by the organization is protected by the Constitution.421
415. Ferrel v. Glen-Gery Brick, 678 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (employee
bringing claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress not entitled to protective
order forbidding disclosure of notes of psychiatrist, reasoning that when an employee
places her physical or mental condition at issue the privacy right is waived). But see
Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 410 (Cal. 1987) (recognizing some privacy
interest for employee commencing sexual harassment action).
416. 541 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
417. Id. at 108.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 109.
420. Curie v. Ward, 389 N.E.2d 1070, 1072, (N.Y. 1979) (Wachtler, J.
dissenting).
421. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (advocating illegal conduct at
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At the same time, however, not all public employees can rely on this standard.
For example, the courts have been consistent in holding that law enforcement
agencies are qualitatively different from other branches of government. In
McMullen v. Carson,4 " the Eleventh Circuit stated:
[t]he First Amendment does not protect personal behavior in the law
enforcement context to the same extent that it does in other areas of
Governmental concern. The need for high morale and internal discipline
in a police force led this Court to hold that "a reasonable likelihood of harm
generally is ... enough to support full consideration of the police
department's asserted interests in restricting its employees' speech." 423
Illustrating the extent to which a public employer can discipline a
protective service employee for off-duty association is Shawgo v.
Spradlin,424 a decision by the Fifth Circuit. In that case a patrolwoman and
a police sergeant were suspended from their jobs, and the sergeant demoted
to patrolman, because they dated and spent several nights together. These
punishments were imposed even though the department failed to provide any
notice that their conduct was prohibited.4 The district court ruled that the
officers did not have a protected property or privacy interest.416 The Fifth
Circuit, although recognizing a property interest, affirmed the decision, and the
some indefinite future time protected by first amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (First amendment protects advocacy of illegal conduct except
where conduct is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action .... );
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
The legal standards by which First Amendment claims are judged has been
outlined by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977). First the court must determine whether the employee's activity was
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 287. If so, the employee still has the burden
of showing that the activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the public
employer's decision to take adverse employment action against the employee. Id.
Having done so, the burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the same
action would have taken place absent the protected conduct. Id.
422. 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985).
423. Id. at 939-40 (quoting in part Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 839 n.12
(11th Cir. 1982)). See also Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796, 800 (W.D.N.Y. 1983),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986) ("An individual joining a police agency must
recognize that acceptance of such an important and sensitive position requires the
individual to forego certain privileges and even some rights that an ordinary citizen
often exercises without restrictions or thoughts of sanctions, because a police force is
a para-military organization with all the attendant requirements and circumstances.").
424. 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1983).
425. Id. at 478.
426. Id. at 473.
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Supreme Court, declining to review,427 let the ruling stand. The court of
appeals rejected the officers' argument that the state could not regulate their
off-duty association, reasoning that "th[e] argument fails to take into account
the fact that the right to privacy is not unqualified, ... and that the state has
more interest in regulating the activities of its employees than the activities of
the population at large."428 The court went on to point out that the burden
on the police officer is onerous in attacking management's regulations: the
officer, to sustain an attack, must demonstrate "that there is no rational
connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county's method of
organizing its police forc6, and the promotion of safety of persons and
property.",421 In this case the court found a rational connection between
"forbidding members of a quasi-military unit, especially those different in
rank, to share an apartment or to cohabit., 430
There are limits, however, even in the protective services. The Fifth
Circuit, in Wilson v. Taylor,43 overturned a decision of a lower court that
had ruled in favor of a police department that had fired an officer because of
his association with the daughter of a convicted felon and reputed crime
figure. The court of appeals pointed out that the fact that the individual is a
policeman does not obviate the need to balance the interests of the employee
427. 464 U.S. 965 (1983). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmum, dissented to the denial of a writ of certiorari, because he believed that
petitioners' conduct involved a fundamental right. Justice Brennan commented, "[t]he
intimate, consensual, and private relationship between petitioners involved both the
'interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters [and] the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions' ... that our cases have recognized as
fundamental." Id. at 971 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599-600 (1977)).
428. Shawgo, 701 F.2d at 482-83 (quoting Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245
(1976)).
429. Id. at 483 (quoting Kelly, 425 U.S. at 245).
430. Id; see also Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250 (7th Cir.) (upholding
discharge of police officer for giving female student off-duty motorcycle ride, rejecting
claim that ride constituted First Amendment right to speech or association), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 147 (1990); Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1983)
(sheriffs order that deputy sheriff cease associating with wife of reputed mobster not
violative of deputy's constitutional right of privacy), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058
(1986); Wilson v. Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555, 563-64 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (no First
Amendment right of association protecting police officer who had extra-marital affair
with another officer, reasoning that state has substantial interest is discouraging
adulterous conduct); Morrisette v. Dilworth, 89 A.D.2d 99 (N.Y. 1982) (discipline
sustained for police officer's association with "Jukebox Tony", a known felon,
applying "exacting scrutiny" test).
431. 658 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981).
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against the interests of the governmental employer: "[Plolicemen, like
teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights." '432 Still, the court noted that "several courts have read
into the balance more deference to the state interest in preserving the morale
and integrity of police departments than might be appropriate in other
contexts. 4 3 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in Battle v. Mulholland,4' ruled
that a black police officer could not be dismissed because he and his wife
permitted two white single women to board with them. Absent a showing that
his associations "would materially and substantially impair his usefulness as
a police officer," the court rejected the argument that his living situation may
have an adverse impact upon the racial tension in a southern town.435
Another federal court, in Burns v. Pomerleau,4m held that a police depart-
ment could not refuse the application for position of probationary patrolman
solely because the applicant was a member of a nudist club. Applying strict
scrutiny, the court reasoned that, "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that this
freedom of association extends only to political or conventional associations
and not to the social or the unorthodox., 437
In Curie v. Ward,438 the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
decision of the trial court directing reinstatement of a correctional officer for
membership in the Ku Klux Klan. Since the employer failed to tender
sufficient evidence of the claimed detrimental impact of employee membership
in the Klan upon the operation of the facility or the inmates, the court of
appeals refused to address the broader constitutional issue of association.439
In an education case, a school board dismissed a middle-aged female
teacher for engaging in "social misbehavior that is not conducive to the
maintenance of the integrity of the public school system' because she allowed
a 26-year-old male visitor to stay at her apartment overnight.4'4 The Eighth
Circuit, declining to consider the dismissal on the basis of association or
privacy, instead reversed the termination on substantive due process
grounds.44' Applying a de facto nexus requirement, the court of appeals
found the teacher could successfully argue that her dismissal was arbitrary and
432. Id. at 1027 (quoting Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967)).
433. Id. at 1027 (citing Byrd v. Gain, 558 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1087 (1978); Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1977).
434. 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971).
435. Id. at 324.
436. 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970).
437. Id. at 65.
438. 389 N.E.2d 1070 (N.Y. 1979).
439. Id. at 1071.
440. Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1973).
441. Id. at 376.
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capricious if she could prove "that each of the stated reasons [underlying her
dismissal] is trivial, or is unrelated to the educational process or to working
relationships within the educational institution, or is wholly unsupported by
a basis in fact.""2
Another federal court, in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
Office," 3 held that the Department of Defense could not require an
expanded security investigation because an applicant belonged to a gay
organization. The court found that there was no rational basis for the
government subjecting all gay applicants to expanded investigations while not
doing the same for "straight" applicants." Further, the court ruled that
subjecting gays to additional scrutiny interferes with their First Amendment
right to associate." 5 "Governmental actions that significantly impair an
individual's First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny,"' and
this, said the court, "is clearly not the least restrictive means to achieving the
governmental interests in protecting national security."447
Courts have similarly held that while a state's interest in regulating the
speech of its employees differs from the state's interest in regulating the
speech of the general citizenry, an employee's First Amendment rights may
be restricted only if "the employer shows that some restriction is necessary to
prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance
by the employee."448  Thus, in National Gay Task Force v. Board of
Education,449 the Tenth Circuit declared unconstitutional a portion of a
statute that allowed punishment of teachers for "public homosexual conduct,"
defined as "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting public
or private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that
such conduct will come to the attention of school children or school
employees." 450 According to the court, although a teacher could properly
be dismissed for public homosexual conduct, discipline for mere "advocacy"
would be barred since it does not necessarily imply incitement to immediate
442. Id. at 377 (citing McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1111 (1st Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972)).
443. 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
444. Id. at 1373.
445. Id. at 1378.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.
1984) (citing Childers v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338,1341 (10th Cir.
1982)).
449. 729 F.2d 1270 (1984), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
450. Id. at 1272.
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action."5 First Amendment rights have also been found for a police officer
who had part ownership in a video store that stocked sexually explicit videos.
The Tenth Circuit, in Flanagan v. Munger,452 ruled that a police department
could not require removal of objectionable films from the store's stock by the
owner, who was also an officer in the department.453
In Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,454 the Supreme Court
in 1985 let stand the Sixth Circuit's holding that it was permissible for a
school district not to renew the contract of Marjorie Rowland, a high school
guidance counselor, because she was bisexual and revealed her sexual
preference. 455 Although a jury found that the employee's mention of her
bisexuality did not in any way "interfere with the proper performance of [her
or other school staff members'] duties or with the operation of the school
generally, 456 the Sixth Circuit nevertheless reasoned that nonrenewal based
on her workplace statements was permissible under the First Amendment
because, under the Supreme Court's test in Connick v. Myers45 7, her speech
was not "a matter of public concern. 458
451. Id. at 1274.
452. 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).
453. Id.
454. 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
455. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
456. Id at 447.
457. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
458. Rowland, 730 F.2d at 447. In a 1983 decision, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983), the Supreme Court considered the discharge of a state employee for
circulating a questionnaire concerning internal office matters. The plaintiff, Sheila
Myers, as assistant district attorney, circulated a questionnaire soliciting the views of
her fellow staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for
a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work in political campaigns. After distributing the questionnaire to
15 assistant district attorneys, Myers was terminated. The Supreme Court, reversing
the district and appellate courts, pointed out that the repeated emphasis in Pickering
v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1964), "on the right of a public employee 'as a
citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern,' was not accidental." Justice
Byron White, writing for the majority, noted that, unlike the issues that Myers
addressed, the subject matter in Pickering "was 'a matter of legitimate public concern'
upon which 'free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the
electorate."' Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.)
Justice White wrote:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen
upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
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The Seventh Circuit has stated that "public employers do not lose their
ability to control behavior and speech in the work-place merely because they
are governmental bodies subject to the restraints of the First Amendment. ' 459
The key is whether the employee's speech touches a matter of "public
concern," and according to the Connick Court, this is determined by the
content, form, and context of a given statement.40 Case law indicates that
when the employee's speech deals with personnel disputes or individual
grievances with management, it will not be protected under the Constitution.
Such information, however meritorious, adds little to the public's evaluation
of the performance of government, and, accordingly, is not a matter of
concern to the public. Even when the speech does touch a matter of public
concern, if the speech or activity adversely affects the efficiency, discipline,
or administration of the public employer,461 the employee's conduct may
still be subject to regulation. Arbitrators have taken a similar approach when
employee's behavior... Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens are
not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government;
this does not require a grant of immunity for employee grievances not
afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the state.
Id. at 147 (citation omitted).
According to the majority, "Myers' questionnaire touched upon matters of public
concern in only a limited sense." Id. at 153. The Court concluded that the survey "is
most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office
policy." Id.
459. Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1984).
460. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
461. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) (statement by
clerical employee in county constable's office concerning assassination attempt on
President that "if they go for him again, I hope they get him," protected speech under
First Amendment, holding statement of public concern).
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issues of speech have triggered discharges.462 In all cases the key for public
management is establishing a nexus between the conduct and job performance.
4. Morality Standards
When considering the issue of public employers' promulgation of rules
and regulations relating to an employee's lifestyle or off-duty conduct, two
additional considerations should be addressed. The first is whether a public
employer possesses the power to enact a morality standard for its employees.
The second issue, applicable only if the employer is found to have this power,
is whether the power has been exercised consistently with the mandates of due
process. The courts considering the validity of enacting standards of morality
have consistently held that the state may indeed enact rules prescribing the
moral standards of its employees, especially in teaching and the protective
services.46 The Supreme Court, however, has stated that if a state designates
462. See, e.g., City of Detroit, 83-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8562 (1983)
(McCormick, Arb.), where an arbitrator, citing Pickering, sustained the suspension of
a city auditor who, during an interview on a network television station, implicated city
officials in a coverup of improprieties in a contract with an oil company; Town of
Plainville, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161, 162-63 (1981) (Sacks, Arb.) (finding
Pickering "and the host of decisions which have followed it" relevant); Douglas
County, 79-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8522 (Doyle, 1979) (upholding suspension of
employee for making public statements that care provided by hospital-employer was
inadequate; Pickering distinguished); see also Los Angeles Harbor Dep't, 84 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 860, 862 (1985) (Weiss, Arb.) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568)
(holding city employer properly suspended employee for writing letter to newspaper
referring to department head as "head inquisitor," and applying both Pickering and
Connick, stating "[h]ere, it is the interest 'of the State, as an employer, in promoting
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees' which must take
precedence."); Department of the Navy, 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 889 (1980) (Aronin,
Arb.) (holding employees' use of media to resolve grievance disputes was permitted,
reasoning, in part, that the activity was protected under the First Amendment).
463. See, e.g., Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399,405,408-09 (1958);
Hoska v. United States Dep't of the Army, 677 F.2d 131, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating
that "a pronouncement of 'immorality' tends to discourage careful analysis because it
unavoidably connotes a violation of divine, Olympian, or otherwise universal standards
of rectitude," and holding that Army failed to provide any "careful analysis" of
connection between incidents of alleged immoral or improper behavior and employee's
ability to execute responsibilities); Velasquez v. City of Colorado Springs, 23 Fair
Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 621 (D. Colo. 1980) (noting that "lack of sufficient moral
character" defense is suspect on its face because it is highly subjective); Dolter v.
Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (rejecting argument that
Catholic Church cannot be held liable for sex discrimination where standards of
morality for teachers were not in accord with moral and religious precepts of church
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some form of moral character as a criterion for bestowing a benefit or
imposing a burden, it must be based on present moral character. '
E. Synthesis: Cases Involving Employees' Lifestyle,
and Existing Constitutional Restraints
Case law indicates that when a public employer regulates the off-duty
conduct or lifestyle of its employees, it must do so consistent with the
mandates of procedural and substantive due process. At a minimum, this
means that there must be some rational connection between the off-duty
behavior and the employee's job. An employer will not be able to effect the
dismissal of an employee for off-duty conduct if management can articulate
no interest whatsoever for its action. If the employee's conduct involves a
fundamental right such as association or speech, or is within an individual's
recognized "zone of privacy", a public employer will have to show more than
a de minimus interest before it can justify a discharge for engaging in
protected conduct. At times the employer's interest must be "compelling,"
depending upon the particular occupation at issue and the specific conduct of
the employee. Finally, if a court finds that the employee has a property
interest in continued employment, or that the discharge affects a "liberty"
interest, certain procedural guarantees must be accorded the individual prior
to the dismissal.
When, then, should freedom to associate or engage in an unconventional
lifestyle bow to the government's interest? As the cases indicate, the easy
answer is when there is a significant nexus between the employee's job and
his off-duty conduct. The most difficult cases involve military and para-
military organizations, such as police, fire, or security-sensitive positions in
government. While these organizations have an acknowledged interest in
promoting security and effectiveness this, however, does not mean that simple
declarations that the state's interests outweigh the employee's privacy interests
concerning unwed pregnancy); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F.
Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aft'd, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Thorne v.
City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 470 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We do not hold that the City
is prohibited by the Constitution from questioning or considering the sexual morality
of its employees."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984); Smith v. Price, 616 F.2d 1371
(5th Cir. 1980) (providing for dismissal of employee for failure to meet prescribed
standards of work, morality, and ethics, to an extent that makes employee unsuitable
for any kind of employment in city's service); Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58,
67 (D. Md. 1970) ("[behavioral pattern] can only be limited to such associations or off
duty activities that affect his morals and integrity or are inimical to the Department.").
464. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
465. Sexual practices, homosexuality, political affiliations, morality standards.
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should be enough for a reviewing court or arbitrator. In the privacy area, for
example, courts should not rule that any employee should be disqualified from
employment simply because that employee sleeps with a member of his own
sex. Moreover, we do not believe that the Supreme Court's decision in
Hardwick is dispositive of anything."66 Just as an individual cannot be
punished for mere membership in an organization that has both illegal and
legal objectives, under the constitution an individual should not be presumed
to violate sodomy (or similar statutes) because that person professes an
"unconventional" sexual preference or orientation. '
Other dimensions of the problem of balancing the rights of employers and
employees in lifestyle cases are explored in the next section and in our
conclusion. One proposition advanced is that an employee with a lifestyle
repugnant to management may fare better in an arbitration proceeding than in
a court applying a mere rational basis test.
V. ARBITRAL STANDARDS UNDER "JUST CAUSE" PROVISIONS
IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The discussion in this section"6 concerns arbitral rulings when unions
challenge management's right to discipline or discharge an employee under
a just cause provision of a collective bargaining agreement"69 because
466. In Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1522, (D.C. Cir. 1986), the appellate court
pointed out that Hardwick "did not reach the difficult issue of whether an agency of
the federal government can discriminate against individuals merely because of [their]
sexual orientation." See also Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.
1988) (distinguishing Hardwick), reh'g., 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
467. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991) (reversing school district's
denial of employment to teacher because of perception that he had "homosexual
tendencies," distinguishing Hardwick).
468. This section is taken in part from MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V.
SINICROPI, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 193-217 (1986); MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & MARK
KAHN Discipline and Discharge for Off-Duty Misconduct: What are the Arbitral
Standards, in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING ROLES, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 39TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 121-54
(1986).
469. Recent survey reports by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) Inc., reveal
that discharge and discipline provisions are found in 96 percent of collective
bargaining agreements analyzed-99 percent in manufacturing and 92 percent in non-
manufacturing. BNA also reports that grounds-for-discharge provisions, found in 94
percent of their sample, are generally of two types-discharge for "cause" or "just
cause" (found in 86 percent of the agreements), or discharge for a specific offense
(found in 75 Percent of the contracts in the database). BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, BASIC PATrERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 7 (12th ed. 1989).
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management disagrees with certain aspects of an employee's lifestyle or, in
some cases, the results of the lifestyle. What rules or standards do arbitrators
follow? Does it make a difference whether the arbitrator is deciding a case
in the public as opposed to the private sector? Do arbitrators track court
rulings and apply a balancing or a multi-tier test depending on the conduct at
issue and the interest asserted by the employer? Most (but not all) of the
cases dealing with lifestyle issues involve off-duty conduct and whether
management can establish a nexus between the employee's conduct and his
job or, alternatively, the employer's product or reputation. The late dean of
the Yale Law School, Harry Shulman, observed that management cannot
regulate the lives and conduct of its employees outside of their employment
relation and "[w]hat the employee does outside of the plant after working
hours is normally no concern of the employer." 470 Shulman went on to note
that the jurisdictional line which separates the cases with which the employer
may be concerned from those with which he may not, is not always a
"physical line which bounds his property on which his plant is located. 4 1
The problem is determining when an employee's off-duty lifestyle (generally
his sexual, health, criminal, or other conduct that the employer disapproves of)
Even if no "just cause" provision is found in the collective bargaining agreement,
the better weight of authority holds that absent a clear indication to the contrary, a just
cause standard is implied in the labor agreement. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Tire Co.,
36 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 552,556 (1961) (Ryder, Arb.); David E. Feller, The Remedy
Power in Grievance Arbitration, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 128, 134-35 (1982).
Despite the high frequency of arbitration cases dealing with discharge and
discipline (about one out of three grievances deals with discharge or discipline), few
contracts contain a definition of "just cause." While no set criteria exists, arbitrators
have uniformly held that any determination of just cause requires two separate
considerations: (1) whether the employee is guilty of misconduct or a serious or faulty
lapse in job performance, and (2) assuming guilt, whether the discipline imposed is a
reasonable penalty under the circumstances of the case.
Professors Abrams and Nolan propose that:
Just cause ... embodies the idea that the employee is entitled to
continued employment, provided he attends work regularly, obeys work
rules, performs at some reasonable level of quality and quantity, and
refrains from interfering with his employer's business by his activities on
or off the job.
Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 601.
The universal rule in grievance arbitration is that the employer must carry the
burden of proof on just cause in a discharge case.
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can result in discipline or even termination by management. Like most areas
of the law, there are more questions than answers.
A. Just Cause Criteria
An examination of published and unpublished awards reveals a number
of standards or criteria arbitrators use to evaluate discharge or discipline for
off-duty conduct. These include (1) injury to the employer's business, (2)
inability to report for work, (3) unsuitability for continued employment, and
(4) co-employee refusal to work with the off-duty offender or danger to other
employees. Like many categories mentioned in this article, there is frequently
overlap between the categories.
1. Injury to Employer's Business
Employers often assert that an employee's conduct should be subject to
management's jurisdiction when the conduct causes an actual or potential
business loss or, alternatively, the company's reputation is injured or is likely
to be injured by retaining the employee. As a general rule, where actual
business loss or injury to reputation is not established or, alternatively, is not
apparent from the misconduct itself, arbitrators are reluctant to sustain a
discharge based on this argument.
a. Actual or Potential Business Loss
Discharge for an employee's off-duty misconduct is most likely to be
upheld where an employer can link the conduct to an actual, as opposed to a
potential or speculative, business loss. But not always. Frequently a
discharge has been upheld where the arbitrator determined that a business loss
was only a possibility. In Baltimore Transit Co.,472 a bus operator was
publicly identified as the acting grand dragon of the state branch of the Ku
Klux Klan. In upholding the discharge, Arbitrator Clair Duff acknowledged
that, unless the discharge was sustained, there existed a clear and present
danger of physical violence and an inevitable economic boycott against the
company. In finding that there was just cause for dismissal, the arbitrator also
pointed out that there was considerable support for a wildcat strike by the
grievant's fellow employees. The arbitrator reasoned that the grievant's
conduct, not his beliefs, were at issue in the case. The employee's "public
utterances were widely publicized and the admitted aims and objectives of the
Klan made it eminently clear that the target of his activities was not mere
472. 47 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 62 (1966) (Duff, Arb.).
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words but action contrary to the rights of a large segment of the population
... at least 50% of patrons of the Company's bus lines. ''473
Likewise, in Gas Service Co.,4 4 Arbitrator A.J. Granoff held that a
criminal conviction, coupled with numerous arrests, a known habit of
consorting with criminals and prostitutes, and a job requiring the employee to
work alone in customer homes reading meters amounted to enough "potential"
harm to a utility that discharge was justified even though no actual business
loss was demonstrated. Granoff noted that "an employment relationship
imposes some responsibilities upon an employee which, as has been well
stated, 'transcend the time and place of employment. '"' 475 Granoff found
that "Grievant's manner of living during leisure hours defies scavenging. ''476
Arbitrator Marcia Greenbaum, in an unpublished decision (November 18,
1985), considered the case of a commission salesman for a small producer and
distributor of phonograph records. The salesman had been discharged after
Postal Service inspectors, equipped with a search warrant, found several carts
of pornography, including child pornography, in. the salesman's home. The
event received considerable local publicity on television and in the press.
Inspection of the affidavit by the company indicated that the employee had
been trading in child pornography, although no indictment had yet been issued
against him. Even though the grievant had not yet been convicted of any
crime, Arbitrator Greenbaum sustained the discharge. In so doing, she
referred not only to the adverse reaction that had already taken place but also
to probable future hazards for the company:
[T]he next [flurry of information], if indictment and a trial with full
disclosure, might bring further reactions, including reprisals of no longer
dealing with the Company, if it were known that [the Company] had
continued to employ [the grievant] after knowing what was contained in the
affidavit. A company should not be subjected to such a possible conse-
quence, nor its employees risk the loss of work, because one of their
number had continued amongst them under these circumstances. ...
An example of a dismissal that was reversed when management was
unable to demonstrate some, but not significant, business damage was an
unpublished decision reported by Arbitrator Benjamin Aaron (June 4, 1987).
At issue was the dismissal of a male flight attendant who had plead guilty to
soliciting an undercover male police officer for prostitution, a misdemeanor,
and lying about it to his supervisors (significantly for the grievant, his
473. Id. at 66.
474. 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1025 (1962) (Granoff, Arb.).
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supervisors were two women). The offense occurred while the employee was
on layover. Because of his arrest, the employee missed his trip causing the
flight to be understaffed, resulting in diminished service to passengers. In
finding the penalty excessive, the arbitrator focused on the consequences of
the employee's offense:
It is true that the flight he missed was understaffed and that the Company
had to pay understaffing pay to those flight attendants who made the trip.
That in itself, however, hardly seems to justify so severe a penalty as
discharge. The Company suffered no adverse publicity; its business has not
been affected by the incident.
One of the reasons why theft is so grave an offense is that there is
always the likelihood that it will be committed again on the job. Flight
attendants have many opportunities to take property that is not their own,
and the Company's consistent policy of terminating those found guilty of
stealing, no matter how trivial the amount involved, is entirely defensible.
[Grievant's] offense, however, is not one likely to be repeated on the job,
if at all.
Management often asserts that dress, grooming and weight restrictions are
necessary because of the image that the company is trying to project to its
market.4 " In an effort to present a business-like image and maintain
revenues, employees are disciplined or even dismissed when they fail to
observe grooming and weight restrictions. When the employer's rules
regarding dress, grooming, and weight restrictions are based on health, safety,
or legitimate business interests, and are administered in a non-discriminatory
manner, the regulation can be expected to be upheld by an arbitrator if
challenged in an arbitral proceeding. A dress or grooming standard that is
based only on the personal preference of a particular individual within the
organization will, in all probability, not survive a "reasonableness" challenge
in the grievance procedure.478 Perhaps the best summary of current arbitral
standards is provided by Arbitrator Peter Maniscalso, in Missouri Public
Service Co.,479 where he applied what appears to be a rational-basis-plus test
and observed:
477. See also supra notes 193-205 and accompanying text.
478. See the discussion of Arbitrator George Fleischli in Arrow Redi-Mix
Concrete, Inc., 56 Lab. Arb. Rcp. (BNA) 597, 602 (1971) (Fleischli, Arb.) ("The
arbitrator does not consider such personal likes or dislikes to be a legitimate basis for
the establishment of a rule that impinges on the conduct of employees both on and off
the job.").
479. 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 973 (1981) (Maniscalso, Arb.).
1992]
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The prevailing theory is that the Company has a right to require its
employees to cut their hair and shave, when long hair and beards can
reasonably threaten the Company's relations with its customers or other
employees, or a real question of safety is involved, and an employer should
be able to expect that his employees will practice personal hygiene and will
clothe themselves in a neat manner, at least when the employee meets the
public.
However, there must be a showing of reasonable relationship between
the Company's image or health and safety considerations and the need to
regulate employee appearance. Therefore, management's right to regulate
in this area is not absolute. Its exercise in any specific manner may be
challenged as arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent with the objective for
which the right is being exercised. 48°
When the concern of management is "public image," arbitrators have
generally accorded great deference to the employer's standards in balancing
the interests of management with the off-duty privacy interests of the
employee.48' Management is not always successful. When grooming
regulations are struck down, it is usually because the standard is unreasonable
as applied to a particular employee and not because the rule is per se
unreasonable. 48 Laxity in enforcement may also preclude management from
disciplining an employee for not observing the rule.483
480. Id. at 976.
481. Albertson's, Inc., 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705 (1981) (Hulsey, Arb.)
(delivery persons); Lloyd Ketcham Oldsmobile, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 953 (1981)
(Hilgert, Arb.) (body-fender repairman); City of Cincinnati, 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1261 (1980) (Seifer, Arb.) (meter enforcement officials); Arkansas Glass Container
Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 841 (1981) (Teple, Arb.) (tank maintenance workers);
cf Safeway Stores, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 798 (1980) (Madden, Arb.)
(grocery clerks).
482. Frito-Lay, Inc., 81-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8562 (1981) (Forsythe, Arb.)
(finding no-beard rule unreasonable for route salesman operating in rural community
near college where beards were regularly worn in the community).
See generally ROLF VALTIN, Changing Life Styles and Problems ofAuthority in
the Plant in LABOR ARBITRATION AT THE QUARTER-CENTURY MARK, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 25TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 235 (1973).
483. See, e.g., Rosauer's, Inc., 82-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8594 (1981)
(LaCugna, Arb.) (allowing management to enforce grooming code prohibiting beards
against all new employees but not against the grievant); Beatrice Foods Co.,
Butterkrust Bakeries Div., 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 44 (1981) (Kulkis, Arb.)
(employers not permitted to reinstate policy requiring employees to wear uniforms
when they had been permitted to wear blue denims); Unites States Dept. of Justice, 81-
2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) para. 8607 (1981) (Meiners, Arb.); cf VALTIN, supra note
482, at 251 ("Hair and beard rules must be capable of uniform application and must,
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Another theme arbitrators often find persuasive when upholding
management's regulation of the employees' off-duty lifestyles (or, in this case,
the results of the lifestyle) is the potential civil liability that may result if the
employee is retained. In College of St. Scholastica,4  Arbitrator William
Berquest upheld a Catholic college's dismissal of a part-time mainten-
ance/janitor who had been arrested on a domestic sexual abuse charge
(subsequently dismissed) and had a prior conviction of sexual misconduct
(unknown to the college at the time of his hire). The arbitrator found that "the
College would be adversely affected if the grievant is reinstated and retained
because of the potential civil liability of the College if the grievant should
commit misconduct of the nature disclosed by the prior conviction."8
Reviewing case law on the nature of liability, Arbitrator Berquest stated that
while the law is not clear as to liability, in his opinion "the Employer would
be held civilly liable for damages for the conduct of the grievant primarily on
the basis of negligent hiring and retention. The risk is too great for this
arbitrator to expect the Employer to assume."18
6
b. Injury to the Company's Reputation
Damage to the employer's reputation is an often-cited standard because
it connotes embarrassment to the company and a potential loss in business.
Determining whether an employee's lifestyle has injured the company's
reputation is difficult and is often highly subjective in the absence of any
objective measurement of actual harm. Where it is argued that a company's
reputation is injured, arbitrators look at the source and degree of adverse
publicity,487 the type of misconduct,48 and the position held by the
in fact, be uniformly applied. Discriminatory treatment may become the ground for
reversal of disciplinary action.").
484. 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 245 (1991) (Berquest, Arb.).
485. Id. at 253.
486. Id. at 253-54; see also Pepsi-Cola San Joaquin Bottling Co., 93 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 58, 63 (1989) (Lange III, Arb.) (sustaining dismissal of service technician
who plead guilty to sexual offense involving stepdaughter, noting potential financial
liability should there be similar incident involving the grievant).
487. See, e.g., Haskell of Pittsburgh, 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1208, 1211 (1991)
(Sergent, Arb.) (noting that customers, distributors, and sales representatives of
company expressed concerns about grievant's drug dealings); Fairmont Gen. Hosp., 58
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1293 (1972) (Dybeck, Arb.); Baltimore Transit Co., 47 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 62 (1962) (Duff, Arb.); Martin Oil Co., 29 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
54 (1957) (Brown, Arb.).
488. See, e.g., Gas Serv. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1025 (1962) (Granoff,
Arb.); Consolidated Badger Coop., 36 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 965 (1961) (Mueller,
Arb.); Quaker Oats Co., 15 Lab. Arb. Rep. BNA) 42 (1950) (Abrahams, Arb.).
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employee48 in determining the extent of "injured reputation." Where certain
felonies are committed (murder or sexual assault) it may not matter what
position the employee holds. In these cases it is the potential for adverse
public opinion that may be deemed sufficient to warrant a dismissal, even
without an objective showing that the company's reputation has indeed been
affected. The more public the position and the more serious the crime, the
easier it becomes for management to sustain a dismissal. Arbitrator Berquist,
in College of St. Scholastica,49 provided the following analysis of the
problem:
As to the effect of reinstatement and retention of the grievant upon the
reputation and business of the College, I realize that the Employer has not
adduced any specific substantive evidence of loss of reputation or adverse
effect upon the business, such as the declining of enrollment or complaints
and comments from students as well as the public. At this point, and when
the grievant was terminated, it was virtually impossible for the Employer
to adduce evidence of this nature because it acted responsibly and as soon
as it could after it became aware of the prior misconduct of the grievant.
In other words, the College is not obligated to continue the employment of
the grievant on a wait and see basis, that is to see if there is any adverse
effect upon the reputation and actual business loss as a consequence. In my
opinion such an adverse effect is reasonably foreseeable and consequently
the College was not obligated to wait it out for such a determination.
The status of an institution of higher learning causes it to be held up
to closer scrutiny in reference to safety and care of its students than other
companies such as manufacturing, or retail. There is no question that to
retain the grievant would, in my opinion, be to affect detrimentally the high
reputation accorded the College and would adversely affect its business in
the future.
The Employer in this instance is obviously in the best position and
most qualified to assess the impact which might and probably would occur
on its reputation. It indicates that it will be adverse. Its continuation as a
viable college of higher learning is dependent upon its maintenance of a
high degree of public confidence in it as an institution of higher learning
and that it will protect and secure to the best of its reasonable ability, the
interest and safety of its students. 491
489. See, e.g., Fairmont Gen. Hosp., 58 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1293 (1972)
(Dybeck, Arb.); Gas Serv. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1025 (1962) (Granoff, Arb.);
Consolidated Badger Coop., 36 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 965 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.).
490. 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 245 (1991) (Berquist, Arb.).
491. Id. at 254; see also Motor Cargo, Inc., 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 181 (1990)
(E. Jones, Jr., Arb.) (upholding dismissal for off-duty cocaine use while in possession
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At times, the employer's plant or work rules will address the issue. For
example, American Airlines' Rule No. 34 provides in part, "[a]ny action
constituting a criminal offense, whether committed on duty or off duty, will
be grounds for dismissal. 492 But in most cases it is left to the arbitrator to
determine the effect or nexus between the conduct and the company's
reputation.
In Trailways Southeastern Lines, Inc.,493 Arbitrator Robert Gibson
considered the discharge of a driver for violating the following rule: "Words
or acts hostile to the Company, or words or acts which result in damage to the
Company's reputation, property or service, are cause for disciplinary
action."494 The grievant had entered a guilty plea to breaking and entering
his estranged wife's house with intent to commit murder, as well as trying to
burn down another house belonging to his wife.4 95  In sustaining the
discharge, the arbitrator reasoned that the employee's conduct "could not help
but result in damage to the reputation of the Company ... because of the
notoriety Grievant received in the newspaper reports.
' ' 6
Arbitrator Robert Mueller, in Cashton Cooperative Creamery,
497
considered the discharge of an employee who had entered a plea of nolo
contendere to taking indecent liberties with his 14-year-old daughter.498 In
sustaining the discharge the arbitrator noted that the conviction resulted in
widespread publicity throughout the small community where the employer
operated in a highly competitive industry.4l Moreover, the arbitrator also
recognized the importance of the views of the grievant's colleagues by
pointing out that, at the hearing, the employer presented a signed statement by
13 out of 18 employees to the effect that they did not want the grievant back
as a coworker.5' Arbitrator Elvis Stephens, in Gulf Oil Co.,501 likewise
492. American Airlines & Ass'n of Flight Attendants, Case No. SS-165-80 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) (1981) (Kagel, Arb.) (unpublished).
493. 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 712 (1983) (Gibson, Arb.).
494. Id. at 713-14.
495. Id. at 713.
496. Id. at 716; see also Allied Materials Corp., 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1049
(1982) (Allen, Arb.) (rule prohibiting "conduct that violates common decency or
morality"); Eastern Air Lines, 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 961, 963 (1981) (Turkus,
Arb.) ("Conduct on or off the job which was in conflict with the Company's interest");
Air Canada, 75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 301,302 (1980) (Brown, Arb.) (rule prohibiting
"violations of a public law or commission of a criminal offence").
497. 61-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8008 (1960) (Mueller, Arb.).
498. Id. at para. 8009-10.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8234 (1984) (Stephens, Arb.); accord
Northwest Airlines, 53 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 203 (1969) (Sembower, Arb.)
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ruled that management could terminate a 31-year employee who pleaded
guilty to having sexual intercourse with a retarded 12-year-old girl.5" The
arbitrator found the felony morally reprehensible, the community close-knit,
and few employees were willing to work with the grievant. 3
Arbitrator Mark L. Kahn, in an unpublished decision (February 18, 1986),
sustained the discharge of a female flight attendant based on her guilty plea
to felony charges of lewd and lascivious acts with a 12-year-old boy who was
living with his mother and brother in the grievant's home. The 36-year-old
flight attendant was an employee with 17 years of service and a good work
history. The record indicated that the grievant's arrest, indictment, conviction,
her referral to the state medical facility, and sentencing were each reported in
the local newspapers, with the grievant identified by name and described as
an "airline stewardess" but with no mention of the name of her employer.
Although finding that her return to duty would not place unaccompanied
children at risk nor give rise to an in-flight problem with co-workers, Kahn
held that the critical factor for sustaining the dismissal was the effect of the
grievant's conviction on the company's reputation. Kahn noted that a flight
attendant is among those job classifications with duties that involve substantial
first-hand customer relations and, accordingly, the employer was entitled to
greater concern about the adverse impact of unfavorable publicity relating to
off-duty behavior. Explaining the basis of his decision, the arbitrator had this
to say:
I reach this conclusion [that just cause existed for the discharge] based on
the gravity of this kind of misconduct as perceived by the traveling public;
the fact that it involved the abuse of a youngster who was a boarder in
grievant's home and who has been placed in grievant's care, for tutoring,
by his mother; the fact that the misconduct was not a single thoughtless act
but continued over a period of many [eight] months; the fact that the affair
received substantial local newspaper publicity over a period of time,
identifying grievant by name and as an "airline stewardess" although her
employer was not named; because there is a high risk of additional publicity
adverse to the Company that could be generated by her reinstatement; and
because there also remains a risk, of unknown dimension, that such off-duty
misconduct might reoccur: an event that could subject the Company to the
probability of substantial adverse public notice compounded by grievant's
previous identification as a felony sex offender. The Company is not
obligated, in my judgment, to assume such risks because of grievant's off-
duty misconduct.
(sustaining dismissal of employee for taking photo of nude teenage boy).
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In Quaker Oats Co.,5 4 discharge was not sustained for an employee
who pleaded guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The
arbitrator noted that the employee's position did not place him in direct
contact with the public and no complaints were received as a result of the
incident 5' Similarly, another arbitrator refused to allow discharge of an
employee with 19 years' seniority who faced an assault charge for shooting
his wife.5° 6 Even though adverse publicity resulted from the incident, the
arbitrator commented: "If [the employee] has lost his acceptability to
customers that fact, too, will quickly appear and the Company will have




Likewise, in Vulcan Asphalt Refining Co.,5s Arbitrator Henry Welch
reversed the discharge of an employee for selling a former classmate (working
as an undercover narcotics agent) a small amount of marijuana.509 The
arbitrator pointed out that while the incident was common knowledge in the
small town and had been the subject of newspaper reports, it did not in any
noticeable degree harm the company's reputation or product5 10 He also
noted that the misconduct did not render the employee unable to perform his
duties, and that his arrest and conviction could not be expected to cause
refusal, reluctance, or inability on the part of other employees to work with
the grievant.s n
Proving injury to the company's reputation is more difficult than
demonstrating that the employer's business suffered a financial loss due to the
grievant's conduct. Indeed, some arbitrators have viewed "business reputa-
tion" as too nebulous a concept to be useful,5 " although these arbitrators are
in the minority. When confronted with arguments that a grievant's off-duty
misconduct damaged the company's reputation, most arbitrators have required
a clear showing before sustaining discharges. This may be accomplished by
reference to adverse media coverage or, in selected cases, by direct reference
504. 15 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 42 (1950) (Abrahams, Arb.).
505. Id. at 43.
506. Martin Oil Co., 29 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 54 (1957) (Brown, Arb.).
507. Id. at 56.
508. 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1311 (1982) (Welch, Arb.).
509. Id. at 1312.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 1313.
512. Movielab, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 632,633 (1968) (McMahon, Arb.)
("violation of the criminal law and having charges filed against him or even being
convicted of a criminal offense for acts committed outside working hours and while
off employer's premises, does not necessarily constitute a proper basis for disciplinary
action unless there is an adverse effect upon the employer-employee relationship
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to the conduct itself. As a note of caution to employers, it may be difficult
for an employer to argue that the off-duty criminal conduct of a grievant
adversely affects its reputation where the company has in the past hired ex-
convicts who have proved to be able and trustworthy employees.
2. Inability to Report for Work
When an employee's lifestyle results in a jail sentence, he may have little
recourse if dismissed by management. However, arbitrators generally look for
a violation of a specific provision of the collective bargaining agreement
before sustaining discharge. In Dorsey Trailers, Inc.,513 an employee was
detained in jail for armed robbery.514 The company had a plant rule that
any employee failing to report for work without giving notice to the employer
within three days lost all employment rights under the agreement. The
arbitrator sustained the discharge.1
Arbitrator John Murphy, in Sperry Rand Corp.,516 summarized the
better weight of authority in this area as follows:
Whether or not confinement of an employee in jail will authorize his
employer to take some sort of disciplinary action depends upon all the
circumstances, including, among other things:
a. The language of their contract.
b. The length of confinement.
c. The nature of the cause for confinement; i.e., whether as the result
of an arrest and inability to post bond, or as the result of a sentence.
d. The nature of the conduct resulting in confinement, i.e., its degree
of seriousness and impropriety.
e. The nature of the disciplinary action to be taken or which results.
f. The employee's previous work and disciplinary record.
g. The extent to which the absence affected the employer's produc-
tion, etc.
h. The effect upon plant morale.
i. Whether or not the conduct occurred on plant property or during
working hours.
5 17
513. 73 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 196 (1979) (Hamby, Arb.).
514. Id. at 197-98.
515. Id. at 198.
516. 60 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 220 (1973) (Murphy, Arb.).
517. Id. at 222-23; see also Bethlehem Steel Co., 32 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 543,
544-45 (1959) (Seward, Arb.).
[Vol. 57
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Employers will fare better if the dismissal is based on the employee's
unavailability for work and not simply on the jail sentence or the specific
crime warranting the jail term.
3. Unsuitability for Continued Employment
What makes an employee unsuitable for continued employment? Mere
lack of trust by management? When does conviction of a crime, for example,
impair the employee's usefulness to the employer? May an employee's
usefulness be impaired even though there is no media publicity of the off-duty
misconduct? A major consideration is always the employee's job and how the
misconduct affects his job responsibility or relates to his duties. Similar to the
reasoning of the courts in constitutional cases involving the privacy claims of
police, arbitrators appear to give greater deference to management in cases
involving guards and the protective services than non-military-type positions.
An individual may possess the physical capacity to perform a job but,
because of the nature of the off-duty misconduct, may be considered
unsuitable for continued employment. Arbitrator Alfred Dybeck, in Fairmont
General Hospital,518 considered the discharge of a hospital maid for shoplift-
ing at a local department store.5 9 Because the hospital had experienced a
recent problem of theft, and even thbugh the maid was not accused of stealing
from the hospital, the arbitrator upheld discharge because her actions created
a serious doubt as to her trustworthiness as an employee.520
The question of an employee's honesty in dealing with his employer
forced the arbitrator, in Southern California Edison Co.,521 to sustain a
discharge. The employee failed to give notice of his absence and lied to the
employer about his off-duty arrest for possession of marijuana (the employee
said that he had been arrested for drunk driving).52 The employee did not
attempt to make alternate arrangements and was away from work for several
days to take care of legal matters. His failure to tell the truth led the
arbitrator to conclude that the discharge was for cause.'
Similarly, in Safeway Stores, Inc.,524 Arbitrator James Doyle ruled the
company had just cause to discharge an employee for "proven dishonesty"
after he was convicted for stealing a vacuum cleaner at another store. In so
ruling, the arbitrator rejected the argument that the words "proven dishonesty"
518. 58 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1293 (1972) (Dybeck, Arb.).
519. Id. at 1294.
520. Id. at 1295-96.
521. 59 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 529 (1972) (Helbling, Arb.).
522. Id. at 530.
523. Id. at 533.
524. 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1293 (1980) (Doyle, Arb.).
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in the contract" meant only dishonesty relating to the grievant's employ-
ment.5'
In American Airlines, 27 however, an employee was given a "second
chance" after being convicted of shoplifting while off duty and not in
uniform.5" The arbitrator reasoned that the employee had not given the
employer any reason to question her honesty during her previous four years
of employment and should be given the benefit of the doubt. No publicity was
given the incident. 29
In general, off-duty convictions will not always warrant a termination,
especially when the employee is long-term and does not falsely report his
situation to management. 50
525. Id. at 1294. The agreement stated, "[e]mployer shall not discharge any
employee without just cause." Id. The contract further stated, "[a]n employee shall
have at least two (2) written warning notices of the specific complaint against the
employee before discharge except in cases of proven dishonesty .... ." Id.
526. See Com Belt Elec. Coop., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1045 (1982) (O'Grady,
Arb.) (discharge by electric cooperative of journeyman-lineman for "theft" of
electricity); Hilton Hawaiian Village, 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 347 (1981) (Tanaka,
Arb.) (discharge of bellman for sale of stolen handgun); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
75 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 409 (1980) (Seibel, Arb.) (upholding discharge of outside
repair technician for making obscene telephone calls).
527. 68 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1245 (1977) (Harkless, Arb.).
528. Id. at 1246,
529. Id. at 1248.
530. See also Union Oil Co. of California, 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8161
(1985) (Nicholas, Arb.) (reversing dismissal of refinery pipefitter for off-duty
possession of drugs); Armstrong World Indus., 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8004
(1984) (Aronin, Arb.) (overturning dismissal reasoning "no nexus has been established
between Grievant's conviction for a conspiracy to sell cocaine and Grievant's
employment relationship."); Means Servs. Co., 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1213, 1216
(1983) (Slade, Arb.) ("connection between the facts of this case [off-duty theft] and
the extent to which the business is affected must be reasonable and discernible");
Nugent Sand Co., 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 988,989 (1983) (Daniel, Arb.) (reinstating
employee who entered guilty plea for growing marijuana notwithstanding rule
subjecting employees to discharge for "[c]onviction of a felony involving honesty,
death other than negligent homicide, morals, drugs or narcotics"); Maust Transfer Co.,
78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 780 (1982) (LaCugna, Arb.) (discharge of truck driver for
dishonesty after entering guilty plea of theft reversed absent showing of causal link
between conduct and ability to perform job); Ralphs Grocery Co., 77 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 867 (1981) (Kaufman, Arb.) (reversing discharge of employees who hosted
party where "lesbian show" had taken place); PRC Sys. Serv. Co., 78-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8456 (1978) (Vadakin, Arb.) (reinstating engineering illustrator
discharged upon a nolo plea to charges of possession and delivery of cocaine, citing
the non-work-related character of offense).
[Vol. 57
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4. Objeictionability or Danger to Other Employees
In some cases an employee's off-duty misconduct will cause co-
employees to refuse to work with the grievant. When confronted with such
a claim, arbitrators generally require a clear demonstration that this is true.
Otherwise, discharge may be viewed as too harsh.
Refusal to work with a fellow employee may stem from an employee's
conviction of a serious crime. This was the case in Robertshaw Controls
Co., 1 where an employee pleaded guilty to sodomy and corrupting the
morals of children.5 32 The employee was a scoutmaster in the community
where he worked with parents, friends, and relatives of the victimized
children.53 3 Arbitrator Clair Duff restated the principle set forth in the often-
quoted Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,5 4 decision.
Arbitrators are reluctant to sustain discharges based on off-duty conduct of
employees unless a direct relationship between off-duty conduct and
employment is proved. Discretion must be exercised lest Employers become
censors of community morals. However, where socially reprehensible
conduct and employment duties and risks are substantially related,
conviction for certain types of crimes may justify discharge. 35
Arbitrator Duff, in sustaining the discharge, noted that the misconduct
could not be kept separate from the activities of the workplace because so
many families were involved. As the arbitrator stated, "[a] business enterprise
by its nature requires collaboration, accord and reasonable harmony among
But see Trane Co., 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 435, 438 (1991) (Reynolds, Arb.)
(distinguishing between drug use and drug sales, concluding that management is not
required to retain a "panderer in its midst."); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 86-1 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8222 (1986) (Canestraight, Arb.) (upholding discharge of employees
of company with defense department contracts where employees made arrangements
for sale on company premises and employer had reason to believe that conduct cause
cancellation of contracts); Phillip Morris U.S.A., 78-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8434
(1978) (Cobum, Arb.) (sustaining dismissal of employee for off-duty cocaine use
notwithstanding plant rule that authorized discipline only when employee carried drugs
on plant premises where employer consistently terminated employees for on- and off-
duty possession); Arco-Polymers, Inc., 69 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 379 (1977) (Milentz,
Arb.) (heroin); Wheaton Indus., 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 826 (1975) (Kerrison, Arb.)
(involving "hard drugs").
531. 64-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8748 (1964) (Duff, Arb).
532. Id. at para. 8749.
533. Id.
534. 38 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 891, 893 (1961) (Duff, Arb.).
535. Robertshaw Controls Co., 64-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH), at para. 5613.
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employees. The technical and administrative sides of an enterprise cannot
function correctly if the human side of the business is disrupted with
conflict."5 Arbitrator Duff reasoned that families do not want their sons to
seek or retain employment in a company where they would be subjected to the
possible influence of a convicted sodomist. It is of note that the arbitrator
made this finding notwithstanding the fact that employees signed a statement
that they had no objection to working with the grievant.537
In Lone Star Gas Co.,53 an employee of a public utility was indicted
and later found guilty of incest.539 The arbitrator found it was impossible to
reinstate the employee when there was testimony by the grievant's fellow
workers that they were reluctant to continue working with him.
40
The samb reasoning in Robertshaw Controls Co., however, was not
controlling in Kentile Floors, Inc.,5 41 where an employee was convicted of
possession of narcotics (amphetamines). 542 Even though the company had
a rule stating that employees convicted of crimes were subject to discharge,
the arbitrator held that the discharge was inappropriate because the conviction
had no discernible effect upon the employee's relationship with fellow
workers. 43 It is of special note that Arbitrator Howard Block reasoned that
the employer's rule was overbroad since it failed to take into account the
relationship between the crime and the employment situation. The discharge
was thus seen as arbitrary and capricious.544 Similarly, in International
Paper Co.,545 discharge was reversed for an employee convicted of an off-
duty assault and battery against his foreman. (The employee, in an apparent
argument over a woman in a tavern, had slashed his foreman with a knife.)
Though the arbitrator viewed the knifing as a serious act of misconduct, he
believed that it would not disrupt plant operations by creating fear among
fellow employees.
In another case,547 an employee was offered $20 by co-employees to
"streak" in front of a baggage terminal at the airport where he worked.54
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. 56 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1221 (1971) (Johannes, Arb.).
539. Id. at 1222.
540. Id. at 1223-24.
541. 57 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 919 (1971) (Black, Arb.).
542. Id. at 920.
543. Id. at 921.
544. Id. at 923.
545. 52 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1266 (1969) (Jenkins, Arb.).
546. Id. at 1266-67.
547. Air California, 63 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 350 (1974) (Kaufman, Arb.).
548. Id. at 351.
[Vol. 57
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The employee accepted the offer and later, wearing nothing but a ski mask,
tee shirt, and cowboy boots, streaked in front of the terminal. 549 When news
of the incident reached management, the employee was discharged for
irresponsibility.550 In overturning the discharge, the arbitrator reasoned, in
part, that the misconduct was not viewed negatively by co-workers. In fact,
because some had even encouraged it, they had little, if any, reluctance to
work with the grievant.
51
When it is believed that the off-duty misconduct poses a threat to the
safety of fellow workers, however, arbitrators are not reluctant to sustain
discharge. In one case, an employee's conviction for aggravated assault for
attacking an elderly man prompted the company to terminate his employment.
The company successfully argued that the employee was dangerous and
continued employment would endanger the safety of his fellow workers.
Similarly, in Central Packing Co.,552 an employee convicted for attacking
his wife and mother-in-law with a knife was subsequently discharged. At
work, the employee had easy access to knives, cleavers, and other instruments.
Even though the employee's numerous arrests and convictions were all
unrelated to work, the board of arbitration upheld discharge for the protection
of other employees.
Even when the off-duty conduct does not involve acts of violence,
discharges have been sustained where a showing has been made that the safety
or health of workers' would be threatened by reinstating the grievant. In
Martin-Marietta Aerospace, Baltimore Division,553 Arbitrator Louis Aronin,
in sustaining a discharge upon the employer's discovery that an employee had
been convicted of selling cocaine to an undercover agent, found that this
conduct had an impact on the employer's product, reputation, employee safety,
plant security, production, and discipline.554 The company established that
the grievant had a history of drug abuse and, at times, was even under the
influence of cocaine while at work.555 The arbitrator, concluding that the
employee was a "pusher," found that the evidence established more than mere
"social use" of drugs by the grievant and determined that the employer could
conclude that the grievant might attempt to sell drugs to other employees.556
549. Id. at 351-52.
550. Id. at 354.
551. Id.
552. 24 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 603 (1955) (Granoff, Arb.).
553. 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 695 (1983) (Aronin. Arb.).
554. Id. at 696.
555. Id. at 696-98.
556. Id. at 698-99; see also New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 76 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 387 (1981) (Simons, Arb.) (discharge of probationary ambulance
corpsman for sale of cocaine); Eastern Air Lines, 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 961 (1981)
1992]
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In general, where co-employee concerns are at issue arbitrators will
uphold discharge if management demonstrates that the safety of other workers
is endangered by reinstatement. A clear showing that co-employees have
refused to work with the grievant will generally be sufficient to sustain a
discharge, although there are exceptions. Evidence that employees will not
work with the grievant if reinstated has also been credited by arbitrators, 57
although the better rule is that just cause should not be determined on a
popularity vote.
B. Application to Public Sector
In the public sector, discharge for off-duty lifestyle infirmities may be
restricted by contractual, statutory,558 or even constitutional mandates.
559
In general, just cause precedents and standards established by private-sector
labor arbitrators have also been applied in the public sector, although in off-
duty cases there appears to be a greater sensitivity to the criteria of the
reputation and mission of the government agency on the part of both
(rurkus, Arb.) (discharge sustained when stewardess while at airport and in uniform
sold marijuana to co-employee); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 891 (1961) (Duff, Arb.) ("Degeneration of the addict could at any time reach
a point where it would seriously endanger the health and safety of fellow employees.").
557. Advocates have routinely conducted opinion polls in support of their clients.
For example, in an unpublished case reported by Arbitrator Benjamin Aaron, discussed
supra at note 477, the grievant submitted the following question to a random sample
of flight attendants: "Would you be willing to work with a male flight attendant who
had solicited for money an undercover police officer for sex and had been arrested,
charged with the offense and paid a $72.00 fine?"
558. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1988) of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 permits
removal of an employee "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service." To dismiss a federal employee for off-duty conduct the government must
make at least two separate determinations: (1) did the employee commit the act(s)
allegedly responsible for his removal; and (2) is there a nexus between the employee's
misconduct and the efficiency of the service. Cooper v. United States, 639 F.2d 727,
729 (Cl. Ct. 1980). The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has, at times,
interpreted § 7513(a) to mean that, where the misconduct is egregious, a nexus is
presumed. Abrams v. Department of the Navy, 714 F.2d 1219, 1221 (3d Cir. 1983)
("employee may rebut this presumption by showing an absence of adverse effect upon
the efficiency of the service, thereby shifting the burden of going forward with
evidence to the agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a nexus
between the off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of the service"); Borsari v. FAA,
699 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983); Masino v. United
States, 589 F.2d 1048 (Cl. Ct. 1978). Note, however, that not all courts have
embraced the MSPB's application of a "presumption of a nexus."
559. See supra notes 342-46 and accompanying text.
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arbitrators and courts. It may accordingly be easier for the public employer
to sustain a dismissal.
As in the private sector, the overriding principle in the public sector is
that discipline for off-duty conduct is appropriate only when such conduct has
a demonstrable adverse effect upon the employer's business or the overall
employment relationship. Illustrative is United States Internal Revenue
Service,5° in which two male employees were suspended for "mooning" a
woman in a parking garage. While discharge was not involved, the reasoning
and analysis articulated by Arbitrator Samuel Edes are consistent with
holdings of arbitrators in private-sector discharge cases.
[The] applicable standard to be applied in judging the conduct of employees
in public service takes into realistic account the fallible nature of the human
condition which results, with substantial frequency, in conduct which is less
than exemplary by commandment of both moral and legal codes. It
recognizes, quite properly, that, however much an employer may be wont
to enforce such codes and condemn their transgression, [the employer] is
entitled to do so only to the degree that there is a direct and demonstrable
relationship between the illicit conduct and the performance of the
employee's job or the job of others.561
Arbitrator Edes further noted that because one employee's off-duty actions
may be subject to disciplinary penalty and another's may not, determination
of the propriety of disciplinary penalty can only be made on a case-by-case
basis.562 Furthermore, an employer's power to discipline is restricted even
where misconduct results in substantial embarrassment to the employer. In
discussing this aspect, he commented that "[i]t is not unworthy of an employer
to hope that all of his employees conduct themselves in a manner which...
is above suspicion... [management] can only exercise his authority in respect
to conduct which affects the work of his employees and, accordingly, the
efficiency of his enterprise."563
The declarations by Arbitrator Edes highlight a principle used by many
arbitrators in regard to off-duty misconduct. Again, arbitrators generally look
for a nexus between the conduct of the employee and the employment setting.
Absent a nexus, the discipline is overturned.
A paradigm case in the public sector is United States Customs Ser-
vice,564 in which Arbitrator Joseph Rocha considered the discharge of a
customs inspector for homosexual behavior. In holding that the agency did not
560. 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 19 (1981) (Edes, Arb.).
561. Id. at 21-22.
562. Id. at 23.
563. Id. at 22.
564. 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1113 (1981) (Rocha, Arb.).
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have just cause to effect the termination, the arbitrator focused on the
grievant's off-duty private conduct and the grievant's on-the-job activities:
If any fact has been firmly established by the evidence, it is that the
grievant separated his homosexual practices from his activities as a Customs
Inspector. He succeeded so well in this respect that no one associated with
his employment knew of his homosexuality until he was discharged. Also
critical is the fact that no traveler ever complained about [grievant] for any
valid reason. Certainly, [grievant's] homosexual behavior did not manifest
itself in any way that resulted in notoriety or public censure which would
reflect unfavorably on Customs .... 56
Customs relied for precedent on a 1970 "sanitized" case arising in
Buffalo in which a Customs Inspector was discharged because he had been
arrested and convicted for engaging in homosexual conduct in a public
toilet.5" That case is easily distinguished from the instant case. In the 1970
case, the homosexual activity occurred in a public place; the arrest and
conviction became a matter of public record. As a consequence, Customs was
identified with notoriety and public censure and was exposed to an erosion of
public confidence. These elements are absent from the present proceeding. 67
This nexus requirement was again applied in Social Security Administra-
tion,568 where an arbitrator was forced to determine if a nexus existed
between an employee's conviction for sexual offenses against a minor, for
which he served a six-month sentence, and his employment with satisfactory
performance as a clerk-typist." 9 The arbitrator was particularly concerned
with possible adverse public reaction, for which the employer offered no
supporting evidence. In overturning the discharge, the arbitrator held that,
absent any demonstrable loss of public confidence in the employer, there
could be no impairment in the efficiency of the agency.57 His reasoning is
cited at length:
Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B) [of the Civil Service Reform Act],
Management has the burden of proof under the preponderance of evidence
test. In this respect, the Agency has a two-fold burden. It must first prove
that a wrongful act has occurred and then that the discharge for the
wrongful act would promote the Agency's efficiency. Since the Grievant's
removal, as stated aforesaid, was based upon two actions, the sexual offense
565. Id. at 1114-15.
566. Id. at 116-17.
567. Id. at 1117 (footnote omitted).
568. 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 725 (1983) (Lubic, Arb.).
569. Id. at 726.
570. Id. at 726-27.
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and impeding the operations of the SSA, they will be discussed separately.
The sexual offense will be considered first.
Although H denied in his testimony that he committed the sexual
offense as charged, a copy of his conviction was entered into the record.
Copies of court records are acceptable evidence and may be received by an
arbitrator as such. Maroon v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 364
F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1966), U.S. v. Verlinsky, 459 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1972).
Thus Management has met its burden in proving the commission of a
wrongful act by the Grievant.
It next must be determined whether, due to the Grievant's wrongful
act, his removal from employment will promote efficiency of the SSA. This
must be accomplished by proving a logical connection (nexus) between
H 's off-duty misconduct and his employment with SSA. As stated in
Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
IT]here must be a clear and direct relationship demonstrat-
ed between the articulated grounds for an adverse personnel
action and either the employee's ability to accomplish his or her
duties satisfactorily or some other legitimate government interest
promoting the efficiency of the service. "
Although, in the case of "certain egregious circumstances a
presumption of nexus may arise from the nature and gravity of
the misconduct." Merritt v. Department ofJustice, MSPB Docket
No. PH075209058 (1981) The Agency specifically states that it
does not intend to rely upon any such presumption. Thus the
SSA must directly prove by a preponderance of evidence the
nexus between the Grievant's off-duty sexual activities and [their
effect] upon the efficiency of the service.
The testimony by various supervisors of H upon which the
Agency relies for this purpose, involved the concern for disabled employ-
ees, as well as student aides, working around the Grievant, the effect of
disclosure and possible contact work with the public and the possibility that
H____ could become a physical threat. All of this is speculative. In order
to engage in public contact work the Grievant would have to be transferred
to a field office which under the circumstances appears highly unlikely. The
fact that H has made sexual advances to minors does not necessarily
imply that he would while on duty attempt to engage in similar activities
with disabled employees or student aides, especially since nothing even
slightly similar to this has occurred over the past eight years. There was
also no evidence that the public was even aware of H 's conviction.
Thus the foregoing evidence is not sufficient to prove the necessary
nexus.
571
571. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 272 (D.C.




Hill and Delacenserie: Hill: Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
MISSOURI LAWREVIEW
Referring further to federal law, the arbitrator concluded:
As reprehensible as H 's misconduct is to this Arbitrator, I must
hold that the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Bonet v. United
States Postal Service, 661 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981) is controlling in this
matter. The employee in that case appealed from a decision of the Merit
Systems Protection Board affirming his discharge from his job with the Post
Office for alleged grossly immoral and indecent off-duty conduct with a
child. As stated therein:
"The Agency cannot satisfy the statutory requirement that
an employee's removal promote the efficiency of the service by
use of unsupported, general assertions that such action is
necessary to maintain the public confidence. To permit otherwise
would be to render nugatory the protections afforded the federal
employee by the imposition of a standard for removal which
requires a connection between employee misconduct (especially
when off-duty and non-work related) and the job. The agency
must demonstrate, therefore, a relationship between this employ-
ee's misconduct and the specter that public confidence will be
undermined." (emphasis added)
Despite our reflective revulsion for the type of off-duty
misconduct in question, whether resulting from a now-cured
mental disability or not, the 1978 (Civil Service Reform) Act
does not permit this court nor an employing agency to character-
ize off-duty conduct as so obnoxious as to show, per se, a nexus
between it and the efficiency of the service. The 1978 Act
prohibits the discharge of a federal employee for conduct that
does not adversely affect the performance of that employee or
his co-employees ......
Although the Agency attempts to differentiate Bonet on the grounds that the
employee in that matter was not actually convicted of a crime as here and
that the employer therein relied solely upon the grossly immoral nature of
the off-duty conduct as establishing a nexus per se, this argument is
specious to say the least. The Bonet decision appears to be on all fours with
the facts in the present matter and just because the criminal indictment
against the employee therein was dismissed due to the unwillingness of the
mother of the child to prosecute, this should not control the reliance
thereon. Other than proof of the commission of the subject sexual act, the
Agency here has failed to prove any relationship between that act and the
undermining of public confidence.
572
572. Id. at 728-29 (footnotes omitted) (citing & quoting Bonet v. United States
Postal Serv., 661 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981) (alteration in original)).
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Similarly, the arbitrator in City of Wilkes-Barre,57 3 refused to allow
discharge of a blue-collar employee who pleaded guilty to possession of
drugs57 4 In so ruling, the arbitrator examined the employee's job perfor-
mance, possible injury to the city's image and reputation, and the existence
of a drug problem among other city employees.57 5 In all three instances, the
arbitrator concluded there was no evidence that indicated any injury to the
employer.7 6
However, in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,s7 discharge was sus-
tained for a state liquor store employee for "conduct unbecoming a State
employee."578 In that case, the employee fatally injured a 71-year-old woman
who asked him to stop beating his wife. 79 News of the incident was widely
reported in the media, which prompted his termination.50 In recognizing that
an employer may take appropriate disciplinary action when off-duty
misconduct affects or is likely to affect the employment relationship, the
arbitrator concluded that the publicity would cause fellow workers to fear the
grievant and make customers hesitant to deal with him."'
Discharge was also justified for a police officer in City of Taylor.58
The officer gave drugs to a female citizen who was also an informant for the
city.s5s The arbitrator determined that the incident would negatively reflect
573. 74 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 33 (1980) (Dunn, Arb).
574. Id. at 34.
575. Id. at 34-36.
576. See also County of Cass, 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 686 (1982) (Gallagher,
Arb.) (discharge of deputy sheriffs after their illegal taking of game fish held improper
absent showing of direct threat to security of employer); Cuyahoga County Welfare
Dep't, 76 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 729 (1981) (Siegel, Arb.) (discharge improper for
county clerical worker who, while away from work on her own time, swore and
threatened assistant supervisor).
577. 65 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 280 (1975) (Stonehouse, Arb.).
578. Id. at 281.
579. Id. at 282.
580. Id. at 282-83.
581. See also Polk County, Iowa, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 639 (1983) (Madden,
Arb.) (suspension proper for correctional facility counselor whose duties included
administering breathalyzer tests after grievant entered guilty plea to charge of operating
vehicle while intoxicated); New York Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., 79 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 65 (1982) (Sabghir, Arb.) (upholding discharge of senior identification
clerk in division of criminal justice services for sale of methadone to undercover police
officer).
582. 65 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 147 (1975) (Keefe, Arb.).
583. Id. at 148.
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upon the police force and would further give rise to the distinct possibility of
adverse publicity against the city and lowered police force morale.
584
In a decision with far-reaching implications for individuals with tax
problems, Arbitrator Peter Feuille, in Lawrenceville Unit School District No.
20 and William McCullogh, an unpublished (November 3, 1987) decision,
sustained the dismissal of a tenured teacher who had been indicted, arrested,
and incarcerated for three misdemeanor counts of income tax evasion. In
sustaining the dismissal, the arbitrator reasoned that the teacher attempted the
functional equivalent of renouncing his citizenship by claiming that the federal
and state government had no authority over him. He also noted that the
teacher was also hospitalized for psychological evaluation and treatment and
that "most of the events were widely publicized in the community." Indeed,
"there was considerable awareness of the Teacher's behaviors among students,
teachers, administrators, Board members, and parents .... Further, the
Teacher offered no persuasive evidence to show that the media reporting of
his conduct was noticeably inaccurate." The emphasis of the arbitrator was
that the teacher could not be an effective role model for students "because he
can no longer credibly teach or demonstrate such virtues as honesty and
patriotism."58
C. Summary
In general, arbitrators are reluctant to sustain discipline or discharge
based on off-duty misconduct (i.e., conduct that occurs off the premises during
non-working time) absent some relationship or "nexus" to the job. Where off-
duty misconduct results in the physical inability of an employee to properly
perform work duties jail, for example), arbitrators examine whether such
conduct violates a specific provision of the agreement. If it does, discipline or
discharge will normally be upheld, especially where the company can also
demonstrate some injury to its operations. When it is argued that an
employee's off-duty misconduct renders the employee unsuitable for
employment, arbitrators in sustaining dismissals have focused on consider-
ations of honesty and the overall character of the grievant as these traits relate
to a specific job. Other considerations being equal, it will be difficult for an
584. Id. at 149-50.
585. See also Las Vegas Bldg. Materials, Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 998
(1984) (Richman, Arb.) (sustaining discharge for employee who, as part of organized
tax protest claimed 14 dependents, had wages garnished by IRS); Shawnee Plastics,
71 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 832 (1978) (Goldstein, Arb.) (sustaining discharge for two
instances of garnishment, holding Consumer Credit Protection Act not applicable). But
see Delta Concrete Prod. Co., 71 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 538 (1978) (Bailey, Arb.)
(ordering reinstatement where garnishments resulted from debts grievant co-signed).
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employer to sustain a discharge based merely upon the fact of a criminal
conviction or that management finds the employee's lifestyle distasteful. In the
"inability" and "unsuitability" cases, however, arbitrators may properly take
into consideration mitigating circumstances such as the employee's prior work
record and whether in similar situations progressive discipline had been
applied.
Is there a synthesis or theory to principles established by arbitrators?
Marvin Hill and Mark Kahn, in an address before the National Academy of
Arbitrators, have summarized most of the criteria arbitrators apply in off-duty
cases as follows:
The characteristics of the employer may be critical. If it is claimed that the
off-duty misconduct had adversely affected or will harm the company's
reputation or sales, or both, this may be of greater concern for firms that
operate in highly competitive, consumer-oriented markets (e.g., airlines,
retail stores, private schools, health clubs, day-care centers) than for
oligopolistic firms with produced-oriented markets.
The location of the employer may be a factor. A prominent employer
in a small isolated town may be legitimately more sensitive to scandal
based on off-duty misconduct than an anonymous employer in a large
metropolitan area.
The nature of the misconduct: Violent, destructive, or perverted
actions may reinforce the nexus more than crimes of the so-called white-
collar variety (e.g. tax evasion). A misdemeanor (e.g., marijuana posses-
sion) is much less likely to be considered just cause for discharge than a
felony (e.g., marijuana sales).
The occupation of the offender. Many decisions [in the off-duty area]
have hinged on a link between the employee's job duties and obligations
and the content of the misconduct. It is not hard to demonstrate a nexus
when a police officer commits a felony off-duty, when a teacher molests a
child off-duty, when a sales clerk is convicted of shoplifting (from someone
else's store), or when a bank teller has embezzled funds from his church's
treasury. The extent and nature of the grievant's customer contacts are
important, especially if they relate to the type of misconduct. Committers
of sex crimes or property thefts will probably not be retained in jobs that
entail entering customers' homes.
Finally, there is the extent and kind of publicity. When the public's
attention has focused on the misconduct and the miscreant has been clearly
identified with the employer, the nexus is reinforced. Often, of course, it
is the publicity that caused the employer to become aware of the off-duty
misconduct.586
586. Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Mark Kahn, Discipline and Discharge for Off-Duty
Misconduct: What are the Arbitral Standards, in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND
EXPANDING ROLES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39Th ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
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Hill and Kahn conclude by noting that, in this context, it is easy to see
why so many of the cases have arisen in connection with government units
that are concerned about their reputation for economic or political reasons, or
both.
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY ANALYSIS: IN SUPPORT OF A
NEXUS REQUIREMENT
What should be the rule when employers attempt to exercise jurisdiction
over an employee because management does not like that employee's
lifestyle? Management has an interest in regulating the private lifestyles of
its employees to the extent, and only to the extent, that a nexus exists between
the employee's job and the off-duty conduct, or alternatively, between the
employer's product or reputation and the conduct at issue. Absent a clear
showing that the private, off-duty, personal activities of the type that would
otherwise be protected by the constitutional guarantee of privacy, speech, or
association have a nexus or relationship to an employee's job performance or
the employer's product or reputation, the decision should be in favor of the
employee. The better rule was stated by Arbitrator Richard Bloch in an
unpublished (February 17, 1981) decision. In reinstating a 13-year flight
attendant who removed a picture from its frame in a motel room while on
layover, Arbitrator Bloch stated the rule this way:
The Company may properly be concerned when the private actions of
employees inevitably involve it in an unflattering light. At the same time,
the Employer is neither the guardian nor the monitor of its employees' off-
duty actions. Basic precepts of privacy require that, unless a demonstrable
link may be established between the off-duty activities and the employment
relationship, the employee's private life, for better or for worse, remains his
or her own.
Saying a nexus exists will not make it so, although as the job in question
becomes more public or customer oriented the employer's burden in sustaining
a discharge is easier than when the job does not involve dealing with the
public. Indeed, in some public services (police, fire, and to a lesser extent,
elementary and secondary education and the postal service) the test and
corresponding burden sometimes has been little more than a mere declaration
that the employee's activity is disgusting to management and any reasonable
citizen. 587  The more unconventional the activity (a sixth-grade teacher
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 121-54, 153-54 (1986).
587. A case illustrating how balances get resolved in favor of management
because of an unconventional lifestyle of an employee is In re Grossman, 316 A.2d
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dressing and undressing a mannequin in his backyard, for example), the easier
it becomes for management to sustain a dismissal, although we believe that
courts and arbitrators should proceed with caution before concluding that
public or private hostility to the individual's conduct alone justifies actions
against the individual.ms Constitutional rights, as well as the right to be free
from an arbitrary or capricious dismissal under a collective bargaining
agreement, should not be determined by polling the public or the immediate
workforce. The views of co-workers and the public may be relevant, but
rarely, if ever, should such considerations be dispositive of dismissal in any
forum.
Public management will and should have a more difficult time regulating
an employee's weight, dress, sexual preferences, and other "addictions" in non
military-type organizations. However, para-military organizations, like police
and fire, may be more free to do as they please when the employee does
something unconventional, but not always. In the private sector, where
constitutional restraints are absent, management is accorded significant
discretion and power to affect employees' lifestyles, although Title VII, the
Rehabilitation and Americans with Disabilities Acts, and state statutes (where
they exist) provide some restraint. To the extent the employer is organized
and the union has negotiated a grievance arbitration provision in a collective
bargaining agreement, arbitrators may provide greater protection to employees
than the courts applying a mere rational basis test. Most arbitrators apply
more than a rational basis test, especially in discharge cases that involve off-
duty conduct issues. They may not announce they are doing this, but a fair
reading of the cases supports this proposition. Whether arbitrators in general
apply what would amount to a strict scrutiny test when fundamental rights are
at issue is open to question. We believe that numerous arbitrators have taken
the high road in favor of employees when lifestyle issues are litigated before
them.
Furthermore, because arbitrators often look to the law for guidance,
58 9
39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), where a 55-year-old music teacher, otherwise
found mentally and physically fit to teach, was nevertheless terminated as "incapacitat-
ed" after undergoing sex-reassignment surgery that changed his external anatomy to
that of a female.
588. Cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that private biases and
the possible injury they may inflict could not be considered in deciding whether a child
should be taken from white mother living with black man); Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d
292, 317 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he unpopularity of the issue surely does not mean that
a voice crying out in the wilderness is entitled to less protection than a voice with a
large, receptive audience.").
589. Frequently, either at the parties' request or even on his own motion, an
arbitrator will fashion an award patterned after external law. See, e.g., City of San
Antonio, 90 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 159 (1987) (Williams, Arb.) (holding that order
1992]
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they may tend to accord more discretion to private sector companies in
regulating lifestyles where constitutional restraints are not operative, but this
practice is questionable and there is no policy basis for the rule. Public and
private-sector management should adopt an objective nexus rule between the
"misconduct" engendered by the employee's lifestyle and job performance.
One court, rejecting the traditional approach of unquestioned deference to
management, and applying a balancing approach to the problem, stated the
better test this way:
impermissibly restricted officer's constitutionally protected off-duty sexual conduct).
Indeed, in the federal sector, remedies must conform to the mandates of law and
agency regulations. Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985) (holding that federal-sector
arbitrators are required to follow the "harmful error" rule contained in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7701(cX2)(A) (1988)).
The obligation and authority of a labor arbitrator to interpret and apply the law
when resolving grievances has been the subject of much discussion and litigation, both
in the legal and arbitral forum.. See generally Archibald Cox, The Place of Law in
Labor Arbitration, in THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION, SELECTED PAPERS
FROM THE FIRST SEVEN ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, 1948-54 (BNA Books 1957); Bernard Meltzer, Ruminations About
Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB, AND THE
COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS (1967); Richard Mittenhall, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (1968);
Mike Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law? in ARBITRATION AND
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NEUTRALS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29 (1970).
Scheinholtz and Miscimarra argue that is it not instructive to ask whether
arbitrators should or shouldn't consider statutory issues. Rather, if arbitration is to be
preserved as a practical, expeditious, and final method of dispute resolution under the
parties' labor agreement, the more helpful query is "whether and under what
circumstances is the consideration of statutory issues appropriate." Leonard L.
Scheinholtz & Philip Miscimarra, The Arbitrator as Judge and Jury: Another Look
at Statutory Law in Arbitration, 40 ARB. J. 55 (June 1985). Noting that it is
impossible to formulate a single answer to the question of whether statutory issues
should be considered by an arbitrator, the authors maintain that four "guiding
principles" should be considered when determining whether an arbitrator should
consider external law: (1) the authority of the arbitrator (whether the parties explicitly
indicate in their labor agreement that an arbitrator cannot consider issues of external
law); (2) arbitral expertise (is the arbitrator competent to resolve the statutory issue?);
(3) arbitration hearing procedures (will the parties' procedure enable a fair resolution
of the issue?); and (4) the finality or "nonredundancy" of the procedure (does an
arbitrator ever perform a service by handing down an award from its inception is
predestined not to be enforced?). Id. Consideration of statutory issues will vary
depending on a balancing of these factors.
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[N]o longer is there the unquestioned deference to the interests of the
employer and the almost invariable dismissal of the contentions of the
employee ... this court [is] no longer willing to decide these questions
without examining the underlying interests involved, both of the employer's
and the employee's as well as the public interest, and to the extent to which
our deference to one or the other serve[s] or disserv[es] the needs of society
as presently understood.59
Hard evidence that an employee's lifestyle-be it heterosexual or
homosexual affairs, sexual practices, dress, weight, religion, or other
addictions-affects job performance should be the rule, not the exception,
before an employee's discharge is effected.
The most difficult cases are those where the employer asserts that the
employee may be mentally and physically capable of performing his job with
the same degree of competency as before the "infirmity" came to light, but
that the actions of the employee have harmed the employer's reputation and,
if allowed to continue with the company, will significantly affect the
company's business or even subject the employer to civil liability. How does
management demonstrate that its reputation has been harmed, or is in danger
of being harmed if the employee is allowed to continue working? How can
the City of Detroit, for example, ever demonstrate that its reputation has been
damaged by an employee's lifestyle if the determining criterion is loss of
business revenue? The same question can be asked of any provider of
services in an oligopolistic market. At a minimum, management should be
allowed to submit evidence that the conduct was the subject of notoriety in the
media or, alternatively, that the conduct was so outrageous (sexual relations
with a retarded child, for example)59' that no employer operating in its
relevant labor market could argue that it is concerned with its reputation if it
permitted the employee to continue working. Under this test, an off-duty drug
offense may be found to have no effect on the company's reputation if the
offense received little media coverage and the individual does nothing but
takes care of the grounds. A different result may be reached if the drug
offense is reported in the media and the employee services customer accounts
or repairs commercial airplanes.
An individual who engages in a lifestyle privately, unobtrusively, and
without publicity should not be subject to dismissal simply because of his
lifestyle. The decision makers within the system-employers, courts,
agencies, and arbitrators-should presume that there are areas of an employ-
ee's private life that are beyond the scope of management's inquiry and
590. Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRouche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1260-61 (N.J. 1985).
591. Gulf Oil Co., Port Arthur Refinery, 85-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) para.
8234 (1984) (Stephcns, Arb.) (sustaining discharge for having sex with retarded 12-
year-old girl).
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regulation. The problem in the lifestyle area is that consensus as to what
constitutes appropriate employer concern diminishes when one moves from the
abstract to the specific. At one end of the spectrum we have a hard time
believing that the Georgia Attorney General really has a legitimate interest in
the sleeping partners of the lawyers in his office592 or that the Mad River
School Board should be concerned that a high school guidance counselor, who
never proselytized bisexuality, announces to her officious secretary one
morning while in "a good mood" that "she was in love with a woman."593
At the other end, a different result can be supported when the Assemblies of
God, a sectarian employer, discovers that its popular evangelist is again
having sexual relations with prostitutes (not an uncommon occurrence these
days for television ministers),594 or when a local school board learns that a
secondary teacher is regularly having sex with her students in the faculty
lounge,495 or when middle-school teachers in North Kingstown, Rhode
Island, start marrying their students.59
592. Lesbian Lawyer Who Wed Mate Is Denied a State Job by Georgia, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1991, at A18.
593. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1016 n.11 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari.).
594. Woman Says Swaggert Asked Her For Sex, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct., 13, 1991, at
A17; cf Judge Cuts Baker's Prison Term, Making Parole Possible in 4 Years, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1991, at A10.
Any priest or chaplain will have a difficult time convincing a court that it should
intervene in an employer's decision to terminate his services. See O'Connor Hosp. v.
Superior Court, 240 Cal. Rptr. 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (opinion withdrawn); Miller
v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls, 728 P.2d 794 (Mont. 1986).
595. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. vs. Shuey, No. 81-102-6 (November 5,1981)
(Dunham, Arb.) (unpublished) (upholding the dismissal of a tenured teacher for having
sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old student "over five and under thirty times").
596. Michelle Green, Outraging the Town He Taught in, a Rhode Island Teacher
Marries His Former Sixth-Grade Student, PEOPLE, October 3, 1988, at 23.
After being dismissed from the teaching position at Wickford Middle School for
marrying Kimberly Ryan, 17 (a little more than six years after they met at school when
Ryan was 11), Frederick Hone, then 46, served a three-month sentence for violating
a court order that he stay away from Ms. Ryan. Hone is reported to have commented,
"Since when do I need the permission of the Superintendent or the school committee
before I marry?" Id. Responding to the allegation that he violated the trust placed in
him as a teacher, Hone stated "I didn't violate any ethics. What do they think? That
I'm going to marry all of their daughters or something?" Id.
The Hones are now in divorce proceedings with Mr. Hone facing felony charges
of threatening the judge who jailed him. Teacher Who Married Pupil Now Regrets It,
UPI Tuesday, November 14, 1989.
[Vol. 57 '
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Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum are the hard cases that are said
to make bad law.' 9 There may be something to the argument that manage-
ment does have an interest in the health of its employees who elect to smoke
or maintain morbid obesity, especially if they are covered under an employer-
paid insurance policy. While a common law court is likely to side with
management on both issues, based on the response of arbitrators in grievances
involving unilaterally imposed smoking regulations on the job5 98 and their
rulings in weight cases,599 we believe that arbitrators would rule the other
way. There may likewise be validity to the argument that a public-sector
employer has an interest in whether its police and fire fighters are following
the "straight and narrow" and not associating with organized crime figures or
drug dealers, or if its elementary teachers appear in Screw Magazine. In both
cases management is likely to prevail when interests are subjected to a
balancing test, although decisions the other way are likely.
More difficult are the cases where management concerns itself with the
off-duty criminal activities of its employees (drug offenses, shoplifting, and
domestic violence or sex offenses). Once an employee places management on
notice of instances of physical violence, should a company be compelled by
a court or arbitrator to take a chance on that employee knowing that repeat
behavior may result in tort liability for negligent retention? What crimes, by
their very nature, imply an impairment in the employee's judgment, stability,
reliability, or social capabilities in performing his job, notwithstanding
mitigating factors? Child abuse? Armed robbery? Marijuana use? Marijuana
dealing (at the wholesale level)? Must management resort to expert testimony
to demonstrate to a trier of fact that an employee's off-duty conduct will affect
its customers, or can triers take judicial-type notice that some misconduct, by
597. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (Holmes, J.)
("hard cases make bad law .... ).
598. See, e.g., Johns Manville Sales Corp. v. IAM Local 1609,621 F.2d 756 (5th
Cir. 1980); Union Sanitary Dist., 79 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193 (1982) (Koven, Arb.)
(holding that total ban against smoking unreasonable); Nicolet Indus., 79-2 Lab. Arb.
Awards (CCH) 8398 (1978) (Rock, Arb.) (holding that smoke-free rule would result
in termination of long-term addicted employees); Schien Body & Equip. Co., 69 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 930 (1977) (Roberts, Arb.) (holding that health could not be
improved if employees could smoke on breaks and at lunch and if non-smokers still
exposed to smokers).
599. Man Roland Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 175, 180 (1991) (Speroff, Arb.)
(reversing transfer of obese employee where "[c]ompany did not prove a direct or
significant correlation existed between the grievant's corpulence and the number and/or
types of sustained injuries he experienced."); American Airlines, Inc. & Assoc. of
Professional Flight Attendants, No. SS-345-89 (1990) (Sinicropi, Arb.) (unpublished);
United Airlines, Inc. & Assoc. of Professional Flight Attendants, No. 64-08-1-130-90
(1990) (Sinicropi, Arb.) (unpublished).
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its very nature, impacts the organization? Is it possible that some crimes will
make an employee better suited to perform his job, such as a high-school
guidance counselor who is convicted of off-duty vehicular homicide while
alcohol impaired? In the words of one court, "the teacher who committed
an indiscretion, paid the penalty, and now seeks to discourage his students
from committing similar acts may well be a more effective supporter of legal
and moral standards than the one who has never been found to violate those
standards." 6
01
Cases involving speech are particularly troublesome (except to academic
communities) such as when a private university, attempting to diversify its
student body, disciplines a professor for writing and expressing views outside
of any classroom that "on average, blacks are significantly less intelligent than
whites. " A local school board, with a large minority student body, may
likewise become apprehensive when its faculty, even though unidentified,
starts wearing white robes with peaked hoods while attending political rallies
in Louisiana. 3 Should management be compelled to take a wait and see
posture to determine if religious and racial hatred and intolerance (un-
deniability the message of the Klan) will spill over to the classroom? Must
management wait for actual complaints by its student body or declining
enrollments or headlines in the Chicago Tribune before any discipline can be
imposed? Are the rules different in New Orleans, Louisiana than in Nowhere,
Iowa? There are, of course, always more questions than answers in the
lifestyle and privacy area (its a maze),6w especially when management's
600. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 414 (1989)
(Hill, Arb.) (sustaining discharge of guidance counselor/coach for off-duty vehicular
homicide conviction while testing positive for cocaine and alcohol).
601. Board of Educ. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. of Los Angeles City. v.
Jack M., 566 P.2d 602, 606 n.4 (Cal. 1977) (citations omitted) (holding 16-year
teacher, arrested for homosexual solicitation, not per se unfit to teach).
602. White Professor Wins Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, at A20.
603. Klan Challenges Law Against Hoods, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 1990 at 12.
604. Cf. It's a maze, this garden, it's a maze of ways
Any man can spend his day
It's a maze, this garden, it's a maze of paths
But a soul can find the way.
Miss a step, trip and fall
Miss the path, meet the wall
Miss the way, miss a turn
Gettin' lost's how you learn.
It's a maze, this garden, it's a maze of paths
Meant to lead a man astray
[Vol. 57
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regulations impact what, in the public sector, otherwise would be First
Amendment rights. The solution, as suggested by Arthur Ross,' 5 is not
found by comparing the intrinsic culpability of different employees or even
the nature of the offense, although both present a good starting point for an
analysis of the problem by employers, courts, and arbitrators. Whatever the
perspective of the decision-maker, the better rule remains: Absent an
objective evidentiary nexus between the off-duty conduct and on-the-job
performance, any inquiry or regulation impacting lifestyles should be
prohibited.
Take a left, and then, turning left again's
How a soul can find the way.
Lucy SIMON & MARSHA NORMAN, It's a Maze in THE SECRET GARDEN (Columbia
Records 1991).
605. See A. Ross, Discussion, The Criminal law and Industrial Discipline Labor
Arbitration-Perspectives and Problems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ANNUAL
MEET NG, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS (1964).
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